Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

42. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, November 20, 1979

CONTINGENCY PAPER

SUBJECT

• Trials of Hostages

I. Introduction

Khomeini apparently has now committed himself to trying the hostages for espionage. He has said nothing about the modalities or how many would be tried, nor has there been any official comment on the possibility raised by the German Embassy that prisoners would be moved to Ebin Prison. (The Germans believe the latter would be a constructive move since it would place the hostages outside of student control.)

The trials could take a number of alternative courses:

—Quick, in camera trials with some or all of the hostages found guilty and all expelled unharmed. If trials are inevitable, as now seems likely, this is the most favorable outcome.

—Some hostages are found innocent, but others are found guilty and sentenced to prison terms. This could include a public show trial in which hostages “confess” and “documentary” evidence of espionage is produced.

—As above, but with some hostages sentenced and quickly executed.

—Trials could be held at the compound by students, or by revolutionary courts, or by both.

General Strategy

—While we want to generate universal condemnation of the trials by governments, organizations and jurists in an effort to prevent them, we will also want, in recognition of the probability that trials will be held, to work through some special channels for the least damaging outcome.

—Our primary objective, once trials seem imminent, should be to influence the Iranians to adopt the most moderate approach in conducting the trials, i.e., rapid, in camera proceedings leading to quick and safe expulsion of all hostages.

—We should avoid any steps which would lend any legitimacy to the trials, such as urging the presence of international observers.

—Policy options below should be considered against the following criteria: (1) will they have an impact on the Iranian position on trials or (2) will they further inflame opinion in Iran without producing the desired outcome? And will they help the President maintain the initiative with domestic opinion, but without inflaming U.S. public anger?

—We need also to consider the psychology of Khomeini and his entourage. Open threats and punitive signs may influence the Revolutionary Council toward moderation, but may inflame Khomeini and arouse his own sense of martyrdom. Threats quietly delivered can also influence the Council, and may speak to Khomeini’s respect for “strength.”

—A crucial question is whether a series of “tit for tat” actions, or a more dramatic step, is more likely to be effective in moving Khomeini.

—In any case, we should keep the negotiating track open through Waldheim and the PLO, with elements already introduced, i.e., once the hostages are released, willingness to accept a Security Council debate on the Iranian complaint, leading to some sort of inquiry of human rights under the Shah; placing no obstacles in the way of Iranian efforts to obtain the Shah’s assets through our court system; and agreeing to conduct relations in accordance with UN principles.

Section II, which follows, provides a chart illustrating the options available to both the Iranians and the United States, at various levels of escalation. It is broken down into those actions each side can take itself and those requiring action by others.

Section III discusses diplomatic steps.

Section IV outlines the advantages and disadvantages of action options available to us. The options are divided into diplomatic, economic, and political. (Military and intelligence options are addressed elsewhere.) Within these three categories, the options are listed in order of increasing severity.

[SECTION II] ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF ACTIONS

Level of Confrontation	Iranian Actions Against U.S.	U.S. Actions Against Iran	Multilateral Acts vs. Iran	International Acts vs. U.S.
Present	Took Hostages; partial release Threaten Trials Closed Consulates	Embargo oil imports Freeze Assets Hint military response Kitty Hawk INS and students	UNSC Statement EC–9 Declaration Démarches in Tehran by others Continued efforts to mobilize world opinion and supportive statements	Seek UNSC debate Seek OPEC non use of dollar Seek condemnation of Shah (no success to date)
Escalation	Announce Trials Stop using dollars for oil Reduce oil production 700,000 bpd Withdraw diplomatic personnel Hostages moved to prison Break diplomatic relations Embargo all U.S. products	Restrict and/or declare PNG Iran diplomats Revoke/Revalidate Iranian visas Embargo imports from Iran High-level Emissary consult Saudis, Shaikhdoms, Iraq(?) Further reinforce military forces, Indian Ocean Initiate destabilization efforts Break diplomatic relations	Press foreign governments to reduce presence in Iran UNGA condemn Ostracize Iran diplomats Intensify appeals	Continue to seek support—probably with little success
Serious Escalation	Students hold trials Islamic Court begins trials Reduce oil exports to 2 mbd Burn/Destroy Embassy or U.S. property Expel all Americans Some hostage(s) found innocent, others await trial	Overflights Step up destabilization efforts Deny visas to all Iranians except special cases Move carrier close to or in P.G. Expel Iranian students/others Total Embargo on exports to Iran	Seek economic measures by U.S. allies Seek UN sanctions Shah to Mexico or Egypt Ask many nations break diplomatic relations Convince IFIs/UN reduce operations in Iran
Severe Escalation	Hostage(s) found guilty American(s) hurt or executed Declares war on U.S. Attack U.S. ship/acft	Selective military option(s)	Emergency UNSC

[Omitted here are Sections III and IV of the Contingency Paper.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 30, Iran 11/17/79–11/20/79. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads, “Revised.” For the background to this paper, see Document 41. The paper was briefly discussed at the November 21 SCC meeting, and it was agreed that “it would be useful for the President to see it after key members of the SCC had had the opportunity to comment.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic Files, Box 13) An unknown hand wrote on Brzezinski’s November 21 Iran activities log: “Odom to Camp David with operational plans.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran 2/80) In his memoir, Brzezinski wrote that he had sent Odom to Camp David “with a sealed envelope containing a chart outlining additional military options developed by Defense and summarizing for the President their scale and likely impact.” (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 483)