Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

312. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Egypt (Eilts) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 21, 1979

This supplements my series of reports from the field (attached).

INTRODUCTION

At your request, I visited Cairo, Jidda and again Cairo during the period November 13–November 20. While in Cairo, I met twice with President Sadat and also with Vice President Mubarak, Prime Minister Khalil and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Ghali. In Jidda, I met first with Islamic Conference Secretary-General Chatti and, subsequently, had a four-hour conversation with Prince Fahd. In both capitals, I briefed the ambassadors on my mission and the results of my talks.

Both Sadat and Fahd asked that I pass on to you their warm regards and best wishes.

You had asked that I take up with Sadat and Fahd (a) the Iranian hostage situation, (b) the need for a thaw in Egyptian/Saudi relations in the interest of progress on the Middle East peace process, and (c) any other matters that they might wish to raise. With Chatti, you asked that I take up the Iranian hostage problem. This report is divided into three sections: (a) Iranian hostage problem, (b) Egyptian/Saudi relations, and (c) other matters.

[Omitted here are the portions of Eilts’s report relating to the Iranian hostage situation.]

EGYPTIAN/SAUDI RELATIONS

First Talk With Sadat (November 14)

During my first meeting, I told Sadat that you had asked me to visit Cairo and Jidda in order to transmit to the Saudis Sadat’s letter to Fahd.² You had been very appreciative of Sadat’s quick and positive response. I planned to leave for Jidda the following day in order to meet with Fahd and wondered if Sadat had any additional thoughts that he might wish me to convey.

Sadat asked if I had read his letter to Fahd, and I said that you had shown it to me. Sadat then asked what I thought of the letter. I said that it was certainly a constructive initiative on his part and that I knew that the views expressed were a true reflection of his pertinent thinking. At the same time, my estimate was that Fahd would react negatively, especially to the long recital of Egyptian complaints of Saudi actions. (In saying this, I made it clear that I was speaking for myself and not suggesting any criticism on your part of the letter.)

Sadat was slightly taken aback, and asked what I thought should be said to Fahd. I told him that I would carry whatever he wished, but that in my view the recital of past complaints should be dropped. Sadat responded that he wanted to “shock” Fahd. I said that I realized this, but I could only tell him, as a friend and as someone who knows Fahd well, that the effect would be counterproductive. Sadat then said that the circumstances had changed since sending you his original letter. He had thought that you would first send the letter to Fahd and that this would be followed by the visit of a special representative. Since these two actions were now taking place simultaneously, it seemed reasonable to change the letter. What would I suggest?

I told him that I would suggest something to the effect that he, Sadat, understands the Saudi position and respects it, that he hopes the Saudis also understand the Egyptian position, that the moratorium on public attacks ought to be reestablished and that some kind of direct dialogue be reestablished between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. I said it was important to show that Sadat did not wish to embarass Fahd or the Saudis and that any communication between Sadat and Fahd would not be published.

In this connection, the last several pages of his original letter were just the kind of constructive language that is needed.

Sadat thereupon gave Mubarak general instructions on rewriting the letter along the lines that I had suggested, but said he also wanted included a series of questions about the area situation which should be of concern to both countries. Wagging his finger under my nose, he did turn down my suggestion that he say he respects the Saudi views. He did not respect the Saudi view, but I did not have to tell them that. I told him I had no intention of doing so.

Sadat asked me to pass on two additional oral points to Fahd.

(a) Despite the differences between the two countries, he is prepared in the event of a security threat to Saudi Arabia to help in any way possible, and

(b) With respect to the Saudi interest in amending UN Resolution 242, Camp David had already enabled this situation to be “jumped over.” The current West Bank/Gaza negotiations aim at obtaining “full autonomy” for the Palestinians and a satisfactory resolution of the Jerusalem problem.

The revised letter was in fact prepared by Osama Al-Baz and given to me late that night. The original English translation prepared by Al-Baz is attached to this report. The Arabic version was in a sealed envelope and I could not therefore check it, but I have no reason to question that it corresponds to the English translation.

Talk With Fahd (November 17/18)

The greater part of my four-hour meeting with Fahd focused on Egyptian/Saudi relations. Fahd remains leery of any direct or indirect contact with the Egyptians, is deeply suspicious of Sadat, thinks Sadat has deliberately betrayed the Arab cause at Camp David and that nothing will come out of the West Bank/Gaza autonomy talks. He is also convinced that, despite Egyptian promises, they will leak any messages between the two countries.

I first told him that you are concerned that a continuation of the Saudi/Egyptian contretemps makes it more difficult for you politically to move ahead in a meaningful fashion in the Middle East peace effort. It is unhelpful to have the two Arab countries with which we have the closest relations be so publicly at odds with each other. I recalled your messages to Fahd and Sadat and said Sadat had sent you a letter in reply, enclosing a letter to Fahd and asking that you arrange to deliver the letter. You had asked me to undertake this mission. I then gave him the letter and suggested it would be useful if he read it so that we could use it as a starting point for our discussion. He did so, sometimes nodding in slight approval, but otherwise making no substantive comment.

He then gave me an hour and a half litany of his complaints against Sadat very much along the lines of what he had said to me in Rome last May,³ but updating it to include more recent Sadat attacks. The thrust of his complaints was that Sadat had lied to him, that Sadat’s earlier protestations of wanting to go to Geneva⁴ had been a sham as evidenced by the sudden Jerusalem trip, that Sadat was not authorized by anyone to speak for the Palestinians and that, judging from what he could tell from Israeli settlement policies, nothing meaningful would come from the current negotiations. He went to great lengths to defend his actions at Baghdad⁵ and insisted Saudi policy is not dictated by any sense of fear of Palestine or anyone else.

When I finally had a chance to say something more, I tried to set him straight on the history of the efforts to get to Geneva, stressing that the Syrians had pulled the rug out from that effort. I told him Sadat is determined to get a Palestinian self-governing authority with wide powers and responsibilities and a satisfactory solution of the Jerusalem problem. Fahd might disagree with Sadat’s tactics, but I could assure him that their objectives are very similar.

Fahd thought that only a statement from you to the effect that there must be an Israeli withdrawal to the June 1967 borders with minor rectifications and that Jerusalem must be returned to the Arabs would help. If Sadat succeeds in his negotiations in achieving these two objectives, he, Fahd, would be the first to applaud and to urge the other Arab states to support the peace effort. But he doubted that this would happen. I told him that you are determined to do your utmost to move the peace process forward, that we should all by now recognize that public statements do little to achieve this objective. I urged that he have confidence in your purposes and support them. Fahd said he has full confidence in you, but as for Sadat—that was something else.

We then went to the question of a possible dialogue. He turned down Sadat’s suggestion of a meeting with Mubarak in Washington—either bilateral or with an American present—or even of having someone else do so. What is first needed, he said, is a “period of tranquility,” i.e., a cessation of mutual public attacks. He said that he was happy that Sadat agrees with this, but charged that Sadat is the guilty party. I said I was not seeking to blame anyone, but noted there had also been unhelpful Saudi press articles. Fahd said that he had given instructions to the Minister of Information to muzzle the press and not allow attacks on the Egyptians.

Since you had authorized me to try out what I thought might be useful, I then suggested the establishment of a hot line between the two. Fahd didn’t like that, and noted that they already have a secure channel between them. I said that I assumed he was referring to the intelligence channel, but noted that Mubarak had told me a message sent four months ago had not yet been answered by the Saudis. Fahd simply shrugged his shoulders. (It may be that Fahd’s growing doubts about Turkibin Faisal make him uninterested in the intelligence channel.)

I told Fahd that the mischievous efforts of ill-wishers on both sides, who were seeking to spread disinformation, could only be curbed if some kind of a channel between Egypt and Saudi Arabia exists and is used. This would permit charges and rumors to be checked out before they escalate to a point where they result in public attacks. I mentioned, as an example, the article in the Egyptian opposition newspaper, Al-Sha’ab, that the Saudis are financing the Kennedy campaign, an article which had prompted Fahd to issue a public denial. This kind of thing could be checked out before it becomes a public issue. Fahd agreed in principle, but made it very clear that he does not trust the Egyptians. They will at some point leak news of any such direct dialogue, however secret it may be.

After we had gone round and round on this for a time and he would not budge, I suggested that perhaps this kind of checking out of malicious gossip could be done through our embassies. He seemed agreeable. Again, however, he spoke of a “period of tranquility” of several months after which the matter of an indirect dialogue could again be considered. (I am convinced that he will do nothing on reestablishing a dialogue with Egypt, direct or indirect, until after the exchange of Egyptian/Israeli ambassadors in later February and after the inevitable ensuring flap has abated. He is scared and considers himself vulnerable in the eyes of the other Arabs.)

Fahd said he will reply to your letter after he gets back from Tunis and, with a little pressing, he also agreed to reply to Sadat’s letter. I urged him to make his replies as constructive as possible and not to give a long recital of past complaints. He gave me no commitments, but said he would consider carefully what I had asked him to do. We shall see.

Second Talk with Sadat (November 18)

I briefed Sadat in Ismailia about the results of my talks with Fahd. I frankly put the best face possible on them, but made it clear that Fahd is not yet ready to resume any kind of dialogue. I also made it clear that Fahd believes the Egyptians will leak any such dialogue.

Sadat took it very philosophically. He said that he had not expected anything more to come from the talk with Fahd, but was glad that Fahd had agreed to the need to reestablish a moratorium on public attacks. He assured me that he will honor it. He also agreed that our embassies be used to try to prevent any misunderstandings from escalating to a point where they become public attacks. (Sadat will have to be carefully watched on this, since he tends to get carried away when he is making a speech.)

Fahd, Sadat said, is afraid. He feels himself vulnerable before the other Arabs. Fahd will do nothing, Sadat opined, until after the exchange of ambassadors and the resultant flurry. Even then, Sadat thought, Fahd will be very leery. This should not trouble us, Sadat added, since there is nothing that Fahd or the Saudis can do to impede the peace process.

Sadat said that it is important that the United States retain the closest possible relations with Fahd and the Saudis in order to prevent them, as he put it, from collaborating with the Iraqis or Libyans in actions against our allies. He mentioned the Japanese and Europeans, but did not spell this out. If we retain such close relations with the Saudis, Sadat said, this will suffice for him. We can all look at the situation again early next year.

OTHER MATTERS

Middle East Peace Process

Sadat felt pleased with the way things are going. He was on cloud nine about the return of St. Catherine⁶ and his visit there. He said that during his last meeting with Begin, he had told the latter not to fight the Jerusalem issue or self-determination. To his surprise, contrary to Begin’s earlier “hysterical” reaction to any such suggestion, Begin had this time simply said, “The time is not right.” When Sadat had spoken of Begin’s brave deed in giving up the Sinai settlements, Begin had commented, “I will take those settlements to my grave.” Sadat remained optimistic about how things are working out. He had asked Ezer Weizman to repeat his ideas to Begin, but acknowledged that Begin may still be reluctant.

Sadat spoke of the desirability of getting the autonomy and Jerusalem questions resolved by the end of January. (His objective is clearly to find a way to make an exchange of ambassadors the following month a little more palatable to the Arab world.) He said that he is pressing the Israelis, but thought that perhaps the time had come for the United States to apply a bit of pressure on Begin on this matter.

Since it was not my mission to discuss the peace process and Bob Strauss was scheduled to be there the following day, we let it go at that.

Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Sadat asked me to tell you that he is sending an ambassador to Moscow. It will be Samih Anwar, the present Egyptian ambassador in London. (Anwar, who is a former minister of state and was once a counselor of the embassy in Moscow, is a very responsible and able man. I have known him for many years and he has always been helpful and cooperative.) Sadat said he is doing so in an effort to see if he can improve relations with the Soviets. He recalled there has always been a Soviet ambassador in Cairo. This action on his part, he wished you to know, will in no way change the Middle East peace process in which you and he are engaged.

CONCLUSIONS

(a) Sadat remains strong, self-confident and optimistic. In contrast, his Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs are less so. Boutros Ghali is speaking of the need for a “mini-crisis” around the end of January because the autonomy negotiations will not have gotten very far. This would be useful, in his view, as a smoke screen for the exchange of ambassadors. Although Sadat does not seem worried about the ambassadorial exchange, Khalil and Boutros Ghali are very worried about it, especially in the absence of progress on autonomy. Sadat did say the Egyptian ambassador will not go to Jerusalem, only to Tel Aviv.

(b) Fahd wants to be helpful, but is not anxious to be counted in at this stage of the game. I do not think he should be pressed too hard, though he should be continued to be reminded of the facts of the Middle East peace effort and who prevented going to Geneva. After yesterday’s Mecca incident,⁷ he will be even more cautious about sticking his neck out.

(c) Our embassies in Cairo and Jidda should monitor closely so that the moratorium on public attacks (including press) is honored.

(d) A follow-up should take place in a few months.⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 54, Middle East: Eilts Report, 11/79. Top Secret; Eyes Only for the President. In the upper right-hand corner of the document, Carter wrote: “Good report—Also had long talk w/ Eilts by telephone (secure). J.” The memorandum was found attached to a one-page summary of the report to which was attached a November 21 hand-written note by Brzezinski to Carter, proposing that the report be forwarded to Vance. The portions of the memorandum pertaining to the Iran hostage crisis are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979-September 1980.
2. Not found.
3. See footnote 4, Document 253.
4. On the Geneva Conference, see footnote 5, Document 24.
5. See footnote 7, Document 91.
6. As a good-will gesture to Sadat, Begin agreed on November 15 to return Mt. Sinai, including St. Catherine, to Egyptian sovereignty, two months ahead of schedule as required under the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. (Christopher Wren, “Israel Relinquishes Mt. Sinai Region to Egypt Ahead of Schedule,” The New York Times, November 16, 1979, p. A3)
7. On November 20, hundreds of Islamic militants seized the Grand Mosque at Mecca during the annual hajj pilgrimage. The attack was led by a former member of the Saudi National Guard who called for a revolt against the Saudi monarchy, accusing it of betraying Islamic principles by becoming close to Western countries. (Philip Taubman, “Mecca Mosque Seized by Gunmen believed to be Militants from Iran,” The New York Times, November 21, 1979, p. A1)
8. See Document 323. Below this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Eilts will be going back to S.A. & Egypt late in Dec. He will give me prior notice, & I’m sure we will use him in some way. J.”