37. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Looking Ahead
The Constitution as Prime Mover
The events in Iran since mid-summer can be related directly to the power struggle underlying the formulation and adoption of a new constitution. In June and July, Khomeini acceded to a western-style constitution based on the 1906 document. However, in late July and August he moved with great determination to insure that his own version of the constitution would be adopted. First, he packed the [Page 84] Council of Experts with his own radical Islamic followers, headed by Beheshti, and directed them to rewrite the original draft according to his own vision of an Islamic Republic. To support this effort, he used the crisis with the Kurds to proclaim himself commander in chief of the armed forces, to shut down press opposition and criticism, and to ban independent political organization.
This initial coup successfully rallied the people around his own leadership and threw the incipient opposition off balance. The show of force was sufficient to convince Iranians inside and outside the country that it was futile to oppose Khomeini, and it solidified fickle Iranian political opinion behind him as the apparent winner. The Council of Experts proceeded to redraft the constitution systematically, placing the clergy at the center of power and creating a special role for Khomeini personally as a sort of President for Life. Once this was well underway, Khomeini’s interest in the Kurdish conflict waned. Recently he has shown willingness to negotiate an accommodation providing for considerable cultural autonomy.
Bazargan and his cohorts in the “government” opposed the super-Islamic constitution, and they began to press more and more openly for a more democratic model. Shortly before Bazargan, Yazdi and Chamran left for Algiers,2 they presented a petition to Khomeini asking that the Council of Experts be disbanded on the grounds that they had exceeded their mandate. Khomeini refused. This may have been the final straw. In addition, Khomeini was probably aware that the Bazargan faction had begun [less than 1 line not declassified] establishing the potential for eventual opposition to his personal rule.
The arrival of the Shah in New York and the absence of Bazargan et al. in Algiers provided the opportunity for the second coup. The focus of propaganda attacks shifted from the Kurds to the United States, and Bazargan suddenly came under attack for his meeting with you. The attack on the embassy was carefully organized. Not only did the attackers come prepared with detailed information and equipment (gas masks and acetylene torches), but the coincidence of the attack with a massive (diversionary) demonstration at Tehran University and the absence of all responsible government officials insured that police protection would be unavailable during the critical first hours.
The incident provided the opportunity to remove the Bazargan government and replace it with the Revolutionary Council. It also solidified support from the students who were an unpredictable element in the anticipated debate on the constitution. Thus, Khomeini further consolidated his personal control of effective power and elimi[Page 85]nated those elements most likely to be troublesome in achieving his own vision of an Islamic Republic.
Khomeini’s Position
Khomeini now has a tiger by the tail, but he is playing for high stakes and is willing to risk all. By placing himself at the visible center of authority, he becomes directly responsible for government actions. Since he and his people are largely incapable of administering the country, this will work against him in time. However, by seizing the initiative in a bold way, he assures that all factions remain cautious. Groups may get together and complain, but as long as he is unyielding and winning, they will probably do little but talk. The stakes have been increased, however, since Khomeini cannot allow himself to be perceived to be out maneuvered or defeated in this latest test of wills.
I suspect that his confidence at present is based on several assumptions:
—The United States will take no direct action for fear of losing the hostages.
—He can wait longer than we can, and eventually he will be able to drive a bargain that makes him appear the winner.
—If the U.S. should strike, the U.S. moral position will be undermined and his own position strengthened. He does not mind losing even large numbers of lives.
—He is the glue holding the country together, and especially in a time of great threat, Iranians will stick behind him as the only alternative to total chaos and dismemberment of the country.
—Although he cannot ride this wave forever, it should be enough to get him through the announcement of the constitution and the referendum now scheduled for December 2. In the meantime, he will attempt to shift the burden of proof to the United States by conducting spy trials.
—Celebration of Ashura on November 28–29 assures that religious frenzy and emotional commitment will increase, rather than decrease, in the short run.
Nevertheless, Khomeini is not in full control. His control over the students is less than complete. Unrest is growing in the military and probably in other areas of society. He is losing in Kurdistan. Azerbaijan is on the verge of revolt and would require only the smallest signal from Shariat-Madari to move against him. The oil fields are increasingly anarchic. Iraq is sending threatening military signals. The Bazargan group is looking for an opportunity to reestablish itself. And the average Iranian is probably far more apprehensive about a direct clash with the U.S. than Khomeini himself.
[Page 86]U.S. Options: Strategy I
Khomeini is playing for time. He must get the constitution ratified by referendum. After that, the usefulness of this ploy will no longer be great and he may be willing to resolve the problem or try to make it go away—as he did with the Kurds after a month or two.
In the meantime, we should work for limited objectives:
—Get additional hostages released on the grounds that they are not spies. Khomeini may find an occasional release is a means of keeping the international community off his back, while he determines the pace of events. The PLO and UN channel could work on this.
—Get the hostages transferred from the students to the Revolutionary Guards. This might appeal to Khomeini since it would give him better control over the day-to-day situation. At the same time, it would increase the pressures within the Revolutionary Council and elsewhere favoring release since it would require only a government decision rather than a prolonged negotiation with the students. We could start working on this objective now, even though it may not be doable until after the referendum or some other later time.
In support of this strategy, we should continue the international barrage, while pressing hard for regular contact with the hostages.
Strategy II
Khomeini is ultimately susceptible to domestic pressures. If there is substantial evidence that this approach is working against him and seriously eroding his power base, he will be inclined to find a way to shift his approach. We can help speed up that realization:
—[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]
—[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]
—[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]
Strategy III
We must recognize that neither of the above courses may succeed. It may be preferable to seize the initiative by a rescue effort. I cannot second guess the expert thinking on this, but I would offer the following:
—[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]
—November 29–30 is the obvious date.
Although preparations for such an effort are compatible with Strategy I, Strategy II should be avoided to prevent growing suspicions of an active U.S. intervention. Also, it would be useful to send some lulling signals via covert channels (particularly the PLO) to the effect that we might consider releasing the Shah in certain circumstances. This would engage them in internal debate and reinforce their belief that we were thinking of no direct action.
[Page 87]Comment
I do not believe the hostages are in imminent danger of their lives. A U.S. escalation therefore carries the danger of casualties which could have been avoided by a more cautious approach. Strategy I could possibly succeed in getting back many, even most, of the hostages over time. However, some of the hostages would almost certainly remain in Iran as “convicted spies” for a long period of time—if only to deter a U.S. military intervention. We will have to be prepared to live with that.
Strategy II should be adopted soon in some form. We must begin to make decisions about successors we would be willing to support. The Soviets will certainly have their candidates, and we cannot afford to leave it all to chance.
If the chances of getting 75% of the remaining hostages by a rescue operation are higher than 50%, I strongly recommend Strategy III. I understand the absolute necessity for compartmentalization, but you should be aware of the importance at some point of relating any direct action to a fine-grained awareness of the political and internal developments. You will be the best judge of whether an independent evaluation is desirable at some point, but I urge that any such operation not be left entirely in the hands of the JCS. You know where to find me.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 30, Iran 11/17/79–11/20/79. Sensitive; Eyes Only. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.”↩
- They met with Brzezinski in Algiers on November 1. See footnote 2, Document 4.↩