Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

4. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 5, 1979

SUBJECT

• Iran

Iranian internal politics are seriously complicating the hostage negotiations. The division in the government between the religious authorities on one hand—headed by Khomeini and his cohorts in Qom acting through the religious komitehs and Revolutionary Guards—and the secular, more moderate forces of Bazargan, Yazdi et al. on the other. We have had a growing body of evidence for several months now that Bazargan and co. were increasingly aware of their inability to influence Khomeini. Consequently, they seem to have decided to initiate a close working relationship with us on the intelligence side. My guess is that they believe in the omnipotence of the CIA and want to get the Agency on their side in the event of a clear break with Khomeini. They know that their jobs depend almost entirely on Khomeini and they are looking for alliances and clandestine support from us as a safety net in case they are fired.

This explains their willingness to meet with us and talk reasonably about our bilateral problems, but this approach (as most recently evidenced by the criticism they have suffered for meeting with you)² makes them even more suspect by Khomeini. A man who spent much of the summer in Qom (Bill Miller’s friend Haeri) says that Khomeini trusts no one but his son. He is willing to make use of people like Bazargan, Yazdi, Chamran, etc., but he would have no compunction about dropping them in an instant if it suited his purposes.

The present circumstances may be the crunch point in this rivalry. Yazdi has accepted responsibility for trying to get the hostages released. He has interceded with Qom on our behalf and he has permitted Bruce Laingen to stay at the Foreign Ministry. For most of yesterday, Laingen was physically in Yazdi’s office, using Yazdi’s telephone on a permanent basis to pass messages back and forth to Washington. At the same time, Yazdi and Bazargan are being attacked in the press for having met with you without the Ayatollah’s permission, and the rhetoric from religious luminaries such as Beheshti has been drawing an ominous distinction between the “language of the revolution” (i.e. the students) and “the language of diplomacy.” Hence Yazdi is in an impossible situation, and this could be issue which costs him his job.

The Shah’s presence here is extremely helpful to Khomeini. Just as in August, when he rallied the population against the Kurds to revive his sagging fortunes, this provides a chance for him to unite the population against the one symbol they all hate. It takes them back to the “good old days” of last year when they all agreed on something. As long as the Shah is here—or perhaps as long as the Shah lives—this will be an issue which Khomeini will exploit.

Since the Shah is a given and since Khomeini’s need to hold on to power domestically will outweigh any benefits he might receive from cooperation with us (at least in his own mind), this argues for a shift in our own policies. We have made a conscious effort to develop good relations with the Iranian government as a long-term investment. At least publicly, we can continue with that but we should have no illusions that it will pay off. Otherwise, we should shift the balance of our efforts to building up contacts with the secular leadership and other opponents of Khomeini to place ourselves as well as possible for a successor government and to end Khomeini’s rule as soon as possible. The longer Khomeini remains in power, the worse it will be for us—and for Iran.

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

In the meantime, Khomeini will use the hostages for his own political purposes. We must continue our efforts to convince him that this is a losing game by mobilizing all the resources we can. A special emissary still strikes me as a very useful initiative on our part. I suspect (and Bill Miller agrees) that when Khomeini has made his point, he will release the hostages. Unfortunately, our principal channel—Yazdi—is not the most effective way of getting our message through to the Ayatollah, and if we overload that circuit we may merely succeed in getting Yazdi, Bazargan and other possible friendly elements fired.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 30, Subject File, Iran 11/1/79–11/10/79. Secret. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.”
2. Reference is to Brzezinski’s meeting with Bazargan and Yazdi in Algiers, November 1. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. X, Iran: Revolution, January 1977–November 1979.