Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

36. Paper Prepared by the Joint Staff¹

Washington, November 17, 1979

BEST ESTIMATE OF SITUATION AT THE COMPOUND

Immediate Security of Compound:

Although not confirmed by hard intelligence, it appears that hostages are being held in at least five and possibly eight locations within the compound. Security includes 20–30 “students” and Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRG) personnel at the Chancellory gate, supported by foot and motorized patrols. News reports on evening of 16 November indicate that up to 100 “soldiers” are joining guard personnel around compound. There are 20–30 additional “students” and IRG in the Chancellory, with 125–175 “students” providing direct security of the hostages, who are reportedly loosely bound. “Students” inside the hostage holding areas appear to be armed with pistols while those outside have automatic rifles and submachine guns. Explosive devices on the perimeter wall have also been reported. It is likely that the compound is under surveillance from adjacent buildings although no observation posts or gun positions have been seen on surrounding rooftops.

Reinforcements:

Within 10–15 minutes after beginning to move about 100 local IRG militia can be at the compound, followed by an IRG motorized “Strike Team” of 150–200 personnel in 20–30 minutes. A motorized 120–160 man Ranger reaction company and up to 1500 IRG back-up strike force personnel may arrive in 30–45 minutes, followed shortly thereafter by an additional 1500–2000 man IRG Strike Force. In addition, an easily excited populace has tended to rally to the compound in large numbers in support of the students when unusual events occur (e.g., recent power outage resulted in mob scene at Embassy). The sheer numbers, without regard to their discipline, cohesion or competence, add up to a most significant threat.

Rescue Assault at the Compound:

Best judgment is that it would take all of the available 75 specially trained Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta personnel scaling the walls during darkness and with complete surprise to have a reasonable chance of freeing at least a substantial number of the hostages. The assault personnel would have to complete their task within 30–40 minutes, from assault to movement from the compound. The assault would be timed for the quiet hours after midnight when few people are on the streets. If surprise is achieved and Delta’s actions can be completed quickly within the compound, the probability of successful movement away from the compound is enhanced. However, there is a high risk of any movement being impeded by the convergence of reinforcing elements and civil mobs. Cover and deception actions elsewhere in the city and the neutralization of the radio/TV stations are being planned.

Insertion and Extraction:

Any chance for success is critically dependent upon achieving surprise and therefore a low visibility insertion concept is envisioned. This would entail having people in the city providing hard intelligence, developing safe havens in advance, arranging for guides, transportation, communications, and general support. Some progress is being made in developing this capability and personnel involved believe much can be done but some time will be required to reach the desired level of effectiveness. Insertion concept is to have two MC–130 “Combat Talon” aircraft (specially equipped C–130 aircraft and crews trained for blackout night operations at low altitude over hostile territory) take off from a country in area (planning now from Aswan, Egypt) and airdrop or assault land Delta personnel in outskirts of Tehran to be met by personnel in-country, transported to safe havens, and spend approximately 24 hours reconnoitering and preparing for assault the following night.² If successful in freeing hostages, force will then move to transportation (such as garbage trucks which are reportedly a common sight during the night). Departure would be to the north and west (into area of city with best roads and fewest people) to designated departure airstrip (e.g., blocked off road or flat open field) for MC–130 aircraft pick up. Aircraft will make an assault landing, quickly load passengers and depart for third country.

Personnel and Aircraft Preparatory Movements:

Air refuelable MC–130s are required, and because of their limited number would have to be drawn from Florida and Okinawa. The aircraft from Florida would go through Europe to Egypt and aircraft from Okinawa through Diego Garcia. Personnel from Delta would be transported to Europe via C–141 aircraft and transferred to MC–130s in forward area for onward movement to Aswan.

Actions Required for Implementation:

—Delta personnel must assemble in isolation, plan, rehearse and make final preparation. Thirty-six Delta personnel have been isolated and are in training, preparation and rehearsal. A scale model of the compound has been provided to assist with familiarization and planning. The number of Delta personnel in isolation is being increased gradually and carefully to reduce potential for compromise.

—Detailed planning will continue by Delta personnel [less than 1 line not declassified] until departure. Planning with limited, essential interagency interface will continue in Washington. MC–130 crews will have to be alerted to begin their specific planning and rehearsal for the mission. Some limited face-to-face coordination and planning between the Florida crews and Delta personnel can take place prior to departure for Europe; the entire force will not be assembled until arrival at Aswan.

—From standpoint of moving people and aircraft, insertion could be made in about four to five days from the decision to go, with assault about one day later. However, there are still many loose ends, particularly as to in-country arrangements. It is difficult to tell how soon those arrangements can be brought to a minimum satisfactory level. To shorten the movement time appreciably it will be necessary to alert MC–130 units and link up elements with Delta personnel in forward areas, with attendant obvious security risks. Proceeding from where we are to D-day would then still depend upon receiving definitive intelligence and solving support problems in Iran.

Required Decisions:

Authority already given:

—Isolate, train, rehearse, and prepare Delta personnel.

—[1 line not declassified]

Authority required:

—Establish [less than 1 line not declassified] contacts for required assistance for insertion of the force, for aid in assault and extraction or, if necessary, movement to safe havens.

Authority required, but no action recommended until in-country elements are in place and preparations underway:

—Alert MC–130 crews and have them begin required preparations (some of this may be feasible to begin covertly without informing crews of the nature of their mission).

—Move MC–130s from Okinawa to Diego Garcia.

—Provide tanker support as required throughout operation.

—Move US-based MC–130s to Europe.

—Move Delta from isolated training area to Europe to join MC–130s.

—Direct movement of all elements to Aswan.

—Launch aircraft and insert Delta.

—Execute Delta assault and extraction following night (MC–130 aircraft launched for extraction timed to rendezvous with Delta and hostages on designated pick-up assault landing strip).

Actions to Improve Probability of Success:

Continue to:

—Assemble intelligence on actions within and in vicinity of compound. This intelligence will be fed to Washington planning cell, to Delta, and to MC–130 planners.

—Build in-country capability to receive, guide, transport, provide safe haven for and generally assist Delta upon insertion.

—[2 lines not declassified]

Alternatives:

Use of helicopters for extraction from the general area of the compound and movement to an assault air strip for pick up by the MC–130 aircraft has been under consideration from the outset. If the extremely difficult logistical and visibility (security) problems could be solved, use of helicopters would be the preferred tactical option for extraction. Efforts to solve these difficult problems are continuing.

Risk:

Actions are being taken to improve chances for success but in any event it will be a very high risk operation throughout. All planning and security could be disrupted by premature forward positioning in order to reduce implementation time. To proceed now beyond what we are doing before in-country support problems are solved would not be prudent.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 30, Iran 11/17/79–11/20/79. Top Secret.
2. In the left margin, Jones wrote: “May be possible to do operation in one night if we can get some Delta people in a day or two in advance—time consuming to arrange. We are working on it. DJ.”