Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

353. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 2, 1980

SUBJECT

• Comments on the Holloway Special Operations Review Group

My comments, based upon reading the complete text of the Report by the Special Operations Review Group,² are meant to answer these questions for you with candor that the Holloway Group could not afford.

—What were the major flaws in the planning and execution?

—Where does the fault lie?

—What are the implications for follow-up actions?

The evidence in the Report is very disturbing. Unless it is inaccurate, it compels one to devastating conclusions about the JCS’s adequacy for planning and conducting such operations. It also has implications for basic and structural changes in Defense in the longer run.

Major Flaws

Of 23 issues chosen for extensive review, the Holloway Group singles out 11 as major. I find it difficult to quarrel with any of them, and some strike me as indicative of serious faults in the operation. They are each worth a short elaboration to give you a sense of the evidence in the Report.

1. Operations Security (OPSEC)

The Holloway Group says the requirements of secrecy were imposed too extensively to permit adequate coordination, first of intelligence, later of training, and finally of command and control during the execution phase. Their Report is too hard on some aspects of security, but OPSEC restraints exacerbated most of the other ten major issues. The Report avoids being personal, but the finger is pointed at Vaught on OPSEC. In fact, General Jones and others share this burden as well.

2. Independent Review of Plans

The lack of an independent review group is underscored as a source of trouble. The Chiefs acted like their own “action officers” in the words of the Report. Sitting in one Sunday when the Chiefs were briefed, I wondered myself how they could know what they pretended to know about feasibilities.

3. Organization, Command and Control, and the Applicability of JCS [less than 1 line not declassified]³

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

—The Marine Colonel in charge of the helicopters had no staff, believed he was in charge of helicopters, but was never appointed as head of helicopters. He was an officer from Jones’ special staff group. Thus no Marine helicopter unit and commander were ever selected. Jones’ choice of Colonel Pittman insured an ad hoc approach to helicopter operations (one of the minor issues in the Report).

—General Gast, USAF, was made a consultant on air operations, but his role in air operations, planning, and training was never clarified with the Marine Colonel, the Air Force, or the Navy. Again he was the Chairman’s ad hoc appointment.

—The Air Force component commander, who managed the C–130 training, was given “on the scene commander” responsibility just prior to the mission with no chance to plan or rehearse.

—No Navy component commander was ever designated. This is standard Navy practice to avoid being entangled in truly Joint organizations (the RDJTF today has no Navy component commander).

Here you have the “joint system” at its traditional best: one or two of the services do not participate fully, usually the Navy, and the Chairman tries to by-pass the CINCs because he does not command them by law. The Holloway Report makes it seem that Vaught is at fault for the confusion in the air operations responsibilities. Gast as a consultant, however, and his special relation with Jones probably made it difficult for Vaught to manage Gast. No reason is given for no Navy component commander and staff. The Report also leaves the impression of a chaotic “Joint” air operations and training endeavor. The JCS has always dodged the issue of “Joint” training responsibility. Whose is it for the RDJTF? That is still undecided!

4. Comprehensive Readiness Evaluation

Training and readiness evaluation was decentralized. No overall rehearsal of the Desert One took place. The Report sees this as a major weakness for the phase at Desert One. Again, this is a “Joint” training problem.

5. Size of the Helicopter Force

Based on statistical data from RH–53 performance history, the Report argues that ten helicopters were needed. This problem, of course, is related to the confusion in the organization for air operations—Navy and Air Force components and staff support. No truly competent air staff examined the issue for the JTF.

6. Overall Coordination of Joint Training

Vaught, based in the Pentagon, let two officers, who were not fully in the JTF, run the joint training at the Western Training site. The Report considers this a mistake. Gast, as Deputy Commander JTF, should have moved to the training site and taken this responsibility. The Report fails to tie this issue to inherent weaknesses of the “Joint” system of training under JCS procedures.

7. Command and Control Desert One

The late designation of the Air Force component commander as in command at Desert One, his lack of a command post location, a deputy, and other command techniques, including communications on the ground, are cited as major flaws. In my view, the Report understates this problem, and it is related to the lack of full Desert One rehearsal. It is also part of the Air Force and Naval component problem.

8. Centralized and Integrated Intelligence Support External to the JTF

The ad hoc and piecemeal effort by CIA in the early phase, the late tie to NSA, the failure to use DIA fully, and State’s reluctance to supply data from hostage mail are some of the points made by the Report. I saw this problem in detail in November. The Report is correct and perhaps too mild in its criticism. The episode is a preview of what you will see if we ever have to transit from peace to war as the results of PRM–11 prescribe.⁴

9. Alternatives to Desert One

As the Report indicates, the road traffic at Desert One made compromise during the following day highly probable. An alternative, without this road problem, would have been preferable, but the intelligence does not readily reveal an alternative. The road problem was evident from the OTTER reconnaissance flight, but the JTF assessed the risk as acceptable—wrongly.

10. Handling the Dust Phenomenon

The Report is comprehensive in exploring ways to anticipate and deal with the dust. Had any of a number of other weaknesses been absent—communications among the helicopters and with other aircraft, with the air weather service, inadequate navigation aides, the lack of a reconnaissance pre-run flight, or a pathfinder—the dust would not have caused at least one abort. I find the lack of a pre-run for weather reconnaissance surprising given the conditions.

11. C–130 Pathfinders

In the Son Tay raid,⁵ C–130s flew with the HH–53s, using all-weather navigation aids to guide the helicopters. The failure to include such pathfinders in this operation is surprising, and in my view wholly inexcusable. It violated basic tactics for moving a force anywhere, ground or air.

Where Does the Fault Lie?

The Report puts lots of emphasis on flaws in command procedures, particularly OPSEC being excessive and rigid, in training, and in air operations planning. The finger is pointed unambiguously at Vaught. The Report also, however, gives a thoughtful reader enough evidence to infer a number of other culprits as well.

First, the Navy component of the JTF is no credit to the Navy. I suspect some strained relations between Vaught and the Navy are hidden. The Navy’s initial fear of a “witch hunt” is now more understandable. There really is a “witch” in this case.

Second, Gast’s role, the confusion in air operations responsibility, and Gast’s relations with Jones are other places the fault may be shared.

Third, the DCI and the Intelligence Community share some of the blame. They dragged their feet, and they hid behind interagency barriers in the early phase.

Fourth, the failure to use the [less than 1 line not declassified] and its JTF concept should be blamed on the Chiefs and General Jones. Interservice rivalry and the sacred cow, the Unified Command Plan, prevented the emergence of an effective JTF in 1977. Precisely these same obstructions are now blocking our recommendation for a Mid East Command.

Fifth, although the Report gives the NCA link high marks, when fault is considered, the Secretary of Defense cannot be blameless. The weak JTF structure was ultimately Brown’s responsibility.

What Are the Implications for Follow-up?

The President could easily use this report for a number of changes:

a. A Mid East Command is imperative if this Report is accurate. The RDJTF will fail miserably as the JCS now has REDCOM/RDJTF/PACOM/EUCOM linked to paralyze planning, training, and deployment. Nor is there a Navy component commander. Nor is there a “joint” training evaluation scheme.

b. An outside review group of retired officers, a proposal by the Holloway group, is not a bad idea. One could be set up.

c. Practice transitions from peacetime to wartime operations for the Intelligence Community are imperative. PD–58⁶ exercises offer this potential, but other things should also be practiced, particularly within the DOD and DIA.

A longer run implication of this Report is found in the necessities it shows for a major change in our Defense Department organization. The JCS is too weak vis-à-vis the services. And DIA is too weak vis-à-vis CIA. The recommended special operations JTF is actually of doubtful legality because it would operate under the NCA and JCS directly, not through a CINC as required by the 1947 National Security Act.⁷ More and more we have the need for a national level military operations staff with directive authority over CINCs and services. The same requirement is dictated by the new PD–59⁸ staffing capability as well as the PD–58 COG/C3I capabilities for the President to control the military forces.

A second major implication is found in the Report’s comments on readiness and training evaluation. The only way we will get greater “factor productivity” in Defense is to look at the “output” of the Department more effectively. Exercises geared to real contingency planning are the single promising instrument for such output measurement. The JCS annual and five-year exercise program, already institutionalized, is the embryo for a future testing system.

Finally, let me add a personal note. From the viewpoint of a military officer who has seen commanders relieved, and who has sent soldiers to jail, this Report is justification for forced resignations at a very high level. Such a sweeping step, of course, may be of dubious wisdom at present, but it is clear that the authors of the Report must have found themselves feeling as I do. They have hedged their judgments to avoid forcing the blame into the open, but the evidence encourages the unpleasant inferences.

I feel that some of the blame should fall on me insofar as I encouraged you to have confidence in the operation. I rendered that judgment on too little first-hand observation of the rehearsals and staff organization. In the final stages, however, I was cut out of the briefings and NSC meetings so that I had a very imperfect view of the details of the operation.

If you want a memorandum for the President on the Report, I shall prepare one, but you may want to reflect on this step for a time while you digest the full import of the Report.⁹

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 27, Iran Special Contingency Group 7/80. Top Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. In a September 4 memorandum to Brzezinski, Denend wrote “there is not a single conclusion in his [Odom’s] memo to you with which I would take serious issues.” Denend concluded that, based on the Holloway Report, 1) any planning and/or training underway for a second rescue operation in Iran needed to be reviewed for organizational soundness, 2) that the report was “dramatic evidence” or a change in the Unified Command Plan, and 3) that any efforts to change the independence retained by the military services “must wait for stronger leadership in the Pentagon.” (Ibid.)
2. See Document 321.
3. PRM–30, “Terrorism,” January 2, 1977, is in Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 1.
4. PRM–11, “Intelligence Structure and Mission,” February 22, 1977, is ibid.
5. The 1970 failed rescue mission of 50 American POWs from Son Tay prison near Hanoi was the first joint military operation run by the JCS Chairman.
6. PD–58, “Continuity of Government,” June 30, 1980, is in Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 23.
7. The National Security Act of 1947 reorganized the armed forces, foreign policy, and intelligence apparatus to meet Cold War demands. The act merged the Departments of War and Navy into the Department of Defense, created a Department of the Air Force, and established three service secretaries. It also established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.
8. PD–59, “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” July 25, 1980, is in Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 23.
9. Odom underlined the phrase “while you digest the full import of the Report,” and wrote below it: “This report can be used for very large initiatives—if you desire—but we need to think through timing and choice of initiatives. WO.”