352. Memorandum for the Record by Director of Central Intelligence Turner1
SUBJECT
- Conversation with Secretary of State, 2 September 1980
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Iran.]
2. We spent a lot of time on Iran (the Secretary mentioned to me afterwards he thought we were handling our position and presentations on Iran in the SCC well). Ron Spiers and I both expressed our concern at the possibility of trials for the hostages. The Secretary made a considerable argument that he thought there were more favorable signs that would mitigate against that. He said there had been four contacts with the Iranians in the last few days that indicated a desire to find out what the United States position on the hostage situation is:
a. There was the initiative, through either the Swedes or the Swiss (he couldn’t remember which), from Rafsanjani (not certain but he thought that is who it was) asking if the Swedes/Swiss could obtain our position and relay it. The Secretary said that the President had approved a response to this.
b. Beheshti had made an approach to the United States indirectly just today for the same objective. He could not recall through whom the approach came.
c. He then referred to his letter to Rajai, the Prime Minister,2 but it wasn’t clear whether Rajai had responded to it.
d. Finally, there was the response of the Majlis to the letter from several members of our House of Representatives.3
He feels the situation in Iran is different today because a governmental apparatus is evolving and through it the position of the militants is weakening. Beheshti has adroitly accumulated power and now he’s talking in terms of resolving the hostage situation. It remains to be [Page 925] seen whether he will exercise his power to do that. But the situation is generically different than it has been over the past 10 months.
I responded that I still didn’t think there was a critical mass of power in Iran; that Khomeini really didn’t want to make a decision on the hostages for fear of losing his constituencies; that the Majlis would not make a decision without Khomeini’s approval; and that hostage trials were an easy delaying and escape tactic for the Majlis. I further reiterated my feeling that Khomeini wanted to bring down President Carter and would move toward trials or other ways to embarrass the President between now and the elections. [portion marking not declassified]
3. I described the fact that we are working with Ambassador Spain in Ankara with respect to rescue option possibilities on the border with Iran. [portion marking not declassified]
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Iran]
8. We talked about the [2½ lines not declassified]. I did express my alarm, however, at two things: First, the Soviets apparently were willing to [less than 1 line not declassified] (though we didn’t know where and whether this was part of a general scenario against NATO or perhaps whether it was purely a military worst-case operation); secondly, I was concerned at the extent of their planning ambitions, particularly [less than 1 line not declassified]. Muskie was clearly skeptical that the Soviets would [less than 1 line not declassified]. We had a debate as to whether this would be more risky from their point of view than going into Poland. [portion marking not declassified]
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Iran]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15. Top Secret.↩
- See Document 344.↩
- The letter from the House members is dated July 2; see Document 309. The Majlis letter quoted by FBIS, September 2, asked Congress to “place on your agenda for urgent action an investigation into the damage arising from the past deeds of the American government and into the legitimate claims of Iran, giving this matter the highest and most urgent priority. Thus may the way be paved toward a solution of the crisis.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 33, Iran Update 9/80) For Rafsanjani’s preliminary reaction to the letter, see Document 329.↩