Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

346. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 22, 1980, 9:30–11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Followup on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—XV

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Edmund Muskie
  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
  • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • Under Secretary for Policy, Robert Komer

• JCS

  • Chairman, General David Jones
  • General Paul F. Gorman, Director, Plans and Policy

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
  • Rae Huffstutler, Director, Office of Strategic Research

• OMB

  • James McIntyre, Director
  • Edward Sanders, Assistant Director for National Security & International Affairs

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski

• NSC

  • M. General Jasper Welch
  • B. General William E. Odom

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting with a statement of its purpose, reviewed intelligence on Soviet exercises and their implications for State and Defense actions. (TS)

Threat Assessment by the DCI

Turner explained that we have seen an upgrading of the Transcaucasus Military District throughout the spring. [4½ lines not declassified]

Turner offered a caveat about his information. It is piecemeal, far from the full view of the July exercises² (see the map at Tab A). [4½ lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

[less than 1 line not declassified] After suggesting a number of reasons, the possible collapse of Iran, our Persian Gulf activities, and the rescue mission, Turner said that it is more likely a general upgrading of contingency planning for the region to bring it to the level that we have observed for Europe and the Far East. [3 lines not declassified] There are, however, constraints on Soviet action: the weakness of the Turkestan Military District, adverse effects on détente, and problems in Poland. (TS)

Turner estimated that an attack is not likely now, but if the U.S. enters Iran, or if there is an internal collapse, these external events might provoke the Soviets to move. [1 line not declassified] this will be an indication of much greater readiness and of offensive rather than defensive thinking on the Soviet part. (SNIE on which Turner’s briefing was based is at Tab C.) (TS)

Discussion of the DCI’s Briefing

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we are dealing with a Soviet contingency plan which likely depends on the internal collapse in Iran. Therefore, we need a better assessment of the Iranian political situation. (TS)

General Jones disagreed with the contingency plan notion. The Joint Chiefs believe there is a 50–50 possibility that the Soviets are themselves trying to control the timing, not just preparing to react to outside events. One of the Chiefs is sufficiently disturbed to recommend immediate deployment to the region in an effort to deter the Soviets. The Chiefs are more concerned with time than the DCI. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski summed up that we have reached no overall conclusions about Soviet intentions. (S)

He then stated the next two issues: what to communicate to our friends, and what to communicate to the Soviets. (S)

Communications to Our Allies in Europe

[2 paragraphs (9 lines) not declassified]

Muskie is seeing Francois-Poncet and Genscher on Monday.³ He agreed to have a general analytical discussion about the possible internal collapse of Iran, but he does not want to be sufficiently explicit on our concerns to encourage Francois-Poncet’s inference that we [less than 1 line not declassified]. (TS)

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

Communications with Countries in the Region

Komer emphasized that only three countries in the region are significant, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, for U.S. military reactions to the Soviets. The Saudis are at present more concerned with the Yemenis than the Soviets. The Egyptians suspect the worst of the Soviets. The Turkish Prime Minister could use this information. Newsom added that we have difficulty with all three, and that we should use this one card to overcome their resistance. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski tasked Newsom to convene a meeting with Komer and the NSC staff to develop possible talking points [less than 1 line not declassified] with these countries for review at the next SCC. (TS)

Communications with the Soviets

Dr. Brzezinski recommended that either the President or Muskie in a public speech reconfirm the President’s State of the Union Address strictures on Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf.⁴ He expressed doubt that bilateral communications would have much effect in light of our many such previous communications which we have more or less allowed the Soviets to ignore, e.g. Cam Ranh Bay.⁵ (S)

Muskie suggested that the President could do this at the United Nations General Assembly in September but that at some point we must be specific with the Soviets. Until we reach the point beyond which their actions will become unacceptable that should be done privately. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski responded that a two-step approach flows from Muskie’s points: a speech at the September United Nations General Assembly for the public, and a Muskie/Gromyko bilateral meeting when Gromyko comes to the United Nations. (S)

All agreed that we could tell the President that this is our preliminary thinking, not a firm recommendation. (S)

Defense Actions

Muskie asked, “What is the bottom line”? Can we defend if the Soviets actually invade? Harold Brown admitted that we cannot defend militarily but we might save the Saudi oil and deter the Soviets from going further, or perhaps deter their invasion in the first place. Our one and one-third divisions moved to Iran in 30 days would confront 16–20 Soviet divisions. (TS)

Muskie was concerned that a defense of only part of the region would hurt our political credibility everywhere. Dr. Brzezinski agreed that this point is critical. Our credibility in the region and in Europe hangs on our willingness and ability to fight the Soviets on the ground in Iran and elsewhere, if horizontal escalation is necessary. (S)

General Jones explained that there are two schools on how to defend Iran. One argues that we should put ourselves on a defense line in the Zagros Mountains and hold the Khuzestan oil fields. Another school, more interested in deterring the Soviet invasion, argues that we must begin to interdict their entry into Iran, making it impossible for them to invade without direct combat with U.S. forces. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski structured the discussion on this point with three military options: first, credible deterrence; second a confined defense within Iran; and third, a Persian Gulf strategy, which defends primarily Saudi Arabian oil. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski and others favored the first category, but they admitted that we do not have the capabilities. General Jones emphasized that not only do we not have them, they decline every day because we are trying to do things on the cheap. In comparison, the Soviets have done a great deal more in a region where they already have tremendous advantages. We plan for five years hence. They are upgrading for operations today. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski tasked Defense to prepare a point paper around the three military options for the next SCC. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 115, SCC 335 Security Framework Persian Gulf 8/22/80. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No Tabs were attached or found. At the top of the first page, Carter wrote: “Zbig—My inclination is to inform Giscard & Schmidt also, protecting our sources. J.”
2. See footnote 3, Document 337.
3. August 25.
4. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and later referred to as the Carter Doctrine, Carter stated in his January 23 State of the Union address to Congress: “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 194–200)
5. In 1979 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed a 25-year, rent-free lease with the Soviet Union allowing the Soviet Pacific Fleet to base at Cam Ranh Bay. It was the largest Soviet naval base outside of the Soviet Union.