345. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones)1
When Jim Holloway and his group asked for my support, I unhesitantly agreed, assuming the final report2 would be a helpful, objective assessment. I asked in return only to see the sections of the final report that touched on intelligence. He sent me Issues #3 and #18 of his report.3 Frankly, I am appalled at the content and tone of these sections.
Issue #3 clearly implies that the Intelligence Community was slow off the mark. [2 lines not declassified] The report’s allusion to delays in responses [less than 1 line not declassified] indicates a lack of understanding of the HUMINT function. The discussion even leaves the impression that intelligence support may have delayed execution of the rescue operation in November–December. I saw no sign that a military operation was anywhere near feasible in November–December; indeed, I believe our mutual perception was that military and intelligence capabilities developed in parallel—neither could be brought to 100% effectiveness instantly after the seizure.
Issue #3 recommends that in any future similar effort the Director, DIA, be placed in charge of an Interagency Intelligence Task Force. This is an unworkable and inappropriate suggestion. The Director, DIA, clearly does not have the authority, statutory or otherwise, to organize and coordinate Community intelligence assets. That is the responsibility of the DCI under statute and Executive Order.
Issue #18 implies that casual conversation with a CIA officer on board Nimitz may have negatively influenced a helicopter pilot. If that were in fact the case, it would indicate highly unprofessional performance by the pilot. In any event, the report goes on to state that [Page 909] “. . . the (mission) abort . . . cannot be related to any alleged enemy radar intercept capability. . . .” Why, then, was this point germane to the investigation? The facts are that [4½ lines not declassified].
I am dismayed if these two misleading references to intelligence are the only references in the report to the intelligence role in the rescue effort. The positive role of intelligence in making the mission possible—from hostage location to arrangements in Teheran [less than 1 line not declassified] and more—surely could not have been overlooked. A one-sided, negative appraisal of the intelligence role—as suggested by the parts of the report I have seen—would be unwarranted, inaccurate and unacceptable. I hope my concerns are misplaced, but what I have seen of the report is not encouraging. Accordingly, I’d appreciate an opportunity to read the entire report before reacting further.4
Yours,
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82B00162R: Subject Files, Box 9, Folder 8: Official Memos/Letters August 1980. Secret.↩
- See Document 321.↩
- An undated paper prepared by the Joint Task Force, “Issue 3, Centralized and integrated intelligence support external to the JTF,” noted that the augmentation of existing intelligence capabilities evolved over time and “in somewhat piecemeal fashion.” Additionally, OPSEC intelligence officers involved in the operation had to “deduce for themselves in essence what was being planned.” The Holloway group believed that the Intelligence Community assets and resources “could have been pulled together more quickly and effectively than was actually the case.” Issue 18, “The enemy radar threat,” looked like a “single, highly explicit event in which unevaluated data was passed directly to helicopter aircrews,” and which “contradicted the final conclusions of intelligence analyst.” The implication was that perhaps “some helicopter pilot judgments regarding altitude selection were affected by the informal report.”↩
- In a September 4 memorandum for the record, Turner also conveyed to Brzezinski his displeasure with the Holloway Report. He wanted an outside Commission to look at the rescue operation for lessons learned. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 95M01183R: Policy Files (1977–1981) Box 1, Folder 3: DCI Turner—Eyes Only Files—Memos and Meetings with Various Officials and Subjects) Turner held a similar conversation with Brown. Brown told Turner that “there were many others like himself who were equally or more upset with the report.” Overall, Turner found Brown to be “defensive” of the report. (Memorandum for the Record, September 5; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15)↩
- Turner signed “Stan” above his typed signature.↩