Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

337. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth and Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, August 8, 1980

SUBJECT

• Exploiting the Soviet Threat to Iran

We believe it would be useful to launch a concerted political-diplomatic campaign aimed at heightening attention to the Soviet threat to Iran. Such an effort was made in the Spring with NATO allies. This time a broader effort, perhaps at some point including pointed warning to the Soviets, should be considered. The attached paper² outlines the rationale and structure of the kind of effort we have in mind. Although this notion was triggered by the recent Soviet exercises,³ we would have to be careful to protect the sources involved when developing our threat story. (S)

It is time, in any case, for intelligence to do a basic and prompt reassessment of Soviet intentions and capabilities toward Iran. Materials for use with allies and other audiences can readily be spun off. (S)

From a foreign policy point of view, this kind of effort is definitely needed, especially in the post-Olympics period, to keep pressures for drifting back to “business as usual” under control. Although we think this unlikely, it could interfere with the President’s effort to give a balanced view of his foreign policy during the campaign. On balance, we are inclined to believe that, as in most cases, here good foreign policy makes good domestic politics.⁴ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 65, Outside the System File, Iran Non-Meetings Hostage Crisis 4/80–11/80. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. A stamped notation in the upper right corner of the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.”
2. Attached but not printed. The undated paper is titled “Campaign to Exploit Soviet Military Preparations Against Iran.”
3. According to an August 2 CIA brief, the Soviet Union had carried out a command post exercise in the Transcaucasus Military District in the last week of July. This exercise was the first simulated ground and air operation against Iran since the overthrow of the Shah. The exercise posited Iran as the primary enemy and included the rapid movement of troops across Iran, the use of air power, and the contingency use of tactical nuclear weapons. The objective of the scenario was the Persian Gulf area. On August 6, a CIA brief reported that a second command post exercise simulating a Soviet invasion of Iran had occurred. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator, Box 8)
4. At the bottom of the page, Brzezinski wrote: “I agree. Give me implementing memo. What about the command exercise? Can we let the Iranians know somehow via the Turks or Paks? ZB.”