Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

314. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, July 11, 1980

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Carlucci et al.

I spoke with Gary Sick this morning about the agenda for this meeting.² He asked for some comments from me which might give focus or direction based on the ZB/HB/Turner meeting.³ Although the meeting was about special contingencies, Zbig raised the question of our capabilities for political combat within the country as it drifts toward civil war. He got the impression that we are not developing resources as rapidly as we must if we are to compete with any chance of success.

Two points emerged from the discussion thereafter. First, in our development of resources for special contingencies, we shall keep in mind their use for other purposes as well. Thus we should have less hestitancy about investing in one-time use capabilities if we can see other possible uses later on.

Second, Zbig asked that we investigate the possibilities of accelerating our resource developments for “political combat” as things get worse in the country. Can we cast our nets wider? Do we have an effective strategic objective? He, of course, considers regaining Iran as key to the northern tier, more important than Pakistan and Afghanistan by far.

There are three possible futures for Iran. First, it can become a radical left pro-Moscow state. Second, it may break into pieces with Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, and the USSR drawn in. Third, it may survive with its borders intact with an anti-Soviet regime which is not pro-West but objectively inclined that way for economic and security matters. Our objective should be to ensure the third outcome.

The first phase of a strategy for achieving this outcome must be the development of a resource base within and without the country. I do not pretend to know how much is enough or which resources to prefer over others in the particular case of Iran.

[Omitted here is material on resources.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 87, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Iran Sensitive 5/80–10/80. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for information.
2. See Document 315.
3. See Document 311.