313. Editorial Note
On July 9, 1980, an attempted coup against the Iranian Revolutionary Government unraveled. The original plot was for 12 pilots with their F–4 and F–5 planes to defect to Iraq, but the plot grew in scope. Ultimately, it included units of the Iranian Air Force, ground forces, members of radio and television organizations, and tribal leaders including from the Qashqai. The plot called for Iraq to create an incident at the border between Iran and Iraq as a diversion under which Air Force supporters would bomb the Tehran Air Base, Mehrabad Airport, the home of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and Pasdaran headquarters and training centers. Ground forces would take over the airport and radio and television stations, then broadcast material, including a speech from Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari, saying opponents of the coup were anti-Islamic. After 72 hours, control of Iran would pass to Shahpur Bakhtiar, the former Prime Minister and leader of the exile opposition group, the National Resistance Movement of Iran. Bakhtiar himself, the extent of whose role in the coup is unclear, moved the coup from its original August 13 date to July 10, and then again to [Page 848] July 9, when it became evident that the Tudeh Party had information of the plot’s existence. The plot unraveled when the initial attack, moved from Tehran to Hamadan, resulted in premature gunfire. (Intelligence Information Cable, [document number not declassified], August 14; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 36, Subject File, Iran Cables & Press, 8/80)
In a July 10 memorandum, Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff wrote David Aaron, the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, that the Iranians had been tracking the plot for about a month, [less than 1 line not declassified]. Sick had reservations about the plot, and expressed his concern about the hostages. He felt that “the ominous part is the drum fire of propaganda lately associating various plots and conspiracies with the U.S.—and particularly with the hostages. The campaign appears to be directed—by design or coincidence—towards laying the justification for trials.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 65, Outside the System File, Iran Non-Meetings Hostage Crisis 4/80–11/80)
In Iran, the government moved on a variety of fronts. Public statements targeted the United States and the hostages. President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr publicly announced that Iran had forestalled a coup and accused the United States, Israel, and Iraq of being in league with the conspirators. Two days later Khomeini accused the United States and the Soviet Union of plotting a coup against him in an effort to crush his Islamic movement. (“17 Iran officers accused of coup tied to U.S., Russ,” Chicago Tribune, July 12, 1980, page S2) Soon thereafter, a member of the Revolutionary Council stated that the conspirators had planned to free the U.S. hostages. (Doyle McManus, “Iran Arrests 100 Officers in Purge of Armed Forces,” Los Angeles Times, July 13, 1980, page OC1)
More concretely, Iran arrested two former generals, who confessed to the plot, their direct links to Bakhtiar, and the bombing targets. More than 500 members of the armed forces were subsequently arrested as part of the plot, including 20 Air Force pilots. (Iran Sitrep No. 373, July 14; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 33, Subject File, Iran 7/1/80–7/20/80) Activists unrelated to the coup were also arrested in a wide crackdown. (Intelligence Information Cable, [document number not declassified], August 14; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 36, Subject File, Iran Cables & Press, 8/80) Five leaders of the plot were executed by firing squad. (“Iran Executes Five Accused of Plot Against Regime,” New York Times, July 20, 1980, page 6)
In Paris, Bakhtiar escaped an assassination attempt, apparently retribution for the intended coup. He told French radio that Iran had sent professional killers to get him. Newspaper accounts noted that [Page 849] Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali had repeatedly stated that killers dispatched by Iran would find Bakhtiar and also mentioned that the Khomeini government had signed an assassination order on Bakhtiar in early 1979. (“2 Killed as Gunmen Raid Bakhtiar Paris Apartment,” Los Angeles Times, July 18, 1980, page A2, and Henry Eason, “Bakhtiar plots the counterrevolution,” Chicago Tribune, July 20, 1980, page A6, respectively) Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, in Paris at the time of the botched assassination attempt, canceled his trip to Nicaragua after the group claiming responsibility criticized Ghotbzadeh for condemning the attack on Bakhtiar. (“Orders From Iran Cited in Attack on Ex-Premier,” Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1980, page B8) In Maryland, Ali Tabatabai, the founder of the anti-Khomeini Iran Freedom Foundation, was killed on July 22 by an American Muslim with ties to the pro-Khomeini group Islamic Guerrillas in America. This group purportedly controlled the Iranian Interests Section in the Algerian Embassy in the United States. (Robert Pear, “Iran Ex-Attaché, Khomeini Foe, Slain in the U.S.,” New York Times, July 23, 1980, page A1, and Vanderbilt University Television News Archive, NBC Evening News, July 24, 1980)