315. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- Meeting of the Aaron, Komer, Pustay, Newsom and Carlucci Group, 11 July 1980
1. The meeting was billed as an effort to examine and make suggestions on our intelligence collection and covert action program in Iran.2 I was asked to describe both.
2. I first ran over the collection priorities. A consensus emerged on the following:
a. We should add a priority on Soviet activities in Iran as a separate item. This should follow priority c, government/internal stability.
b. The military and economic developments priorities should be reversed.
3. In the more general discussion on priorities that ensued the consumer agencies had the following suggestions:
a. More intelligence on religious groups would be very welcome.
b. A high priority was the decision-making process (some argued that one did not exist). If we could describe the process consumers would welcome reports on the atmosphere that surrounds those in authority.
c. Newsom laid considerable stress on more information from the Bazaaris.
d. In connection with our efforts to penetrate the hostage holders, Newsom renewed an earlier suggestion. If we had the names and backgrounds of some of those involved and could identify the educational institutions in Iran that they attended, State could seek Aid people who may have taught at those institutions. They might have known those involved. The group asked that we update our information on the hostage holders and make it available to them. I would appreciate it if NFAC could do a paragraph or so on the nature of the group and enclose biographic information on those individuals we have identified.
e. Komer asked if we had some [less than 1 line not declassified]. He suggested we explore trading information with them on the Soviet external threat for their assessment of Soviet activities inside of Iran. I said we would explore this possibility.
[Page 852]f. Some discussion took place on obtaining better intelligence on the newly-formed Parliament. I said we were placing attention on this group as a target. It was suggested that we draw up a list of the members and include whatever information we might have. I said I was sure something along these lines was under way.
3. Komer asked that we think about a program which is separate from a) FI collection; b) covert action and c) hostage rescue infrastructure which would be directed toward the possibility of U.S. military intervention in southern Iran in response to Soviet intervention. The program would entail grouping assets in localities that would be key to such an operation. I suggested Komer send me his priority list and we would initiate such a program noting that although developing human assets would take a considerable period of time we could start our technical collection immediately. [portion marking not declassified]
4. [13 lines not declassified]
5. The only problem that arose during the discussion on covert action was Aaron’s continuing belief that we can somehow erect a structure inside without reference to the exile group. He asked about doing this with labor unions, the Bazaaris, etc. I pointed out that in each case there was no identifiable leadership with which we could work. We were not adverse to working with these groups, indeed we were trying to target on them, but in many instances the best lines inside came from those on the outside. I told him I saw no phoenix in Iran about to arise from the ashes. [portion marking not declassified]
6. State was asked to go out to its posts with a request for stepped-up reporting on Iran. [7½ lines not declassified]
7. I talked with Newsom about access [less than 1 line not declassified]. I told him we were prepared to send [less than 1 line not declassified] over. Newsom agreed that we should have access but said the first priority was to have him meet with his family. He might very well be on his way back to the U.S. within 48 hours. If so he much preferred we interview him here. I told him he would unquestionably get requests from other intelligence components for access [less than 1 line not declassified], but that he could tell them that CIA would handle their requirements. I suggest we convey this to the Pentagon, including General Vaught. [portion marking not declassified]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 14. Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified].↩
- See Document 311. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room at 11 a.m. Newsom, Komer, Pustay, Carlucci, Spiers, Sick, and Odom attended. (Note, Black Chamber Meeting, July 11; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 87, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Iran Sensitive 5/80–10/80)↩
- [name not declassified] signed for Carlucci above this typed signature.↩