Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

31. Memorandum From the Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Cogan) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner¹

Washington, November 15, 1979

SUBJECT

• White House Situation Room Meeting on 14 November 1979 Concerning Covert Action Prospects in Iran

1. The following is for your information.

2. On 14 November 1979 the DDCI, accompanied by the undersigned, attended a meeting chaired by David Aaron at which Mr. Robert Murray of DOD, Hal Saunders and Gary Sick were also present. Explaining the background to this and the previous meeting on 12 November,² Mr. Aaron said that the Vice President, after consultation with the President, felt that planning should be initiated regarding covert action in Iran, but this should be kept outside the SCC framework at least for the present.

3. The aim of the group, continued Mr. Aaron, was to develop options on Iran—without having crossed the threshold into anti-Khomeinism but on the assumption this will be the case. Mr. Aaron outlined the broad lines of options as follows:

a. Sowing dissension within the Khomeini regime. Creating differences within the Revolutionary Council to enhance destabilization. [2 lines not declassified] In general, sowing dissension through both internal and external contacts.

b. [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

c. The “infrastructure” option: irrespective of a and b above, what can we do to build up assets (e.g., among the dissidents) who would play a role in a future, post-Khomeini Iran?

4. Setting a target date of 19 November, Mr. Aaron said he would like to have from the Agency a paper detailing what steps we could take in response to the above three suggested options. NE Division will work with Chief, [less than 1 line not declassified] Staff in preparing this paper.³

5. Another consideration in the above context, said Mr. Aaron, is the Soviet position and response in the current situation. What are the Soviets doing and how can we counter this? DDCI plans to task NFAC to respond to this requirement.

6. At the conclusion of the meeting, the DDCI noted that it would seem feasible to undertake destabilization measures in Iran; e.g., orchestrating a press campaign that Khomeini is leading the country to disaster; inducing defections; announcing these defections; having Bakhtiar go public in his opposition; organizing anti-Khomeini rallies, etc.

7. A paper prepared by NE Division (attached) was given to the DDCI as background and talking points for this meeting.

Charles G. Cogan

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁴

Washington, undated

Possible Options to Increase Pressure on Khomeini, Assuming Policy Decision to Unseat Him

I. While the hostages are still held, and there are believable assurances that they will not be harmed:

(A) [1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified]

(B) [1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

(C) [1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

(D) Orchestrate an open anti-Khomeini rallying call by Bakhtiar. Insure widespread press play. [1 line not declassified]

(E) [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

(F) Float rumor (press) campaign suggesting other western countries are soon to freeze Iranian assets.

(G) Establish contact with [less than 1 line not declassified] to confer with him on options for possible future government.

II. While the hostages are being held, but we are uncertain as to their well-being (threats having been made, one or more having already been executed); and/or the post hostage situation:

(A) Make the necessary commitments to the following individuals in order that they issue public statements withdrawing their support of Khomeini

(1) [1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

(2) [name not declassified]

(3) [name not declassified]

(4) [1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

(5) [1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

(6) [1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

(B) After this is done, make needed commitments to the following to follow suit:

(1) [name not declassified]

(2) [1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

(3) [1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

(4) [1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

(C) [1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

(D) Initiate widespread [less than 1 line not declassified] press campaign pointing out disaster of Khomeini government. Focus on economic problems, collision course, isolation, irrationality.

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

In efforts such as described under II above, the risk of leading to the collapse of the central government is inherent. Just what would suffice to halt the diffusion of power once the Khomeini forces were gone, is uncertain. Bakhtiar, for all his liabilities is perhaps the answer. We believe from available evidence the left in Iran is not yet ready to move to establish control from the center or in any of the provinces. They do have the capability to instigate economic disruption—particularly in the oil fields. In the face of this, it might look possible that the succeeding government would have to invite foreign technicians and skilled workers back to Iran to get the fields working again.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81M00919R: Executive Registry Subject Files (1976–1979), Box 14, Folder 10: C–372. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Operations.
2. See Document 24.
3. Turner placed a large checkmark next to this item and wrote in the margin: “I’d like to see 1st.”
4. Secret.