32. Memorandum From the Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency (Waller) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner1

SUBJECT

  • Iran Situation

1. This memorandum contains an idea for your consideration and further exploration.

2. On 14 November 1979, you asked me if I had any ideas as to what action we might take in view of the deteriorating situation in Iran—ideas which, in my opinion, should be based on the premise that any viable accommodation with Khomeini is neither possible nor desirable. This does not address itself to the more acute problem of the refugees.

3. I have attached a few thoughts. I am sending copies to the DDCI, the DDO and Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, whose grasp of the present situation is better than mine and who may have a sound basis on which to reject this out of hand or modify it. Clearly there are some drawbacks. Any covert action under the 662 procedures carries with it the consequences of leakage.2 Also any dynamic political action in the south of Iran, if it became known, could stimulate compensating Soviet covert action in the north (including Tehran), in which leftists, Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Mazandaranis, etc., are used to promote pro-Soviet regimes, as was the case in 1945–1946. I believe, however, that it must be assumed that the Soviets already have dynamic links to one or more leftist movements and would be quick to capitalize on provincial chaos in the north anyway, if they could do so.

John H. Waller
[Page 70]

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency (Waller)3

INTRODUCTION

In May 1979, I sketched out a scenario (hereto attached)4 in which the Iranian left would coalesce ultimately attracting more moderate liberal lay elements in opposition to Khomeini. This was based on the assumption that Khomeini could not construct or keep a functioning government, thus economic decline, unemployment and exasperation by literate Iranians would create a situation in which Khomeini would eventually be ousted. I also predicted a feudal breakup of the country in which urban-oriented leftists would control the capital and some other large northern cities such as Isfahan, Meshed and Kerman, while provincial ethnic or tribal groups would take advantage of the army’s virtual impotence to assume de facto autonomy in their respective regions. The Kurds would resist central authority in Kurdistan, the Azerbaijani Turks would control that province, the Arabs of oil-rich Khuzistan would resist strong central control, the Qashqais and their close neighboring tribes would enjoy autonomy in the south, and Baluchi separatism would begin stirring again in southeast Iran.

I also suggested that “before the left seizes urban-labor power, various conservative middle-class landowners, pro-Shah and military elements in Iran or abroad will seek secret Western backing and support.”

I concluded that the feudal picture painted by this scenario “will provide the U.S. with neither a reliable source of oil nor political influence in Iran,” and that “the situation will beg progressively for U.S. covert interference as the only viable alternative to chaos and a hostile government antagonistic to U.S. policy aims and infecting other oil-bearing Persian Gulf areas vital to our economy.” And, you will recall, I predicted that “as U.S. influence declines, there will be pressure from [Page 71] the administration on CIA to find political action solutions in Iran; congressional/public concerns for Iran will provide an atmosphere permitting such operations.”

That the above scenario is unfolding as predicted is no tribute to my prescience; it is the result of an entirely inevitable, predictable dynamic. That the administration made an honest try to get along with Bazargan, provide military supplies, etc., was good insofar as the onus of the deterioration of relations now rests firmly on the Iranians. But, if this short-lived policy of accommodation with Khomeini was based on a genuine conviction that Bazargan or some other reasonable government under Khomeini could work and cooperate with the U.S., then this policy was demonstrably unworkable.

At any rate, the situation as it stands today is:

—The left on one major occasion on 12 August 1979 tested its street strength with impressive showing. That it has not made a serious bid for street control and power is probably based on the conviction that the time is not ripe. Khomeini, particularly now that he benefits from a new anti-American wave, is not yet dislodgeable [less than 1 line not declassified] and economic disintegration has not reached an advanced enough stage. The left is still biding its time.

—The moderates in Iran’s political spectrum are becoming rapidly disenchanted, and with Khomeini having obviously jettisoned responsible government in favor of medieval Islamic bigotry, totally devoid of statecraft, this process will accelerate rapidly.

—The various “conservative, middle-class land-owners” referred to above seem, indeed, to be finding a rallying point in Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar has, in all likelihood, or will seek, Iranian expatriate private backing and will probably seek backing from the U.S. if he has not already done so (feelers through the Qashqai, etc.). Bakhtiar’s move, if it ever comes, (or some other move by moderates, possibly military) will precede a leftist bid for urban power and the leftists will be the urban beneficiaries of civil war in the streets. They will have the advantage thus of not having to take on Khomeini, a semi-deified saint in the eyes of Iran’s common man; they will instead pose as the champions of order in the face of a bourgeois effort to depose Khomeini.

The groundwork for the other feature of my scenario, tribal, provincial autonomy, is already taking place. The Kurds clearly are beyond reach of the center and intend to stay that way even though it means withdrawing into the mountains. Khuzistan Arabs, possibly incited by Iraq, have had to be brutally suppressed by Admiral Madani (who has now resigned and may not be replaced by such a resolute man). And, [1½ lines not declassified], the Qashqai strategy is to build a tribal coalition to maintain southern tranquility ostensibly as a favor to Khomeini, but actually to get into position to bid for power under a nationalist banner in the event of civil war in which Khomeini is martyred. In many ways, the Qashqais, using a provincial base of power, are [Page 72] aiming to do in the south what the left intends to do in northern urban arenas.

POSSIBLE U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

[1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

a. Provide secret encouragement and give material assistance to Bakhtiar as the moderate opposition figure who seems to have the most momentum. But this course of action must presuppose that he can overthrow Khomeini and form a viable alternative government. I believe he may be able to upset Khomeini, providing two things: (a) he can rally some kind of viable military underground which can seize street power in the face of both leftist and pro-Khomeini street machinery, and (b) he can somehow get Khomeini personally out of the picture—[less than 1 line not declassified]. But, I doubt if Bakhtiar could last long if he did overcome the odds and take power. Either resurgent Islamic mass protest or leftist street disruption could prevent him from effectively ruling. He might well be assassinated by one fanatic or another. In sum, Bakhtiar, bearing an intolerable burden of ousting a saint, ill-equipped to contest on the street and with the best of luck armed only by an uncertain military force, and with no provincial backing (except the Bakhtiar tribe between Tehran and Isfahan) is not a good bet, in my opinion. [2 lines not declassified]

b. Let nature take its course in Tehran—monitor it but not influence it—until someone else rids Iran of Khomeini, [3½ lines not declassified].

The purpose of the following analysis is to explore in outline how we could achieve this latter alternative:

[heading (1 line) not declassified]

The Saudi Arabian Government must be assumed to be concerned and worried by events in Iran as:

a. A breakdown of Iran would lead to leftist, pro-Soviet control or, at a minimum, a feudal chaos in Iran. Geopolitically, either possibility must be frightening to the Saudis.

b. Evidence of Shia missionary zeal could pose a direct threat to Gulf Sheikhdoms who have significant Shia populations (Bahrain, particularly) and, more importantly, pose a possible—at least, theoretical—threat to the Saudi Shia population which dominates Saudi Arabia’s oil producing and refining regions near Dhahran.

c. Apparent U.S. impotence and inability to do anything once again underscores how little hope Saudi Arabia can put in the U.S. as its protector.

d. As a provincial vacuum in Iran provides its prime rival, Iraq, with a happy hunting ground for intrigue amongst the Arabs of Khuzistan (possibly also amongst the Kurds, although the Iraqis must view the Kurds as a double-edged sword).

e. As a situation in which an irresponsible clerical, nationalist government might revive irredentist agitation for the return of Bahrain.

[Page 73]

[2 paragraphs (9 lines) not declassified]

[1 page (heading and 7 paragraphs) not declassified]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 13, Folder 1: Iran (Tab B, Iran Notebook). Secret. Copies were sent to DDCI, DDO, and Chief, Near East and South Asia Division.
  2. A reference to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 which expanded congressional oversight and control of the CIA. See also footnote 2, Document 44.
  3. Secret.
  4. Attached; scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. X, Iran: Revolution, January 1977–November 1979.