1. This memorandum contains an idea for your consideration and further
exploration.
2. On 14 November 1979, you asked me if I had any ideas as to what action
we might take in view of the deteriorating situation in Iran—ideas
which, in my opinion, should be based on the premise that any viable
accommodation with Khomeini is
neither possible nor desirable. This does not address itself to the more
acute problem of the refugees.
Attachment
Paper Prepared by the Inspector General, Central
Intelligence Agency (Waller)3
Washington, November 15, 1979
INTRODUCTION
In May 1979, I sketched out a scenario (hereto attached)4 in which
the Iranian left would coalesce ultimately attracting more moderate
liberal lay elements in opposition to Khomeini. This was based on the assumption that
Khomeini could not
construct or keep a functioning government, thus economic decline,
unemployment and exasperation by literate Iranians would create a
situation in which Khomeini
would eventually be ousted. I also predicted a feudal breakup of the
country in which urban-oriented leftists would control the capital
and some other large northern cities such as Isfahan, Meshed and
Kerman, while provincial ethnic or tribal groups would take
advantage of the army’s virtual impotence to assume de facto
autonomy in their respective regions. The Kurds would resist central
authority in Kurdistan, the Azerbaijani Turks would control that
province, the Arabs of oil-rich Khuzistan would resist strong
central control, the Qashqais and their close neighboring tribes would enjoy
autonomy in the south, and Baluchi separatism would begin stirring
again in southeast Iran.
I also suggested that “before the left seizes urban-labor power,
various conservative middle-class landowners, pro-Shah and military
elements in Iran or abroad will seek secret Western backing and
support.”
I concluded that the feudal picture painted by this scenario “will
provide the U.S. with neither a reliable source of oil nor political
influence in Iran,” and that “the situation will beg progressively
for U.S. covert interference as the only viable alternative to chaos
and a hostile government antagonistic to U.S. policy aims and
infecting other oil-bearing Persian Gulf areas vital to our
economy.” And, you will recall, I predicted that “as U.S. influence
declines, there will be pressure from
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the administration on CIA to find political action solutions in Iran;
congressional/public concerns for Iran will provide an atmosphere
permitting such operations.”
That the above scenario is unfolding as predicted is no tribute to my
prescience; it is the result of an entirely inevitable, predictable
dynamic. That the administration made an honest try to get along
with Bazargan, provide
military supplies, etc., was good insofar as the onus of the
deterioration of relations now rests firmly on the Iranians. But, if
this short-lived policy of accommodation with Khomeini was based on a genuine
conviction that Bazargan or
some other reasonable government under Khomeini could work and cooperate with the U.S.,
then this policy was demonstrably unworkable.
At any rate, the situation as it stands today is:
—The left on one major occasion on 12 August 1979 tested its
street strength with impressive showing. That it has not made a
serious bid for street control and power is probably based on
the conviction that the time is not ripe. Khomeini, particularly now that
he benefits from a new anti-American wave, is not yet
dislodgeable [less than 1 line not
declassified] and economic disintegration has not
reached an advanced enough stage. The left is still biding its
time.
—The moderates in Iran’s political spectrum are becoming rapidly
disenchanted, and with Khomeini having obviously jettisoned responsible
government in favor of medieval Islamic bigotry, totally devoid
of statecraft, this process will accelerate rapidly.
—The various “conservative, middle-class land-owners” referred to
above seem, indeed, to be finding a rallying point in Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar has, in all
likelihood, or will seek, Iranian expatriate private backing and
will probably seek backing from the U.S. if he has not already
done so (feelers through the Qashqai, etc.). Bakhtiar’s move, if it ever comes, (or some
other move by moderates, possibly military) will precede a
leftist bid for urban power and the leftists will be the urban
beneficiaries of civil war in the streets. They will have the
advantage thus of not having to take on Khomeini, a semi-deified saint
in the eyes of Iran’s common man; they will instead pose as the
champions of order in the face of a bourgeois effort to depose
Khomeini.
The groundwork for the other feature of my scenario, tribal,
provincial autonomy, is already taking place. The Kurds clearly are
beyond reach of the center and intend to stay that way even though
it means withdrawing into the mountains. Khuzistan Arabs, possibly
incited by Iraq, have had to be brutally suppressed by Admiral
Madani (who has now
resigned and may not be replaced by such a resolute man). And, [1½ lines not declassified], the Qashqai strategy is to build a
tribal coalition to maintain southern tranquility ostensibly as a
favor to Khomeini, but
actually to get into position to bid for power under a nationalist
banner in the event of civil war in which Khomeini is martyred. In many ways,
the Qashqais, using a provincial base of power, are
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aiming to do in the south what the left
intends to do in northern urban arenas.
POSSIBLE U.S. COURSES OF ACTION
[1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]
a. Provide secret encouragement and give material assistance to
Bakhtiar as the moderate
opposition figure who seems to have the most momentum. But this
course of action must presuppose that he can overthrow Khomeini and form a viable
alternative government. I believe he may be able to upset Khomeini, providing two things: (a)
he can rally some kind of viable military underground which can
seize street power in the face of both leftist and pro-Khomeini street machinery, and (b)
he can somehow get Khomeini
personally out of the picture—[less than 1 line
not declassified]. But, I doubt if Bakhtiar could last long if he did
overcome the odds and take power. Either resurgent Islamic mass
protest or leftist street disruption could prevent him from
effectively ruling. He might well be assassinated by one fanatic or
another. In sum, Bakhtiar,
bearing an intolerable burden of ousting a saint, ill-equipped to
contest on the street and with the best of luck armed only by an
uncertain military force, and with no provincial backing (except the
Bakhtiar tribe between
Tehran and Isfahan) is not a good bet, in my opinion. [2 lines not declassified]
b. Let nature take its course in Tehran—monitor it
but not influence it—until someone else rids Iran of Khomeini, [3½ lines not declassified].
The purpose of the following analysis is to explore in outline how we
could achieve this latter alternative:
[heading (1 line) not declassified]
The Saudi Arabian Government must be assumed to be concerned and
worried by events in Iran as:
a. A breakdown of Iran would lead to leftist, pro-Soviet
control or, at a minimum, a feudal chaos in Iran.
Geopolitically, either possibility must be frightening to the
Saudis.
b. Evidence of Shia missionary zeal could pose a direct threat to
Gulf Sheikhdoms who have significant Shia populations (Bahrain,
particularly) and, more importantly, pose a possible—at least,
theoretical—threat to the Saudi Shia population which dominates
Saudi Arabia’s oil producing and refining regions near
Dhahran.
c. Apparent U.S. impotence and inability to do anything once
again underscores how little hope Saudi Arabia can put in the
U.S. as its protector.
d. As a provincial vacuum in Iran provides its prime rival, Iraq,
with a happy hunting ground for intrigue amongst the Arabs of
Khuzistan (possibly also amongst the Kurds, although the Iraqis
must view the Kurds as a double-edged sword).
e. As a situation in which an irresponsible clerical, nationalist
government might revive irredentist agitation for the return of
Bahrain.
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[2 paragraphs (9 lines) not declassified]
[1 page (heading and 7 paragraphs) not
declassified]
