261. Editorial Note
On April 16, 1980, President Jimmy Carter met with senior advisers and mission commanders to discuss the details of the rescue operation. The meeting took place in the Situation Room from 7:36 until 10:05 p.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) Among those present at the meeting were the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski; Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Chairman of the Joint Staff General David Jones; Secretary of Defense Harold Brown; leader of the Delta Force, Colonel Charlie Beckwith; Director of Operations, Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Philip C. Gast; the commander of the overall rescue mission Major General James Vaught; and White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan. (Jordan, Crisis, pages 254–264) Frank Carlucci, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, represented Admiral Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence. (Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, page 110)
[Page 702]As Brzezinski later recalled, during the briefing Carter emphasized that he would not interfere with operational decisions and would give the military maximum leeway within the approved plans. Carter emphasized that every effort had to be made to avoid “wanton killings.” He and Brzezinski also agreed to increase the number of helicopters planned for the mission from seven to eight, but held the number there rather than compromise surprise and secrecy with a larger armada. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pages 495–497) According to Jordan’s account of the meeting, the closest Carter came to direct operational orders was over the discussion of possible loss of life. Jordan quoted Carter:
“I think it is important to keep your mission simple. It will be easy and tempting for your men to become engaged in gunfire with others and to try to settle some scores for our nation. That will interfere with your objective of getting our people out safely. In the eyes of the world, it is important that the scope of this mission be seen as simply removing our people. If innocent people are killed, the Iranians will make a great public spectacle of it and will say we murdered women and children.” (Jordan, Crisis, page 254)
In his account of this meeting, Carter wrote that he was particularly impressed with mission commanders Vaught, Gast, and Beckwith. He gave them his complete confidence including the promise of non-interference in the mission. Carter noted also that the helicopters and transport planes were already in position, and, for the first time, they had eyewitness information on the location of the hostages. (Carter, Keeping Faith, pages 507–509)
The next day, April 17, Carter wrote the following diary entry: “Vance has been extremely despondent lately, and I called Warren Christopher in this morning to talk to him about what should be done. He advised me to meet with Cy late in the afternoon to add some personal concern to help resolve the problem.” Carter further wrote that he had spoken with Vance who for “the third or fourth time” had “indicated that he might resign.” Carter then wrote that “after he [Vance] goes through a phase of uncertainty and disapproval, then he joins in with adequate support for me. He said he would stay on, but afterward would reserve the right to say that he disagreed with some of the policies on Iran.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, page 511) Carter and Vance met from 5:30 until 6:40 p.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary)
Brzezinski recounted that a small group, which he chaired, began holding daily meetings to fine-tune the rescue mission. He noted that they had stepped up “efforts to deceive the Iranians by initiating a new round of negotiations while pressing publicly for all Americans to leave Iran.” (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pages 495–497)
[Page 703]As a part of this disinformation campaign, a message was sent to Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh on April 23 through Swiss Ambassador Erik Lang in Tehran suggesting that Iran and the United States “take stock of our respective positions in the crisis” and noting that the Carter administration was “willing to discuss practical steps to resolve the crisis as soon as possible.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 33, Iran Update 4/80) As Jordan recalled in his memoir, he volunteered to see Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh again. The meeting was arranged through lawyers Christian Bourguet and Hector Villalon. Jordan and translator Stephanie van Reigersberg left Washington on April 18 and met with Ghotbzadeh in Paris on April 19. (Jordan, Crisis, pages 264–267, and Saunders, “Diplomacy and Pressure,” American Hostages in Iran, page 135) Ghotbzadeh stressed that breaking relations had been bad, and, in answer to Jordan’s question, said that the hostages “are not important anymore,” but that it would still be “months and months” before they returned home. He also told Jordan: “I just hope your President doesn’t do anything rash, like attack Iran or mine our harbors.” Jordan reassured him that this would not happen. On April 19, Carter read Jordan’s report, which Jordan had written on the return flight, then called Brown to say “my last remaining doubt about the mission has been removed. Tell Colonel Beckwith to proceed.” (Jordan, Crisis, pages 265–267)
Carter recalled that Jordan had concluded from his meeting with Ghotbzadeh that “there is absolutely no chance the hostages will be released for two and a half to three months, and an even greater chance that it will drag on five or six months. This only supports the tentative decision that you have already made.” Carter also noted that he had been impressed with a report from hostage Chargé Bruce Laingen, urging strong action against Iran. (Carter, Keeping Faith, pages 511–512) The telegram from Laingen, received via the British Embassy in Tehran, is in Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Iran NODIS Cables Apr 1980.
No other records of these meetings have been found.