Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

260. Intelligence Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, April 18, 1980

COUNTRY

• Iran/Iraq

SUBJECT

• Former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar’s comments on his plans to return to Iran, on his recent visit to Iraq, on his problems with General Gholam Ali Oveisi’s plans, and on his support from Hassan Nazih [less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

• [1½ lines not declassified]

Summary: On 15 April 1980, former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar told a confidant that he now plans to return to Iran towards the end of May once some deficiencies in his plans have been corrected, once his staff in Baghdad is better organized and once he has had an opportunity to hold discussions on cooperation with former Iranian Oil Company Director Hassan Nazih. During 13–14 April, Bakhtiar was in Iraq for discussions with Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. Saddam Husayn agreed to support Bakhtiar, but was unsuccessful in getting Bakhtiar to agree to cooperate with General Gholam Ali Oveisi. Iraq is supporting Oveisi in his efforts to overthrow Ayatollah Khomeini by military means. Bakhtiar is reluctant to support Oveisi because of Oveisi’s past associations and because he thinks Oveisi’s plan will only cause the urban Iranian population to unite behind Khomeini. Bakhtiar warned Saddam Husayn about providing troops to Oveisi because it might give the Soviets cause to move into Iran, but Saddam Husayn discounted this. He also told Bakhtiar, whatever happens in Iran, Iraq does not want the U.S. to be able to reestablish its presence there. Bakhtiar also commented on the progress of his own plans: He said that his propaganda campaign and clashes of his supporters with Pasdarans are going well, that plans are underway to sabotage pumping stations on refined products lines, and that he has enough arms for his supporters, but is having trouble getting them to Tehran. End summary.

1. Former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar now plans to return to Iran in the latter part of May 1980. He had hoped to return to Iran by the end of April, but was forced to change his plans because of several new developments. Notably, in reviewing the plans drawn up by his staff, he noted some deficiencies which must be corrected prior to launching his movement. He is also disappointed at the delays that have occurred in getting his staff in Baghdad organized.

2. Bakhtiar went to Baghdad at Iraqi President Saddam Husayn’s request the weekend of 12–13 April and had numerous discussions with Barzan Ibrahim Al-Tikriti, Saddam’s half-brother, as well as a two-hour meeting alone with Saddam on 13 April. Saddam told Bakhtiar that he was willing to support him despite Bakhtiar’s refusal to cooperate with General Gholam Ali Oveisi who is also receiving Iraqi aid. According to Bakhtiar, one of the primary reasons Saddam Husayn wanted to talk to Bakhtiar was to try to obtain some form of cooperation between Oveisi and Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar refused to even consider cooperation with Oveisi for two basic reasons: One reason is Oveisi’s past association with the Shah and the second is that Bakhtiar does not accept Oveisi’s relying solely on a military solution to overthrow Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Bakhtiar told Saddam Husayn that Oveisi’s plan will not work because it will unite the urban population behind Khomeini. Bakhtiar warned Saddam Husayn about committing any Iraqi soldiers in support of Oveisi as such a commitment would provide the Soviets the option of moving into Iran. Saddam told Bakhtiar that he did not think there was much chance of the Soviets actually invading Iran, particularly because of the already heavy Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

3. What impressed Bakhtiar most about his discussion with Saddam Husayn was Husayn’s almost irrational fear of Khomeini. He was particularly concerned about what Khomeini might or might not be able to do among the Iraqi Shia.

4. In discussing big power involvement in Iran, Saddam Husayn said that one benefit of the revolution in Iran was that the Americans had been forced to withdraw in toto. The Iraqi President thought this was a positive development and he hopes the U.S. will not be able to get back into Iran in strength. ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: Saddam Husayn would look with disfavor on the evolvement of any situation which provides the U.S. the opportunity of regaining a foothold in Iran.) Bakhtiar disagreed with Saddam Husayn about the benefits of keeping a U.S. presence out of Iran. Bakhtiar argued that a big power presence is needed to counter the Soviet threat in the region, pointing out that while Iraq has no common border with the USSR, Iran has 2,000 kilometers of common border with the Soviets as well as bordering on Afghanistan. Given this situation, Bakhtiar, said, Iran must take steps to protect its independence. He pointed out how easy it was to kick out the Americans and commented given the same degree of Soviet involvement, Iran would have a difficult time getting rid of the Soviets.

5. In spite of Bakhtiar’s conversation with Saddam Husayn, Bakhtiar remains concerned about what to do with General Oveisi, and his desire to attempt to overthrow the Khomeini regime militarily. Oveisi, Bakhtiar says, considers it essential that a military decision be obtained before the politicians move in. Bakhtiar is concerned at the amount of support that Oveisi is getting from the Iraqis who find Oveisi’s arguments persuasive mainly because they fit in with the Iraqi view of Iran. ([less than 1 line not declassified]. Comment: [2 lines not declassified]) On 11 April, Oveisi was on the Iraqi-Iranian border assessing the situation. Reportedly he also conferred with Kurdish tribal leader Sardar Jaf. When he went up to the border, forces loyal to Oveisi occupied twelve deserted Iranian border posts. Oveisi will stay in Iraq until circa 16 April trying to determine whether it will be possible for his forces to carve out a substantial area of operations inside Iran, whereupon he will return to France.

6. Commenting on his own movement’s efforts, Bakhtiar said that part of his plan is already in operation and bearing fruit. He was referring to the propaganda campaign currently being conducted by two radios under his control and clashes between his supporters and the Iranian Pasdarans. In noting the success of his growing propaganda campaign, Bakhtiar pointed out that he is coming under increasing attack in the Iranian media. He believes this is an indication that his message is getting through. He has sent tapes back to Iran where they are copied and distributed throughout the country. Bakhtiar said that he would like to see more public relations support from Western countries. He is attempting to generate more support from liberal European groups. He plans a public appearance on 22 April in Brussels which is being supported by a liberal political group. He also plans to meet with West German Socialist Party leader Willy Brandt in Strasbourg at the end of April.

7. As his propaganda campaign increases, Bakhtiar will begin the next phase of the plan which will be to sabotage the transportation of refined oil products. Bakhtiar has obtained the advice of experts who say that the pumping stations on refined products pipelines are very vulnerable as Iran does not have the spare parts and expertise to repair them. Bakhtiar’s supporters are planning now to blow up some of these pumping stations. Large amounts of explosives have already been sent to Iran. Bakhtiar said that Saddam Husayn told him the major oil companies assume there will be sabotage operations against Iranian oil. As a result, Iraq has already been approached by the Japanese and several Western oil companies asking for increased liftings of crude. The Iraqi leader said Iraq has increased its sales of oil and is demanding a premium for these increases.

8. Bakhtiar claims he has a sufficient number of arms for his supporters. One problem though is that he has a fairly large quantity of arms in the Basra area, including AK–47’s, rifles, RPG’s, and grenades, that he would like to ship to Tehran. Current crackdowns in Kurdistan and Khuzestan are making the shipment of arms difficult for his group. They are now trying to smuggle the arms to southern Baluchistan and then move them from there to Tehran.

9. Another reason Bakhtiar is delaying his return to Iran is that he just recently obtained the support of former National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) head Hassan Nazih. Bakhtiar wants to devote more time to planning and discussions with Nazih whom he hopes to meet with soon. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: [2 lines not declassified] Hassan Nazih and his group have offered to support Bakhtiar. Abdal Rahman Boroumand, at one time a close associate of former Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, and currently an intermediary between Bakhtiar and non-national front figures, is holding discussions with members of Nazih’s group on how best to organize.)

10. ACQ: [less than 1 line not declassified]

11. [2 lines not declassified]

12. Washington Dissem: To State Exclusive for the Director, INR. To DIA Exclusive for the Director, DIA.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 93, Iran, 4/18/80. Secret; Specat; [handling restriction not declassified]; Exclusive. Sent to the Department of State, JCS/DIA, the White House Situation Room, the NSC Staff, and the CIA Office of Current Operations.