Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

262. Memorandum Prepared by the Iran Working Group¹

Washington, April 24, 1980, 8 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Cottam/Ghotbzadeh Conversation, 0800, April 24, 1980

Cottam said Ghotbzadeh’s first point was that his position was “very bad.” He was desperately fighting within the government to resist a turn towards the Eastern Bloc and he was losing. Cottam said Ghotbzadeh had always argued that he was the main obstacle to communist influence in the new revolutionary regime and it was possible that he was employing this argument to induce us to be more flexible.

The second point was that Ghotbzadeh’s preferred “salami tactics” would no longer work. His idea of a careful step-by-step to persuade Khomeini to change his position could not succeed now. Previously he had thought that family visits to Iran could have an effect on the Ayatollah. Now he thought there was little chance Khomeini would see any of them if they came to Tehran. There was little prospect that a gradual change in the atmosphere could lead to a resolution of the crisis.

Instead, Ghotbzadeh thought, he had to aim for something more dramatic. He had in mind working through the Arabs. He hoped that we could assist in stimulating an initiative with the Arabs. It was not clear what he had in mind, but it appeared that he wanted Algeria and Syria to undertake a mediation effort. It also seemed he wanted us quietly to encourage them to do this. There was some indication of a meeting of leaders of the countries involved which could result in a visit to Tehran and which could have an influence on Khomeini. Ghotbzadeh indicated Algeria and Syria were respected by Khomeini. Ghotbzadeh thought that he was in such a difficult position in Tehran that he was unable to take any initiative himself. Any initiative that was taken should appear to be spontaneous and originate with the mediating countries.

Ghotbzadeh said that anything we could do on our side to improve the atmosphere would be welcome. He mentioned Senator Church’s idea of a White Paper on Iran² in that connection.

Finally, Ghotbzadeh said that the hostage issue was not having any impact at all on the campaign for parliamentary elections.

1. Source: Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Precht. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “Mr. Newsom has seen Apr 24, 1980.” There is no indication as to the location of Cottam or Ghotbzadeh.
2. See footnote 5, Document 227.