Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

258. Memorandum From Marshall Brement and Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, April 17, 1980

SUBJECT

• Future Soviet Military Intervention in Iran (S)

Attached at Tab A is a CIA analysis of Soviet policy toward the Iran-Iraq conflict.² It argues that the Soviets are likely to try to avoid getting drawn into the conflict in a manner which could seriously damage their relations with either side. To date, the Soviets have sought to cast the blame on the US for the exacerbation of tensions between the two countries. However, pressure is mounting on Moscow to take a clearer stand, and lately Soviet commentary has evinced a slight tilt toward Iran. (S)

Although they could use the threat of Iraqi military intervention as a pretext to invoke paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Treaty of 1921³ to justify their own intervention, the Agency thinks the chance of their doing so is remote—in large part because of the danger that the US might respond militarily. They feel that the Soviets are more likely to try to maintain a balanced policy and attempt to preserve—and where possible extend—their influence in both countries through conventional diplomacy and economic means. (S)

The paper does not deal with a number of recent developments which suggest an attempt by the Soviets to exploit the instability in Iran and to prepare for possible limited military intervention. These include:

—[1½ lines not declassified]

—the dispatch of large numbers of ethnic Azerbaijanis back from the USSR, including prominent exiles dating back from the post-war Soviet sponsored Azerbaijan Democratic Republic;

—the apparent reactivization of the Azerbaijani Democratic Party which closely cooperates with the Tudeh;

—aid to ethnic dissident groups, including arms and guerrilla training;

—[1 line not declassified]

—upgrading of combat readiness of units in Transcaucasus MD. (TS)

These developments do not provide hard evidence that the Soviets have decided to intervene. The Soviets may well only be engaging in prudent contingency planning. But the Soviets could conceivably also be positioning themselves to take military action when and if it becomes desirable or necessary. (C)

The Soviets are now pinning their hopes in Iran on the ability of the Tudeh to increase its strength and eventually assume a position of power. The Tudeh is, for example, in far better shape today than the Bolsheviks were in the autumn of 1916. The Tudeh has consistently supported Khomeini for tactical reasons; in return Khomeini has granted the Tudeh a degree of freedom and autonomy not allowed other Leftist parties. The Soviets undoubtedly hope that this strategy will allow the Tudeh to dominate a post-Khomeini coalition. It is the best organized and best armed party in Iran. While it still lacks a strong popular following, it has been increasing its strength among key elements in society, especially the intellectuals and labor groups, and it recently has been actively attempting to recruit among the military. (S)

The continued revolutionary situation and consequent economic deterioration or, for that matter, Khomeini’s death or removal from the scene, could work to the Tudeh’s advantage. At present the middle class is weak and fragmented, and power is in the hands of the extremists—the mullahs who would take the country back to the fifteenth century, on the one hand, and the radicals who want to accelerate the pace of the revolution, on the other. Under these conditions, the Tudeh could well present itself as the only viable “modernizing” force capable of opposing the mullahs and implementing a true socio-economic revolution. Demoralized and disenchanted with the mullahs, many elements of society might acquiesce in, or at least not resist, a power grab by the Tudeh. (S)

Should the Tudeh take part in a popular front government, an Afghanistan-like situation might well develop where an appeal for Soviet forces to stem “counter-revolutionary bandits” may be made—a call the Soviets would find hard to resist, particularly if they are successful in Afghanistan. For this reason, it is extremely important for us to have counter-forces positioned in the area in order to make a Soviet decision to intervene as difficult as possible for them. This underscores the need for us to:

—monitor Soviet activity in Iran and the Transcaucasus very closely;

—accelerate our efforts to develop the RDF;

—continue to press forward vigorously with our search for facilities and other sites for pre-positioning and stockpiling in the Gulf;

—intensify our efforts to improve our bilateral relations with Turkey and to bolster Ankara economically, with the long-term goal of stationing some forces there for use in Mideast/Persian Gulf contingencies;

—improve relations with other Arab states in the area, particularly Iraq;

—set up a forum in the Alliance to discuss non-European threats to the Alliance;

—press the European allies to do more to bolster their own defenses on the Central Front; and, above all,

—keep the pressure on the Soviets in Afghanistan (the more they are bogged down there, the less likely they are to intervene elsewhere). (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran 4/1/80–4/18/80. Top Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Albright, Odom, Friendly, Deal, Henze, Griffith, Ermarth, Blackwill, Sick, Thornton, and Welch. A stamped notation at the top of the page reads: “ZB has seen.”
2. Paper prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, April 10, “Soviet Response to an Iranian-Iraqi Clash,” attached but not printed.
3. See footnote 3, Document 248.