Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

257. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 16, 1980

SUBJECT

• Group Discussion on Soviet Threat to Iran (S)

As you directed, Odom, Welch, Brement and I discussed the memo I sent you² (Sick and Denend could not make it). We had large areas of agreement, and lively differences. I try here to summarize them, and invite the others to comment further below, as needed. In a nutshell:

—There is a substantial Soviet military threat to Iran, in both the near and the longer term, most likely to be triggered by (a) US military action, or (b) the need of a promising pro-Soviet regime for support.

—The judgment in my memo on Soviet expectation of the need to use force and willingness to do so may or may not prove correct; but it is overstated in the light of current evidence. (Three-to-one against me here; I’ll stand pat on my judgment, however.)

—We do need to do more faster in building our security posture in and for Southwest Asia. But it will take more than apocalyptic opinions to generate the requisite additional money and political energy. (S)

Some key points in the discussion:

Bill expressed some skepticism about the extent and novelty of Soviet military upgrades in the Transcaucasus.³ In a day or so, we’ll be getting a complete inventory of what they’ve done since December, and the supporting evidence. The senior DCI staffer on the problem told me today he regards the activity as extensive and novel, but not signifying imminent (days, weeks) operations. He says it looks like they are meeting a new force readiness objective some months in the future. Marshall argued that the Soviets probably regard their military improvements as a prudent response to turmoil in the region, and they need not be linked in Soviet thinking to any specific contingency or schedule. The US forces buildup in the Indian Ocean would be enough to rationalize it. (S)

Marshall argued, with Bill’s support, that the Soviets have a preferred strategy for gaining dominance in Iran, in which they have justifiable confidence: A Tudeh-dominated regime, arising out of a post-Khomeini “popular front” and able to consolidate its power without direct Soviet intervention. If this regime were seriously threatened with overthrow from within, the Soviets would intervene to preserve it. But the Soviets see their main military task as deterring US military intervention. I argued that a Tudeh regime would almost inevitably be met with widespread armed resistance requiring Soviet intervention, as in Afghanistan. We were all quite unsure as to how fast the rise of a Tudeh regime could come about. (S)

Marshall was of the view, on balance, that the Soviets would probably not intervene militarily to prevent the emergence of an effective Islamic regime, even if it sought to liquidate the Left. He also judged that Soviet public disaffection over the costs of the Afghan war, assuming it is not a fairly quick victory and well over by the time of a decision on Iran, would have at least some inhibiting effect on a Soviet repeat performance in Iran. I agree strongly on this point; it’s a very powerful case for making the Soviets bleed in Afghanistan. (S)

Jasper contended that Soviet force readiness improvements in the Transcaucasus are only marginally relevant in comparison to other factors since (a) Soviets would need many other units in any case and therefore (b) Soviets are free to manipulate indicators in Transcaucasus in a disinformation program. The other, more important factors are (a) the gross power imbalance in the region, (b) the dominance of internal Iranian developments in any Soviet calculation, (c) Soviet willingness to risk any level of direct military confrontation with the US, (d) US readiness to oppose a Soviet move, and (e) reaction of our European allies. Put simply, grabbing Iran militarily is worth it if the West acquiesces but is not worth it if the West is galvanized to isolate the Soviet Union and thereafter extinguish its penetration into the third world. We tended to agree on this. We also tended to agree that we are arguing over variations on a deeply gloomy prognosis. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 32, Subject File, Iran 4/1/80–4/17/80. Secret. Sent for information. Brement, Welch, and Odom concurred.
2. Memorandum from Ermath to Brzezinski, April 15. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “Fritz: discuss with WO-MB-JW & GS—and give me a report. This is important. ZB.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 65, Outside the System File, Iran Non-Meetings Hostage Crisis 4/80–11/80)
3. Memorandum from Odom to Brzezinski, April 16. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 27, Box 6, Iran 4/80–8/80)