Office of the Historian

256. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, April 16, 1980, 9–9:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • Iran

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Warren Christopher
    • David Newsom
    • Robert Owens

  • OSD

    • W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

  • JCS

    • Lt. General John Pustay

  • CIA

    • Admiral Stansfield Turner

  • Treasury

    • Robert Mundheim

  • Justice

    • John Harmon

  • White House

    • Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • David Aaron
    • Lloyd Cutler
    • Hedley Donovan
    • Jody Powell
    • Joseph Onek

  • NSC

    • Gary Sick

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The SCC reviewed a proposed list of additional non-belligerent sanctions against Iran. The following steps were unanimously recommended for Presidential approval:2

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1. Embargo all imports from Iran to the United States. This can easily be done under the existing provisions of IEEPA and amounts to approximately $1 million per month. Treasury will prepare the necessary implementing regulations. (C)

2. Prohibit the export of food and medicine to Iran. IEEPA provides authority to prohibit all exports except private donations of food, clothing and medicine. The SCC agreed that private donations would continue to be excepted since this includes packages to the hostages and clear humanitarian gifts. A finding will also be prepared under the Export Administration Act prohibiting exports on the grounds that Iran is assisting international terrorism by its acts. (C)

3. Prohibit the Use of U.S. Passports for Travel to Iran. There is statutory authority for the President to invoke measures short of war in order to induce the release of hostages. Use of this statute to prohibit using passports is subject to challenge under the provisions of the subsequent Passport Act which does not provide such authority for hostage cases. If applied to U.S. journalists, we can anticipate an immediate challenge; but court action will require some time. We can probably defeat such a challenge on grounds that the safety of U.S. citizens is endangered by remaining in Iran; however, we will not cite that as our reason in the initial announcement. (S)

4. Prohibit all Financial Transactions with Iran, Including any Transactions in Connection with Travel to Iran. If drawn tightly and applied immediately, this would prevent a U.S. citizen from buying a ticket to leave Iran. A group composed of representatives of State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce and the Counsel to the President will meet to draw up regulations which are as tight as possible to pressure all U.S. citizens to depart Iran as soon as possible. The group will also examine the potentially serious policy and constitutional problems relating to the application of this order (under IEEPA) to the press. (S)

5. Telecommunications. Matt Nimetz will meet today with representatives of COMSAT to explore the technical implications of interrupting satellite communications with Iran. It was agreed that continued contact with Iran was sufficiently beneficial for intelligence purposes and for maintaining contact with Laingen and intermediaries in Tehran that we should not order an immediate interruption by COMSAT. However, unless there are overriding technical reasons, we should call for an extraordinary meeting of INTELSAT members within 30 days to consider barring Iran from use of the INTELSAT system. The SCC recognized that we may be unable to muster a two-thirds vote in INTELSAT, but considered it desirable to signal our intent to pursue our efforts to isolate Iran internationally. (S)

6. Close Offices of Iran Air, the National Iranian Oil Company, and the Iranian Natural Gas Company in the United States. They would be given [Page 692] until May 1 to comply. The SCC considered closure of Iranian banks, but recommended against taking this step at this time since it would cut off the financial support of most of the 50,000 Iranian students in this country, many of whom are minorities. It could also prompt a massive shift of these students and other Iranian nationals to welfare. (C)

7. [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

The SCC also considered denying landing rights and port facilities to foreign airlines and ships serving Iran. This is a secondary boycott and totally inconsistent with U.S. efforts to defeat the Arab boycott against Israel. It would create major policy problems for the U.S. and with our allies. The SCC recommended against such moves at this time.3 (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 14. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote “Zbig, J” in the upper right corner.↩
  2. Carter approved items 1–7 with a checkmark and initialed “J” in the right margin beside each item. On April 17, Carter issued these additional sanctions against Iran in Executive Order 12211 and notified Congress of his intent in an April 16 letter. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 714–717)↩
  3. Carter wrote “I agree” in the right margin.↩