Office of the Historian

251. Memorandum From Robert D. Blackwill of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, April 11, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Iran and the Allies (U)

After listening to the President’s clear exposition to Stobbe this morning2 on the gravity of the Iranian situation, and in view of the [Page 680] President’s sharp sense of urgency, I am moved to express my concern that our message to the Allies on Iran is not getting across in a blunt and unambiguous way. In his Wednesday meeting with the Allied Ambassadors, Secretary Vance declined to speculate on military options open to the United States if current sanctions proved insufficient. But, according to the reporting telegram, “he did make clear that there remain additional economic steps as well as non-economic measures.”3 Following this meeting I received several calls from European Embassies which indicated that they had interpreted Vance’s remarks to mean that we were not seriously considering the use of military force and that the Allies had some time in which to decide what additional measures, if any, they should take against Iran. This later point was reinforced in the Aide Mémoire that we sent out on Tuesday4 which said “we also strongly urge that Allied Governments give serious consideration to a complete break to relations in Iran in the weeks ahead, if Iranian authorities continue to reject efforts to achieve a peaceful solution.” (S)

I worry that Vance’s comments to the Ambassadors, which were quite different from those of the President, may have contributed to the vapid statement by the Nine yesterday in Lisbon.5 If we have in our own mind a clear deadline for European action against Iran (the President told Stobbe we had only a few days in which we could continue to act in moderation), we should so inform the Allies immediately. If we do not, and if we act militarily, they will certainly charge that they were surprised again by an Administration speaking with more than one voice and that they had been led to believe that more punitive steps on our part were not imminent. Such a straightforward message from us would also, of course, increase the likelihood that the Allies will come around. (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Iran 4/1/80–4/18/80. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “Zbig—Discuss with Warren. C.” Below Carter’s handwritten note, an unknown hand wrote “done.”↩
  2. Carter met with the Governing Mayor of Berlin, Dietrich Stobbe, from 9:13 until 9:20 a.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary)↩
  3. As reported in telegram 93885 to selected diplomatic posts, April 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800179–0127)↩
  4. April 8. See Document 246.↩
  5. See footnote 3, Document 247.↩