250. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting1
- PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- The Vice President
-
State
- Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
-
Defense
- Secretary Harold Brown
-
JCS
- General David Jones
-
The White House
- Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Jody Powell
-
CIA
- Adm. Stansfield Turner
MINUTES
The President: The likelihood of hostage release is remote. We need to review our options. Diplomatic moves not likely to be productive. We need to decide our actions and to set a timetable. I will go around the table and solicit opinions.
Warren Christopher: There are some non-belligerent options we should consider: no more exports/imports of any kind; blacklist Iranian ships; blacklist airline companies that service Tehran; embargo telecommunications; remove all items from pipeline; go back to the UN.
We need to give the Europeans some time to respond to our request for embargo.2 (Then discusses the down side of the blockade mining option for Americans, Europeans—it does not resolve the hostage issue.)
Harold Brown: The proposed diplomatic initiatives are not impressive. Moreover, they will push Iran toward Soviet bloc. For example, Aeroflot could step in. There are punitive military options, but a blockade could complicate relations for us with the Gulf states and even the [Page 678] Soviets. Mining is less dangerous, though the Soviets could be invited to sweep. Neither, however, resolves the hostage issue.
We should therefore consider the rescue. Latest plans reduce the possibility of disaster, but some deaths are unavoidable. A decision needs to be made very soon—no later than within the next three weeks:
Stansfield Turner: The negotiating option is not really open. The only non-belligerent option is to get Khomeini’s advisors to convince him that it is immoral to retain the hostages. Mining would have impact on internal stability if undertaken before the harvest comes in.
As to a rescue, it is probable that all of the hostages are now in the compound.
David Jones: (Describes in detail the mining option.) The rescue option has been well rehearsed. It may be too late to undertake it in May–June. The current scheme calls for two nights and one day—and we are losing nighttime (describes the operation in detail).
The Vice President: Rescue is the best option. We are in an intolerable situation which is humiliating to the United States. A blockade will enhance the humiliation while increasing Soviet influence in Iran. I come down for the rescue. We need a careful deception program, and we should explore the Iraqi aspects.
Jody Powell: We need a formula for explaining the timing of the rescue.
Zbigniew Brzezinski: Rescue is the best of the available action alternatives. If undertaken, it should be undertaken as early as possible; there should be a post-rescue punitive option, if the rescue fails; and we should consider taking prisoners to Egypt (as protection against new hostages being taken by the Iranians).
David Jones: The 24th would be the earliest date.
The President: I have talked this over with Rosalynn, also with Ham, Fritz, Jody, and Cy, and I have talked extensively with Zbig. We may have damaged our country by not acting sooner. (Impressed by Sadat’s views.)3 We have to go now on a stronger course of action. Our national honor is at stake. We have to go with the rescue. To do so we will [Page 679] have to keep it clandestine, even from people here in the White House. In the meantime, we can also use Christopher’s list and we could tell the Iranians that we are prepared to consider Khomeini’s demands in order to provide a cover for the rescue. We should also tell the allies we need more support and indicate that we may have no choice but to blockade. We need to move quickly—by the 24th if ready. (Cy prefers also the rescue option if we have to go the military route.)
(12:48 p.m.) So we ought to go ahead with the rescue without delay.
David Jones: (Outlines possible military deception designed to simulate the mining option.)
Zbigniew Brzezinski: (Argues for a diplomatic initiative and a mining deadline to maximize deception.)
The President: We need to plan for post-rescue actions in the event the rescue does not work.
(1:19 p.m.) OK, let’s go.4
- Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 7, Iran 4/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House. At the top of the page, Carter wrote: “Susan, My top secret pers file. J.” Susan Clough was Carter’s personal secretary. Vance was on vacation in Florida. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 492–493) Jordan also attended this meeting and for the first time learned of the rescue operation. (Jordan, Crisis, pp. 249–251) In his memoir, Carter quoted from his April 10 diary entry: “The Iranian terrorists are making all kinds of crazy threats to kill the American hostages if they are invaded by Iraq—whom they identify as an American puppet.” He then wrote: “We could no longer afford to depend on diplomacy. I decided to act. On April 11, I called together my top advisers.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 506)↩
- See Document 246.↩
- Sadat met with Carter in Washington April 8 and 9. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) In a March 28 meeting in Giza, Sadat had told Sol Linowitz, Special U.S. Negotiator for the Middle East, that, because of Iran, the Soviet Union would not withdraw from Afghanistan and that, after Khomeini died, Iran would move to the left and the Soviets would exploit such a development. “In Iran,” he said, “anything can happen.” Sadat also reaffirmed that he would allow the Shah to remain in Egypt. He told Linowitz that the Shah was “very bitter” toward the United States. (Memorandum from Linowitz to Carter, April 1; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 4, Egypt President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin 4/80 Cables and Memos 3/25/80–4/9/80)↩
- As Jordan later recalled, his support for the rescue mission had sounded “lukewarm.” He wrote to Carter that “once you are satisfied with the soundness of the rescue plan, I believe you should proceed with the mission.” (Jordan, Crisis, p. 251)↩