252. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Iran and the Soviets (U)
I am concerned about the evidence we continue to get of steady, quiet build-up in the Transcaucasus for a Soviet military move into Iran. While I do not question current intelligence assessments that there is no indication that the Soviets are actually preparing to move, I am fearful that we are in danger of wishfully turning this rational assumption into a conviction that they will not move. I worry about the kind of mind-sets that afflict intelligence estimators and comfort policymakers and which led to conclusions, e.g., that the Soviets were not putting nuclear weaponry into Cuba in 1962 or that the dynasty was secure in Iran in 1978. (S)
I am worried also about the impact of increased pressure by us on Iran or punitive measures if the hostages are harmed. Given the utterly irrational state of mind that dominates elements in Tehran, and the intense hatred of Khomeini for America, a seemingly rational action such as a naval blockade could conceivably provoke an Iranian invitation to the Soviets to come in to protect them. Khomeini could give such intervention his blessing with a doctrine of “the lesser Satan.” The Iranian left, certainly capitalizing on current tensions to improve its position, could abet such a move. (C)
[1 paragraph (4½ lines) not declassified]
Do the Soviets want to invade? In the final analysis, I find it impossible to believe that the Soviets could resist temptation to take over most or all of Iran if the opportunity presented itself to them in a form where they could get themselves invited in as a protecting power. For more than 150 years, the Russians have aspired to advance in this area. Afghanistan has whetted their appetite; but Afghanistan will continue to cost with little prospect of return. Iran could be a paying proposition with its vast oil and gas reserves—the first really profitable territorial acquisition for the Soviets. It could help pay for Cuba and Ethiopia and help [Page 682] surround and subdue Afghanistan. If the Soviets were invited in to help frenzied Iranians defend themselves against America, they could anticipate almost no internal resistance, such as they have had to face in Afghanistan. (C)
[1 paragraph (17 lines) not declassified]
Unless we think in broad strategic and operationally bold terms, we are likely to stumble into a mess in Iran which will result in the takeover of the whole country by the Soviets. (C)
[1 paragraph (10½ lines) not declassified]
In contemplating possibilities for unusual, far-reaching actions against Iran, we should at least think about the potential for more effective action we might have if we were able to utilize bases in Turkey for this purpose. The state of our relations with Turkey during the 1970’s has, in spite of the recently concluded DCA, left us sadly limited in our capacity to utilize that country’s facilities. But how much is release of the hostages and settlement of our festering crisis in Iran worth to us? How much have we already expended on it? A half-billion dollars in military aid firmly committed to Turkey for the next three or four years would go a long way toward satisfying their needs for force modernization, would tie them in more firmly to NATO and would enormously strengthen the alliance in its southeastern sector. It does not seem to me that this would be too high a price to pay for utilization of Turkish bases for mounting a strike against Tehran. (S)
In terms of the kind of thinking we conventionally do these days, the “strategic thoughts” I have just outlined above might be considered justification for my incarceration in a psychiatric institution, an inverse American version of the fate of General Grigorenko . . .2 But I sense that we may be whipping ourselves up into a emotional frenzy over the hostages in Tehran which could inadvertently have far worse consequences which would do more harm both to us and to the world than some of the actions I have suggested thinking about . . . (C)
- Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Logged INT Files, Box I031, Folder 2, JEC INT 8002284–8006395. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Sick, Odom, Ermarth, Welch, Brement, and Griffith. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “helpful. ZB.” Below Brzezinski’s note, Sick wrote: “great—other than penultimate para!! GS.”↩
- General Petro Grigorenko was arrested and declared guilty of “prophesying” in 1964 when he criticized Nikita Khrushchev as “an ordinary zero” who would be out of power by the autumn of that year. A commission of psychiatrists sentenced him to prison and then to a psychiatric hospital. He was released in 1965 after Khrushchev’s fall from power in October 1964.↩