Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

25. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 13, 1979, 9:30–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President
• • State
  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Warren Christopher
  • David Newsom
  • Harold Saunders

• Defense

  • W. Graham Claytor

• JCS

  • General David Jones

• Treasury

  • Secretary William Miller**

• Energy

  • John Sawhill**

• Justice

  • Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti**

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Frank Carlucci

• White House

  • Hamilton Jordan
  • Jody Powell**
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Colonel William Odom
  • Gary Sick

**Present for discussion of domestic issues only.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Domestic Issues:

1. Iranian Nationals. All agreed that a further act directed at Iranian nationals was not desirable today. The acts taken to date have been very effective,² but if we get into a routine of taking a new act every day it could be perceived as largely political in motivation. State will provide an advisory opinion by tomorrow on revocation of existing visas which have not yet been used, exclusion of further Iranian nationals from entering the U.S., and the best means for prohibiting or delaying issuance of additional visas. One possibility is to request that all new visas be referred to Washington for review.³ It was noted that about half of the visas granted in the past year were to minority groups (Jewish and Bahá’í), and a formal exclusion could impact on these groups. (S)

2. Unofficial Trade Embargo.⁴ On the military side, State and Defense have talked to the principal companies involved and they will cooperate on a quiet basis. Commerce will have a paper ready today cataloguing other areas of commerce except food. Treasury will provide a recommendation tomorrow on how best to proceed. Secretary Bergland has provided to the NSC a survey of food exports to Iran which will be examined today.⁵ All agreed that interference with food exports is quite different from other commodities and should be handled with great care. Any work on a trade embargo is to be handled as extremely sensitive. (S)

3. Iranian Assets. There was no unusual movement of Iranian assets from U.S. foreign branch banks yesterday. The initial report of withdrawal of Iranian assets appears to have been exaggerated.⁶ Major U.S. banks have been asked privately to keep us closely informed of any request for withdrawal and to delay action on the grounds of assuring authenticity of the order after the change of government in Tehran. All communications on this are to be conducted through Treasury. State [less than 1 line not declassified] will turn off [less than 1 line not declassified] normal contacts with banks. Treasury has done a draft paper for the NSC on steps to be taken in the event of a freeze, and the machinery is ready if needed. Iranian assets are estimated at $6–7 billion in U.S. banks, versus about $3 billion in U.S. bank loans to Iran. (TS)

4. Energy. Foreign and domestic reactions to yesterday’s announcement⁷ have been uniformly positive thus far. DOE has prepared a list of actions in three categories: (1) what we will ask the state governors to do when they are called in within the next week; (2) steps we would ask the public to take; and (3) steps the government would initiate. The first two relate primarily to conservation measures. Steps under consideration for government action include: improvements of the crude oil allocation system; modification of gasoline allocation regulations to prevent the distortions of last summer; better management of fuel stocks to prevent a precipitous run down; and acceleration of coal conversion. DOE is looking at a possible two-stage rationing proposal: first, a windshield sticker keeping each car off the road one day per week; and secondly, a backup coupon rationing plan. A small interagency group under DOE is looking at specific steps. It was agreed that any legislative steps should be carefully orchestrated to prevent getting bogged down in a lengthy debate on the Hill. The Governors of the IEA will meet in Paris next Monday and we will need to consider what we ask of them. (C)

5. Demonstrations. Justice will recommend that Interior revoke the automatic permit previously granted to a group of Iranian militant students to demonstrate in Washington. We expect the students to challenge this in the courts. State and Justice are working together on this and believe there is a decent chance that the revocation will be sustained. (C)

Political-Military Issues:

1. Investigation/Trial of the Shah. Ramsey Clark is to talk to Professor Falk to persuade him to drop his efforts at an international tribunal. All agreed that a show trial was unacceptable as a means of seeking release of the hostages. (S)

2. Eilts Mission. Hermann Eilts will arrive in Washington this afternoon. Instructions will be drafted immediately following the meeting in preparation for the President’s meeting with him.⁸ (S)

3. Fluor. The SCC agreed that it would be best to permit the negotiations between Fluor and the Iranians for departure of their personnel from Isfahan to proceed without public comment for the moment. It was felt that drawing public attention to the issue would risk hardening the Iranian position. Fluor is now down to 25 people. They may be required to remain for another week to coordinate turnover to the Iranians and other foreign nationals. (S)⁹

4. UN Security Council. The Iranians are calling for a UNSC meeting to establish a commission to investigate the Shah’s crimes and return his assets to Iran.¹⁰ All agreed that a formal debate in the Security Council was undesirable, and Ambassador McHenry has been instructed to attempt to turn off the request.¹¹ If a UNSC meeting cannot be avoided, we would take the position that there should be no discussion of the Shah until after the hostages are released, since that represents a clear violation of the UN Charter and international law. (C)

5. Diplomatic Relations. The SCC believed that severing diplomatic relations with Iran at this point would complicate the efforts which are presently under way, including the PLO and the Iranian Chargé who is trying to get a meeting with Khomeini. It could also introduce unpredictable and possibly unproductive consequences from the Iranians; however, the possibility of a break in relations should not be precluded as part of a larger deal. Secretary Vance felt that other friendly nations would probably resist any attempt to persuade them to join us in breaking relations. The British Ambassador only yesterday recommended to London that they cut back as far as possible but maintain their staff in Tehran. The Mexican withdrawal is related to their own expectation that the Shah will return to Mexico at some point. State will do a more complete assessment of these questions on an urgent basis. (S)

6. Contact by Kurds. State has informed our Embassy in London not to meet with the Kurdish delegation seeking to contact us there.¹² We could probably not get the Kurds to do more than they are already doing, and the contact could be used as evidence of hostile intent. (S)

7. Embassy Security. State briefed the press last week on the precautions which had been taken at the embassy, but the story got little play. State will make the attempt again to get the story out. (C)¹³

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 105, SCC 198a Iran 11/10/79. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote “Zbig, J” in the upper right corner.
2. The actions to date included deportation proceedings against all Iranian students in violation of applicable immigration laws, in-depth inspections of documentation carried by Iranians entering the United States, emergency regulations identifying two additional grounds for deportation, the interview of students arrested for violations of local laws to determine the legality of their immigration status, and involvement of the FBI if found to be in violation. (Memorandum from Civiletti to Carter, November 12; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 29, Iran 11/1/79–11/14/79)
3. Carter wrote in the margin next to this sentence: “I agree.”
4. On the front page of the Summary of Conclusions of the November 12 SCC meeting, Carter wrote: “Zbig: Expedite proposal for unofficial economic embargo.” The meeting did not discuss an embargo. (Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 105)
5. Carter underlined “paper,” “recommendation,” and “survey of food exports” and wrote “to me” in the margin. Several of these papers were conveyed to Brzezinski under a November 13 covering memorandum from Sick. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 29, Iran 11/15/79–11/16/79)
6. See footnote 5, Document 19.
7. See Document 22.
8. No record of a meeting was found. For Eilts’s report on his mission, see Document 43.
9. Carter wrote in the margin: “Prepare for me a statement to be made if/when Fluor people are detained.”
10. As reported in a memorandum from Sick to Brzezinski, November 13. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 17, SCC Meeting #200 held 11/13/79)
11. Not found.
12. The Department instructed the Embassy not to “have any contact with dissident Kurds at this time. Any public suggestion that we are having such contacts could have dangerous consequences for the hostages.” (Telegram 294989 to London, November 13; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 30, Subject File, Iran 11/1/79–11/10/1979). The Embassy had requested instructions in telegram 22387, November 13, 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175–1684)
13. Carter wrote in the margin: “Let Jody & Hodding issue a written report—send me a copy.”