Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

245. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, April 7, 1980, 9–11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Deputy Secretary Christopher

• Defense

  • Deputy Secretary Claytor

• JCS

  • General David Jones

• Justice

  • Attorney General Civiletti

• The White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Mr. David Aaron
  • Mr. Hamilton Jordan
  • Mr. Lloyd Cutler
  • Mr. Jody Powell

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
• • NSC
  • Gary Sick (Notetaker)

MINUTES

The President read the latest report of telephone contact with Bourguet in Tehran,² then opened the meeting noting that the only item on the agenda was Iran. The last week had shown a profound change in the situation. The militants had offered to let the hostages be transferred to the custody of the Government, and the Government had refused. We are close to the point where we must take forceful action. We should inform the Allies privately and then publicly that they should break diplomatic relations with Iran, and we should prepare for forceful action, including the interruption of commerce. They need to know we have a very serious situation on our hands. We have bent over backwards, we have been patient and long suffering, and we could not have been more willing to wait for responsible action by Iran. The President saw no way we could raise the level of our activity on the diplomatic or negotiating front, including the actions of the five individuals (Capucci, Noland, Lang, Villalon and Bourguet) who have formed themselves into a crisis commission in Tehran. We have an obligation to some of our people there in Iran and we should let them know that they should come out. The President had read the list of options discussed previously by the SCC and was aware of the areas of agreement.³ His own preference was to bring the thing to a head, to ask others to join with us, and if they will not to move to take forceful action later on.

The Secretary of State noted that a draft announcement⁴ had been circulated to all participants in the meeting, and he suggested that it be made later today, possibly about 3:00 p.m., which would provide sufficient time to notify those who need to be notified, including those key congressional leaders who should be informed in advance. He noted that there had been some possible additional steps discussed by the SCC which should be reviewed in addition to those covered in the draft announcement.

The President said we are no longer involved in a negotiation with the terrorists. The obstacle now is the Government, with Khomeini as the ultimate authority of the Iranian Government.

Admiral Turner said he did not think it was that clear. Although that was a good line to take publicly—and it could be defended—it was not entirely clear that the militants would in fact have let the hostages go if ordered to do so by the Revolutionary Council.

The President said he included Khomeini in the Government. In that sense, it was not a radical departure, but the militants had for the first time stated that they would turn the hostages over. We should get it out of our minds that we are dealing directly with the terrorists. We need to expell the Iranian diplomats from this country as quickly as physically possible.

Secretary Vance said he recommended the announcement today, with the diplomats to depart by tomorrow night.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if we could enforce it.

Attorney General Civiletti said yes. The only difficulty would be if there was armed resistance.

Dr. Brzezinski said it was his view that we should confront any armed resistance with overwhelming force. It should be crushed quickly.

The Attorney General said he would argue against that approach. If there is armed resistance from the Embassy or Consulates, we should take the kind of measures which the FBI would normally take in such a situation and cut off the food, water and electricity and force them out within 3–5 days. If we should storm the Embassy and kill a dozen or more persons, the results could be tragic and have serious consequences for the hostages in Tehran.

Dr. Brzezinski said it would be worse if a siege should develop here supported by threats from Iran to kill or harm the hostages if the siege is not lifted.

Secretary Vance said he supported the Attorney General.

The President asked what would be the best time to take action.

The Attorney General said evening would be best. Immediate surveillance of the diplomats would be established, with full escort and the Embassy would be ringed. In effect we would take custody of them, although they would be free to move within a very restricted zone. We would stay with them.

Mr. Aaron pointed out that this would not constitute an arrest. They would have the 24–36 hour period to get out of the country.

The Attorney General said that they would arrest them if they violated the terms of their restrictions or failed to depart.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what would happen to the Embassy.

The Attorney General said it would be sealed, and no one would be allowed to enter. We would hope that a third power would be appointed as Protecting Power, and then we would permit some of them to enter as necessary. We have reports that anywhere from 15 to 60 non-diplomats either reside in the Embassy or move through it frequently. Some of them are armed.

The President wondered if this was the case only in Washington.

The Attorney General said it was also true of the Consulate General in Houston.

Mr. Aaron wondered in the event of resistance whether we could seize the Embassy.

The Attorney General said that would not be legal until the order to depart had expired.

Mr. Aaron wondered if we should not break relations. Would that give us more latitude?

Dr. Brzezinski noted they could barricade themselves in the Embassy and refuse to leave.

The Attorney General said that was the worst case. It was considered unlikely so far as the diplomats themselves were concerned, but we do not know about the others.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if tear gas could not be used to rout them out.

The Attorney General said he thought so.

The President asked what short of a declaration of war would give us the necessary authority to move into the Embassy.

The Attorney General said that a situation deemed beyond the control of local forces could justify a declaration of national emergency and the sending of U.S. troops.

The President asked if the Attorney General anticipated problems in the event of an announcement this afternoon.

The Attorney General said that he thought 3:00 p.m. was about right to move. We should begin during normal business hours. Afterwards we would seal the Embassy. We would let people out, but let no one in, and we would hope the numbers inside would be reduced by attrition.

The Secretary of State wondered what would be the interaction between this action and the Iranian students who planned to march against the Shah. Where is this group likely to be between 2 and 4 o’clock?

The Attorney General said that they had a permit to march for the next three days. Between 2:00 and 4:00 they were scheduled to be in a prayer vigil. They proposed starting their parade at the Islamic Mosque and march a double circuit, ending at Lafayette Park. They had been negotiating yesterday with Police Chief Klutz, and an alternate location for the final demonstration had been agreed. They were banned from Lafayette Park. We can ban them from any location near the Iranian Embassy—as far as ten blocks if we wish. The demonstration was expected to be a group of about 200.

Dr. Brzezinski said in his view nothing would be worse than a prolonged siege. We should employ surprise and clear them out of the Embassy before they had a chance to react. Otherwise, if it drags out, the situation will work to our disadvantage and the militants in Tehran could threaten to kill the hostages.

The Secretary of State said that we could not surprise them. They were already expecting this and had shipped some documents out of the Embassy to the UN Mission.

Dr. Brzezinski said that perhaps there would be no resistance. If so that was good. But we should gain control of the facilities right away.

The Secretary of State said that in his judgment there would be no surprise.

Dr. Brzezinski said that they should not be allowed to barricade themselves in the Embassy.

Mr. Aaron noted that we have reports that the Embassy will be closed today.

Mr. Sick observed that a conversation between the Chargé, Ali Agah, and an unidentified individual yesterday evening indicated that the Embassy might be closed today and/or tomorrow in protest against President Sadat’s arrival in Washington.

Mr. Cutler said the best time to move would be in the evening. The diplomats could be picked up outside the Embassy.

Mr. Aaron observed that 30 or more are reported to be living inside the Embassy.

The Vice President said he thought the evening would be the best time.

The Attorney General agreed, but added that he saw no real problem with the diplomats themselves. It was earlier agreed that we would not grant immediate asylum to any of the diplomats, but they need 24 hours at least to get out of the country. That could be from 3 o’clock today until midnight tomorrow night. He said he disagreed with Dr. Brzezinski only if there were armed resistance. He did not think it would be advisable to storm the Embassy.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if the Embassy could not be saturated with tear gas. It should be done quickly so no siege could develop.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense said he agreed with Dr. Brzezinski. A prolonged seige would be the worst possible scenario.

Mr. Jordan asked if those with weapons would not be in violation of the law.

The Attorney General said that possession of weapons within the Embassy at this time and until the deadline for departure had expired was not illegal.

The President asked what our position would be if we called the Chargé to the State Department and advised him to depart and he said he needed to go back to the Embassy to get some papers together.

The Attorney General said we would permit him to go to the Embassy. We cannot violate the Embassy premises until the expiration of the 24-hour notice. Presumably, if we broke relations and allowed only an hour to comply, we could do everything necessary. However, this would be contrary to traditional diplomatic law and practice.

The President wondered what would prevent him from going back to the Embassy and barricading himself inside.

Mr. Powell said that he was not a very gutsy individual, and it seemed less likely that he would do it than some others.

Secretary Vance said that the FBI had had experience with situations of this kind over the years. He had faith in their experience and ability to get people out of buildings.

Mr. Claytor said the FBI could starve them out, talk them out, freeze them out. But that would take 2–3 days which would give the militants the opportunity to use threats against the hostages. This situation was very different from the usual siege type situation.

Mr. Powell said he was not sure we would look inept if we cut off the Embassy utilities and if they barricaded themselves in against the law. After two or three days we could get them out and lock them up and hold them until our own people were released. Rushing in would just get people killed, and it could make us look even more stupid.

Mr. Cutler said that killing someone would put the hostages in greater danger.

Dr. Brzezinski said that tear gas did not kill people. He could imagine being forced to close off Massachusetts Avenue for several days during an armed siege. They could have stockpiled food and drink. It could take many days to get them out. We would look ridiculous if we could not enforce the law right in our own capital. We should use tear gas in the evening, preferably on the first day rather than the second.

Mr. Powell said we should make a judgment expeditiously when the situation arises.

The President said we would not foreclose the option that the situation might develop peacefully. If we take violent steps at the start we allow them no opportunity to leave on their own. However, if there is a barricade situation, we would not reject the use of forceful actions. If they hurt our hostages, they will be hurt severely. If we hurt them at this point, we open a new likelihood that our hostages will be injured. We should do it peacefully but firmly.

Secretary Vance said that the diplomats are required to depart from Dulles.

The President asked if we would escort them to the plane.

The Attorney General said yes. We are also prepared to put an escort on board if necessary. We also have contingency military aircraft available.

The Vice President said taking action in the evening makes sense. During the day there are people in and out. There is a chance they could grab innocents and hold them. If we moved at night, the innocents would be out of the building.

Mr. Cutler said that would also avoid any possible interaction with the proposed demonstrations.

Dr. Brzezinski said it was inevitable that the demonstrators would congregate in front of the Embassy.

The President said we should prevent any assembly or demonstrations around the Embassy and Consulates. He wondered if the announcement should be postponed until 8 o’clock this evening.

Mr. Powell said there would be lots of speculation throughout the day.

The Vice President said that would also avoid the heavy evening traffic and the danger of a shooting incident.

Mr. Cutler said the problem would solve itself if it turned out that the Embassy was closed today.

Secretary Vance said that would not take care of the Consulates.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered how we know they are armed.

The Attorney General said Secret Service observations had seen armed individuals inside. Of the Consulates at Houston, San Francisco, Chicago, and New York, the highest risk appeared to be in Houston because of the substantial student population and in Chicago where the head of the office was a rabble rouser and very nearly a fanatic. Weapons have been seen only in Washington.

The President said we would come back to the timing question. He noted that the sanctions should go ahead. The question was whether they should include food and medicine.

Secretary Vance said we have taken the position all along that food would not be used as a weapon. We would not get our Allies to go along with us on a food boycott. The closer we stick to the sanctions voted in the UN the better will be our chances to get others to come along.

Mr. Cutler agreed. Most food was already effectively blocked. Our position would have more moral force if we observed the sanctions voted at the UN. An embargo would accomplish nothing except publicly making us look tougher.

Mr. Powell wondered if the Allies will help.

The President said only if they think we will interrupt commerce.

Mr. Claytor said a blockade would also interrupt food and medicine.

Mr. Aaron said that our present announcement must have an “except” clause which requires us to explain.

Secretary Vance said the answer is simply that we are imposing the sanctions voted by the UN.

Mr. Aaron said that will attract attention to the fact that no one else is imposing these sanctions.

The President said we will call on the Allies to institute these sanctions. We will first ask privately, later publicly. He preferred that we go for now with the UN sanctions. We should call on the Allies forcefully to join with us. Then . . .(?)⁵ We need to get others involved even if it aggravates them. The situation is intolerable.

Admiral Turner said that no embargo of food would likely have a substantial impact. Cutting off all Iranian commerce would, but otherwise they will be able to find suppliers.

The President said the primary thing is not a mutual interest by five or seven nations, but rather to let Khomeini know he faces a problem not just with us but with others as well. Because of our actions, he is not convinced. In retrospect, he did not believe we had been firm enough. We had been too equivocal. He then turned to the question of a census of claims.

Mr. Cutler said we should make it clear that we intend to satisfy claims especially of the hostages and their families out of the frozen assets and that legislation is being introduced to that end.

The Attorney General said that suits and claims are pending now and could be satisfied by attachment except that the sovereign rights immunity prevents attachment. This could be removed by statute or it could be combined with extra rights and a claims proceeding which would recognize the right of claims for reparations.

The Vice President said that the freezing of $8 billion in Iranian assets was the one thing we have done which really hurt them. We will need to be in a position to bargain with that money for the final release of the hostages. Once it has been attached, we lose control.

Mr. Cutler said if we take ownership of the assets and establish a claims process, we are always in a position to settle on the remainder of the assets. But in the meantime we can pursue more vigorous steps.

The President asked how much money was involved.

Mr. Cutler said it was about $6–8 billion in the U.S. and $12 billion worldwide. We should only vest the assets held in this country, but that would be more than sufficient to cover any conceivable claims that might be made.

The President asked how soon we could have legislation.

The Attorney General said very quickly if we only wish to waive sovereign immunity. If we want to set up a claims process, that would be more complex, but there are ample precedents and it should be possible within a week to clearly define all the alternatives.

The President said we cannot bargain away the rights of the hostages.

Mr. Cutler said we never planned to give back all the frozen assets without first settling claims.

Dr. Brzezinski said he thought that we could send a message to Iran by use of the language in Option A⁶ but it would not lock us into a specific program. We would not wish to be faced with the need to extricate ourselves from legislation for purposes of negotiations.

The Vice President said we should keep the Congress out of this. They can vote any kind of attachment on these funds, and it would be impossible to vote against that sort of thing. They could vote half a billion to every hostage.

Mr. Cutler said the mere inventory of claims was a very modest step. It would take five years for individuals to pursue their claims through litigation.

Mr. Christopher said he was concerned that we do not know exactly where we want to go. He wondered if we wanted to go to Congress with all the hearings, etc.

Mr. Powell said Option A was not clear enough. We should say something about claims dispersal. He thought Option B⁷ was more appropriate.

Dr. Brzezinski said we could announce Option A and background the other.

Mr. Cutler said “claims are to be satisfied out of assets frozen by the previous Government order.”

The President was inclined to go for Option D.

Mr. Powell said we need to move forcefully. If necessary we can get congressional leaders down here and say what we need.

The President said we need to be able to move expeditiously if the hostages are released. We should keep any legislation honed down and specific. The legislation can be vetoed if it is too much. We can warn the Congress that special interest legislation is not acceptable. He could not see keeping the hostages and their families on tenterhooks for five years.

Dr. Brzezinski said this would make it more difficult to negotiate the final release.

Secretary Vance said that Option C would aid in designing a claims program.

The President said we would still have to draft legislation.

Mr. Powell said it would be known within 24 hours of the time we started.

Mr. Cutler said that the Congress will draft it if we do not.

The President said he could see no problem with drafting legislation.

The Attorney General said there was only a political problem. Should we, for example, put in reparations of $1,000 per day for each hostage held?

Mr. Cutler said he could see no problem. There was plenty of money to cover any foreseeable claims. If there were insufficient funds, that would be different.

The President said that since we must prepare legislation, we should go ahead. He thought that if we were perceived as acting forcefully for a change, that could keep Congress under control.

Mr. Jordan said he would hate to see us have to change legislation two months from now to negotiate a solution.

The President said the problems are going to be there anyway. We may face a struggle with Congress. He would prefer to let the courts handle this expeditiously. He was not a lawyer, but in the few weeks after the hostages are released—or killed—we should have a quick response.

Mr. Aaron noted that the President had earlier indicated a desire to raise with the NSC the proposal of stopping all financial transfers between Iran and the U.S. The main effect of this would be to cut off funds to the Iranian students in the country. Many would go on welfare. Others would probably leave. The SCC had decided that if we wished to get rid of the students, we should simply throw them out rather than use the financial weapon. It would be cleaner. This action was very close to a break in diplomatic relations.

The President agreed that this was probably not the way to go. He did want to discuss the possibility of a break in relations, however.

Mr. Claytor briefed the President on the number of Iranian military students in the country.

Secretary Vance asked what excuse we had to keep 500 military students in this country under these circumstances.

Dr. Brzezinski said that if they were not sympathetic to the Khomeini regime, they should be allowed to stay.

The President said we could offer them asylum if they want to stay.

Mr. Claytor said that the U.S. military would prefer to send them home if the diplomats go. A number of midshipmen are in U.S. colleges just like civilian students. They are paid through Iranian banks.

The President wondered what proportion of these Iranian students are supported by the Government.

Mr. Claytor said only 500 are actually paid by the Government of Iran.

The President said that the other thousands are supported by their families. He thought we should permit them (military students) to stay if they ask for asylum, otherwise he thought they should go home. We should have a viable option to break diplomatic relations.

Secretary Vance said we should do the expulsion first. If we then get the Allies to join us, we could all break relations at once. He thought, however, that the Allies probably will not break relations. They may withdraw all their people.

Dr. Brzezinski said it would be better if we did it now in a clean break.

Secretary Vance said that we previously told the Allies we would consider that in mid-May.

Dr. Brzezinski said that was when we were talking about a transfer first, with the break in relations to come if they did not follow through with a total release by mid-May. That situation is now changed since they have not agreed to a transfer of the hostages.

The President said he could not see what significance it should have for the Allies if we decide to break relations.

Dr. Brzezinski said that in view of the political situation, he thought a clean break in relations made a better package.

Secretary Vance said it could be argued, however, weakly, that a break in relations would change the diplomatic status of our hostages.

The President agreed that was a weak argument in view of the lack of respect they had shown for diplomatic immunity.

Mr. Claytor asked what effect a break in relations would have on student visas.

The Attorney General said that a break in relations would immediately affect how quickly you could act in cancelling A–2 visas, but it would not affect at all how quickly you could expel students. They could still delay through the courts.

The President said he did not think we should try to expel students.

Dr. Brzezinski said the Allies would probably not break relations. They have too much at stake. If we take the step several weeks from now, it will look like a weak and empty gesture. He failed to see why we should not do it now. The package we are considering is marginal. We should not dribble it out.

The President said it would forego an Iranian break with us which would make them seem to be more forceful than us. Our break should put a greater sense of responsibility on our Allies. We would be saying we were through with Iran, that we were washing our hands of it. Giscard, Schmidt, Thatcher, and others would see the ball was out of our hands and the responsibility was more their own. We should ask the Allies to respect the UN sanctions and let Iran know that they will break relations later if the problem is not solved. Our break in relations should not shock even our most severe critics.

Mr. Claytor wondered about the effect on the U.S. priests and others who had been going back and forth to Tehran.

Secretary Vance said that in terms of international practice, it would make no difference. However, psychologically it would make them less willing to continue their efforts.

Mr. Powell said the psychological effect of a break in relations would be to send a signal that this is the first step. The average citizen would see this as the possible prior step to some kind of military action.

The Vice President said that if they break first, we will look weak and reactive. He would like to get ourselves out of the position of being seen as trying to get the Allies always to go along.

Mr. Powell said it was important for us to signal that while we want the support of our Allies, we intend to do what we have to do. Maybe this is the most encouraging thing we could say to the Allies.

Dr. Brzezinski said it would also tell the Iranians that we have exhausted all steps available to us. He recommended that we say that explicitly and privately to the Iranians. We should also indicate that we will wait 2–3 more weeks, then take more severe action. They may threaten the lives of the hostages. It is necessary for the views of Khomeini, the Revolutionary Council, the President and the students to coalesce.

Mr. Christopher said he thought we should go ahead with the break in relations. Otherwise we are left with the problem of trying to explain the metaphysics of why this is different from a break in relations.

The President asked for views, then noted that the group was unanimous in their views, “Just like the Revolutionary Council.” He did not support cutting off financial support for the students, but we should cut off all visas. With regard to the “refugees from injustice,” phrase in the announcement, he thought that our interpretation of exceptions should be very narrow. We should not let them into the country. If they are truly escaping from persecution, that is acceptable.

Mr. Aaron suggested changing the wording to say that Consular officers will not let them in unless there are compelling reasons.

The President added unless there are compelling and proven reasons. The impression is that we have not done a damned thing. Just as the expulsion of 65 diplomats who then “vanished.”

The Attorney General said that nearly 1,400 Iranian students have left and we are pretty certain of that although we do not have a signed piece of paper to prove it in each case.

The President said that we are making tough statements, then when the evidence dribbles in . . .

Dr. Brzezinski suggested “compelling and convincing reasons . . .”

The President said if people are truly suffering, yes they should be let in. But if they are living comfortably in Europe or elsewhere, let them stay there. The guidance needs to be rewritten.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that we needed to discuss employment of measures beyond those adopted to date.

Mr. Christopher asked about timing of the announcement.

The President said he hoped he was not going to be informed that the Revolutionary Council was meeting to reconsider the whole issue.

Mr. Christopher said he would not be that brave. He did want to report that the Iranian Embassy was indeed closed today. Since the danger of a confrontation was primarily a Washington problem, he thought that an announcement as soon as possible after the meeting would be desirable.

The President said that we should forbid any demonstrations to go near the Embassy.

The Attorney General said they needed a little time to mobilize. Not just an hour or so.

Mr. Aaron said the demonstrators were probably assembling now.

The President said that we should notify the Allies in strict and cogent terms that the situation is intolerable and that we will take more forceful action unless the hostages are released. We should call on them to impose sanctions, break diplomatic relations, and use all available means to release the hostages. Our words should not be equivocal. This must not keep dragging on.

Admiral Turner noted one phrase in Khomeini’s statement was noteworthy.

Dr. Brzezinski said that Khomeini had mentioned visitation rights.⁸

Admiral Turner said that the hostages’ wives would wonder whether we will try to get someone in. We could also use visits to get more information about who is where.

Mr. Powell wondered if we should look to the UN for that.

The President said he did not attach too much significance to that statement. He had read it and it was equivocal.

Mr. Christopher said that the latest message from Ambassador Lang in Tehran said that the militants made Capucci promise not to reveal how many hostages he had seen and that he was to come back tomorrow for something important. This suggests a need to try and see where all the hostages are located.

The President said that, on timing, it would be at 3:00 and he would make an announcement.

Mr. Cutler said the news from Tehran suggested that the militants cannot account for all 50 hostages. Perhaps we should mention that.

The President said he would be queasy about acknowledging that there might be 50. The militants could use that as an excuse to get rid of some of them.

Secretary Vance agreed, noting we should be aware of the reaction of the hostages’ families.

(At that point, 10:36 a.m., the meeting was reduced to the statutory membership of the NSC.)

At 10:37, the NSC reduced itself to its statutory membership. The members at that point were: The President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dr. Brzezinski and David Aaron.

The President said that he was really quite disappointed in recent developments. Bani-Sadr is apparently too weak and lacks the courage to act. The Secretary of State agreed with him.

The President said that his own assessment was that we are embarked, finally and after great caution, on a procedure which he—he was interrupted at that point by Hamilton Jordan who asked about Congressional notification. Should the Congressional leaders be brought down to the White House? The Secretary of State pointed out that the Congress was not in session and the leaders would not be around. The President concluded that if we get a draft of the statement before noon, we can notify the key Congressional Leaders.

The President then continued his earlier thought. We have been adequately reticent. In retrospect, we may have delayed taking action for too long, although, at the time, it seemed the better course of action. Now, we need to consider additional steps. We need to force the Allies to help. If they will not, they must know that we will be taking more forceful action. The President said he thought that what we are going to announce today will not result in the freeing of the hostages. But he still believed that knowledge on the part of the Iranian officials, including such figures as Beheshti, that Iran is suffering and is increasingly isolated is a necessary step in getting the hostages released. He did not believe that we would get the help of Bani-Sadr if the action he must take to free the hostages is unpopular. Bani-Sadr is hanging by his fingernails already.

Turning to the military options, the President said that his inclination for the last few months has been the mining option. He did not believe that stopping ships at sea in a blockade would be operationally sustainable. Moreover, he thought it would put pressure on us from our Allies to desist, but if we simply go forward and mine the harbors, we could maintain the mining even if they were occasionally swept.

Mining would have the virtue of being an accomplished fact and, moreover, could be done without loss of life which the President thought is an important factor for safeguarding the lives of the hostages. At the same time, we would have to tell the Iranians that if the hostages are hurt, then military action would be swift and would be severe.

The President said that we have to think of counteractions to Iranian threats against the hostages, but the most important thing is to convince the Allies that we are going to take these steps rather than the Iranians.

Turning to the possibility of a rescue, the President said he had a bad feeling about the rescue operation. He thought that it would be extremely difficult to stay undetected and in Iran for 24 hours. He says that it sends shivers down his spine.

He wondered whether we had explored the other options such as paratroopers and moving the carriers further into the Gulf so that the helicopters could move in in one operation to pick up the hostages. General Jones said yes, that we had looked at those options and discarded them as being impractical. General Jones said that their confidence in the rescue operation has gone up even since the briefing at Camp David.⁹

The President asked why.

The Chairman said there were two reasons. First, the two individuals which we agreed would be infiltrated into Iran have been there and have looked around. They say it is perfectly safe to wander about the streets. The abnormal has become the normal. They were never threatened nor were they watched. They surveilled the Foreign Ministry, and they even went into the foyer. They went in routinely and got directions from one of the militant guards. Their conclusion is that the situation is so relaxed and so fluid that the operation could be conducted with low risk of detection.

The Chairman said the other reason was that the Otter mission was very successful.¹⁰ Moreover, they were looking at a modification of the plan which would involve caching fuel out in the middle of nowhere. He said, under those circumstances, we would still have to hide the helicopters in the shed for a day, but the caching of fuel would mean that the operation would be significantly less complicated.

He said a C–141 could drop the fuel 12 miles south of the area where the Otter explored. With fuel there ahead of time; the helicopters can depart from the carriers with the Delta team on board and, if the mission must be aborted, they can return to the carriers.

The Chairman said that our principal uncertainty is still whether the hostages are in the Embassy compound. He thought we may need to take some additional risks in order to get a better picture of that situation.

Turning to the schedule, he said the 17th is a possible date for conducting the rescue, but the 24th would be preferable. He would like to ask the NSC to look at the possibility of a decision to cache the fuel before that date. The operation would be conducted as follows: We would take in a C–141, drop four people and a little fuel and a jeep with some radios. They would go into the foothills, surveil the area to find a place to cache the fuel and to land an airplane, if that proved to be the desirable way to supply the fuel. If they run into trouble, they would come out either with an Otter, with a helicopter, or it is possible to literally snatch them from the ground with a moving C–130. However, the area was totally barren and appeared as though no human being had set foot on it for centuries.

The next night, three C–130s would come, and more people would be brought into the foothills. They would then continue the execution of the mission on into Tehran, or they would be pulled out and we would stay in a holding pattern.

With this scenario, we would still have the 24-hour waiting period around Tehran, but he did not believe that the risk of exposure is great at that point.

The President asked what would be visible during the day of waiting.

The Chairman answered that there would be no airplanes; there would be six helicopters, outside, up in these barren hills covered by camouflage. There would be 100 people waiting in the warehouse, which is located 12 miles from Tehran.

The Director of Central Intelligence said that the principal advantage of this is that there would be no more C–130s flying across Saudi Arabia the first night. General Jones said the seizure and holding of Nain has been eliminated and the overflight of Saudi Arabia has been reduced to only the second day when there would be no tip-off problem. Admiral Turner stressed that under this approach, the troops would come out from the carriers on the helicopters and not on a C–130.

The Chairman said that they were about two days away from completing planning on the fuel-caching operation. Once that is completed, he would then like to ask that we consider the possibility of caching the fuel. At the same time, we are looking at the place where the Otter landed to see if that operation could be simplified. He then went on to describe the Otter landing—the fact that they had encountered three trucks, but concluding that it was a much simpler, easier operation than had been anticipated.

Admiral Turner said that one of the members of the team with the Otter reported that he was on the road and could not see the Otter which had landed 100 yards away. He said that the Major who conducted the operation was confident that we could get away with it. He said that we would have to stop traffic on the road during the actual operation, but they had been successful in laying out an airstrip for the C–130s. However, he thought the option of caching the fuel and using only helicopters was a much better option because it avoided the C–130 overflights of Saudi Arabia.

The Chairman continued by saying that we will worry most about any tip-off during the 24-hour waiting period. If we got such a tip-off, we could just go in after our people or lift ourselves out to an isolated area where we could once again recover them with the C–130s.

He said he did not want to be optimistic, but if our planning looks good and our training demonstrates that the operation could be conducted, he would like to come back and seek a decision on the possibility of caching the fuel. The President asked how soon we could cache the fuel? The Chairman said in about a week, but we would like to aim for the 24th as a rescue date.

Dr. Brzezinski asked, if we are inclined to do this, what would be the actions we would take afterwards? Americans might be seized. He thought we would have to threaten severe reprisals if any remaining Americans in Tehran were harmed. Dr. Brzezinski also thought that we need a post-failure plan. Again, a massive retribution would be required if we wound up with a large number of our people killed or captured. Failure, he added, would have massive international consequences.

The Chairman said that they believe the possibility of a disastrous outcome is probably small, primarily because we are building in fail-safe points along the way. There is a much higher probability, however, that we would have to pull out without having conducted the rescue.

Dr. Brzezinski said that if we are inclined to do this, then we do not want to go ahead with mining or the military threats. We want the vigilance of the Iranians to remain at a low point.

The Vice President asked the Chairman what his judgment was of the likelihood of being detected on a scale of 0–100. The Chairman replied that it was well above 50%. The Vice President asked, if we were detected, what is the likelihood that we could get out? The Chairman said he would put that at 80%. He said the place is so relaxed, so without authority, so without leadership, so without organization, that he felt the likelihood of interception was small.

Dr. Brzezinski said the political advantage lies with the rescue over a mining option. Mining would drive the Iranians towards the Soviets. Rescue would not, unless it failed in which case retribution and retaliation become necessary.

Secretary Vance said that mining also increased the likelihood of the hostages being killed. He was concerned, moreover, about the effect in the Middle East generally. He thought there was a likelihood of a strong reaction on the part of the Middle East countries to a mining operation. Finally, he agreed it would push the Iranians toward the Soviet Union. He felt these were substantially negative considerations to be weighed when deciding on the mining option.

The President said the blockade had the same disadvantages. The Secretary of State agreed and thought that a blockade was even more complicated. Dr. Brzezinski said that a rescue was politically more desirable than mining, but considerably riskier.

The President said that what sticks in his mind is the bloodshed, the deaths. He said we cannot do it without deaths.

The Chairman commented that the principal casualties would be Iranians and not Americans, with the exception of those who may be down in the vaults and being closely guarded in the basements of some of the buildings in the Embassy compound. He thought the operation at the Foreign Ministry would not be too difficult.

Dr. Brzezinski said there was no way of avoiding the fatalities, including Americans. Indeed, we have had reports that some of the militants would try to kill the Americans even if Khomeini had ordered them released.

Admiral Turner thought the probability of Americans being killed was less than that we might not be able to find them all. He has been examining reports concerning the location of the hostages, but it was his conclusion that, with the recent arrival of the visitors, all the Americans had been moved back into the compound; however, he did not have hard evidence to that effect. But even if they are all there, the Delta force has to go through five buildings and count 50 heads, and they have to do this running around in the dark; therefore, under those circumstances, it is likely they would leave some behind.

Admiral Turner went on to say that surprise is the sine qua non of a successful operation. He thought there were elements of possible prior detection in the actions that would be announced this afternoon. He said these actions will increase the alert of the Iranians. The longer we wait: the more tense things become, and the more likely the possibility of detection. He said, at the moment, surveillance is down, but as pressure is applied, the Iranians will go back to a more vigilant stance.

The President said that we could have some diplomatic subterfuge. Admiral Turner suggested, for example, that we gear up another action by Waldheim.

The Chairman said that mining would not adversely impact on a rescue unless, as a result of the mining, the Iranians did something with the hostages that would reduce our capacity to free them. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we would want to save mining as a post-rescue option to deter subsequent actions against Americans left in Tehran. The Chairman concluded by saying that we should use the threat to work on a rescue operation, and come back in several days for a decision on whether to proceed with a fuel caching operation.

The President said we cannot make idle threats. We cannot sit here three or four weeks from now still wondering what we are going to do. On the other hand, he was still not inclined to do the rescue until the hostages’ lives were in danger. He said there is no question but what we will kill some of them. On the other hand, we cannot foreclose all our options. He noted the Secretary of State was against mining and he, himself, was against the rescue. There seemed to be nothing we could do.

Dr. Brzezinski said we could tell the Allies that we would take more forceful action by mid-May and then, if necessary, we could go earlier with the rescue operation. The President emphasized once again that he would not go for a rescue until the lives of the hostages were threatened. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that we might get that reaction with the break in the relations we were announcing today. Admiral Turner added that the trouble with that criterion is that if the hostages are threatened, the possibility of a rescue drops.

The President said he saw no objection to caching the fuel. The Chairman pointed out that we would have a lot of people on the ground during the operation. He said it was a fairly large operation. However, if we were to get away with it, we would gain confidence that we could also get away with a rescue undetected. He concluded by saying that if we are not going to go after the hostages until they are threatened, then he thought that mining was a reasonable alternative.

The President discounted that mining would drive the Iranians into the arms of the Soviets.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should send a message to the Iranians giving them a deadline by which time we would take an action such as mining. The President asked to whom we would send the message. Dr. Brzezinski indicated that we could send it to Khomeini. He felt that the history of his behavior indicated that he was subject to pressure and threats.

The Director of Central Intelligence said that we would be asking Khomeini to back off his current and most recent statement which was quite categoric and firm. The President said that he could always finesse the problem by constituting the Parliament. Admiral Turner pointed out that they have not gotten their elections completed for that purpose yet.

The President asked the Secretary of State what options he saw. Secretary Vance replied that he preferred a rescue over mining although he said there would be substantial loss of life.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we move forward on a more flexible program. We could tell Khomeini that by May 15 we would undertake military action. We could tell the Allies that unless they pressure Iran we would be taking more severe action. We could, at the same time, authorize the caching of the fuel and then, by the third or fourth week in April, we could make up our mind which route we wish to go.

The President said he thought setting a deadline in our messages to the Iranians is ill-advised. It would put their nation on alert. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that this would not affect the mining option, but the President added it would affect the rescue.

In reply, Dr. Brzezinski said we could nonetheless go earlier on the rescue, before the deadline, in fact: we could begin by setting June 1 as the deadline. Dr. Brzezinski then asked what about the daylight problem.

The Chairman said that there were two problems. First, the nights were growing shorter, thus reducing the time we have for operations and forcing us to consider a three-day operation. Second, by mid-May, the temperature will have increased to the point that it will be difficult to get the helicopters over the mountains fully loaded with the Delta team. Thus, we may have to consider the use of even more helicopters and more prepositioned fuel.

The President asked why the fuel cannot go into the rendezvous zone on the same night that the helicopters go in.

The Chairman replied that it is a possibility and, indeed, is one of our options. However, we then have a large number of C–130s and refueling aircraft going over Saudi Arabia in daylight of the first day of the operation.

The President asked at what point the helicopters needed to be refueled. The Chairman replied that the helicopters only have the range to get half-way to Tehran. The President asked whether they needed to refuel on the first night. The Chairman replied, “yes”; they would enter Iran on the first night, get refueled and then go on to Tehran.

The Chairman went on to explain that they are also exploring the possibility of having the C–130 tankers come out of Diego Garcia, but this required a lot of C–141 tankers as well.

Returning to the question of the shrinking nighttime, the Chairman said that, as the nights grow shorter, they would fly the helicopters in only a few hundred miles to a point where they could still return to the carriers should they be discovered. They would wait the night and then go on the second night to the point where they would pick up their fuel.

The President asked how much fuel was involved. The Chairman replied, “9,000 gallons.”

Dr. Brzezinski asked about the containers for the fuel. The Chairman explained that if we drop in the fuel, they will use blivits. These are essentially large tires containing 400 gallons of fuel each that can be rolled along the ground to a hiding place. However, if they land the C–130s, there is fuel inside of them, and the helicopters simply come right up next to the C–130s and are refueled. In this option, three C–130’s are used. The helicopters, after being refueled, go and hide in the hills outside of Tehran. The problem is that this requires overflight of Saudi Arabia during daylight hours which might tip off the Iranians somehow that an operation was under way. Therefore, we are looking at the combination of C–130s and C–141s refueling from Diego Garcia.

The Chairman concluded by saying that, in three or four days, we will have our analysis completed of these various alternatives, particularly whether the caching idea looks good. If we do not proceed with the operation soon, or if the prepositioning of fuel does not turn out to be a desirable option, we can in a few weeks send in the Otter to look for another landing site away from the road.

Mr. Aaron asked why we couldn’t have another Otter operation right away. The Chairman replied that we need good moonlight for the Otter operation. Admiral Turner added that the pilot found that he could see much better than he thought he would be able to with the night-vision devices that are associated with the Otter.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how much leadtime would be necessary to place the fuel if we should decide today to go forward with that.

The Chairman asked if he could approach the problem from the other end. If we were to go forward with the rescue, the Chiefs would recommend aiming for the 24th of April. While we could get it there within a week of any decision to go, our plans would call for putting it in the night before and then go right on with the rest of the operation. Alternatively, if we wanted to test our capacity to carry out this activity surreptitiously, we could put it in three or four days ahead of time. In that circumstance, they would camouflage and hide the fuel, and we would pull the men out. Dr. Brzezinski asked, that if they just went forward with the operation, what would happen to the men? The Chairman explained that the men who would do the hiding of the fuel and all the ground operations are part of the Delta team. They would simply continue on into Tehran as part of the activity there.

Dr. Brzezinski thought that trying this operation might be worthwhile so that we could see whether the risks proved to be as great as one thought. The President added that conducting a prepositioning of fuel operation would increase the risk of detection, but if successful, it would increase our confidence in being able to conduct the overall operation. The Chairman explained that a large number of planes over Saudi Arabia in the daytime might provide a tip-off to the Iranians that an operation was under way. Dr. Brzezinski added that the Israelis might well know of it, and they could be penetrated by the Soviets.

The Chairman said that, because our target date is the 24th, they would like to come back to the National Security Council in five or six days on a decision as to whether to cache the fuel. Admiral Turner asked how many C–130s were involved. The Chairman explained that there would be three. He said that we would come out of Diego Garcia the first night, and the second night we would fly over Saudi Arabia. The President asked whether it would be better to come out of Diego Garcia than Egypt. The Chairman replied, yes.

Dr. Brzezinski asked, that if we were aiming for the 24th, when would the Delta team have to leave the the United States. The Chairman replied, the 18th or 19th.

The President asked, how far do we usually put the carriers up into the Gulf? The Chairman said that we come as close as 60 nautical miles from the Straits of Hormuz, but we are normally operating farther away.

Mr. Aaron asked whether the British would be notified of our operations out of Diego Garcia. The Chairman replied that we could figure out a way to operate so that the British would not know what we were up to.

The President asked if there were any further observations. Admiral Turner said that he thought it was time to intensify our political action operations in Iran. [4 lines not declassified] Admiral Turner felt that, in the long run, [less than 1 line not declassified] neither Khomeini nor Bani-Sadr is going to be viable and will be replaced at some point. [1½ lines not declassified]

Admiral Turner also noted that we had been polite during this period of negotiations in the material broadcast [less than 1 line not declassified]. He would now like to be more strident.

The President replied that we will not prevent any group from making whatever moves they may make—that we couldn’t do so in any event. The Secretary of State asked whether the groups would then expect money if we gave them such a signal. [1½ lines not declassified]

This portion of the meeting concluded at 11:30 a.m.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 57. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
2. Not found. Swiss Chargé Kaiser reported that the final discussions within the Revolutionary Council took place “against the background of drastically worsening relations with Iraq, which are the actual dominating topic of the afternoon news.” He also noted: “These most recent developments with Iraq, behind which is also seen the work of U.S. imperialism, leave the impression that this issue is now the priority concern.” (Message from Kaiser to the Department of State, April 7; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 32, Subject File, Iran [Retained] 4/80)
3. See Document 236.
4. See Document 244.
5. As on the original. Apparently Sick did not hear Carter’s full comment.
6. See footnote 5, Document 244.
7. For an explanation of Options B, C, and D, see footnote 6, Document 244.
8. In a statement made on April 7, prior to the announcement of U.S. sanctions (see Document 246), Khomeini reiterated that the hostages would remain in the hands of the militant students until Parliament met and determined their fate. He noted that the “condition of the hostages and their place is good from every point of view.” (William Branigan, “Khomeini Bars Hostage Transfer Until Parliament Decides Issue,” Washington Post, April 8, 1980, p. A1)
9. See Document 217.
10. See footnote 6, Document 217.