Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

236. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 3, 1980, 9–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran/Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • David Newsom
  • Peter Constable

• OSD

  • General David Jones
  • Lt. Gen. John Pustay

• CIA

  • Frank Carlucci

• Justice

  • Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti
  • Judge William Webster
  • Robert Carswell

• White House

  • David Aaron
  • Hedley Donovan
  • Lloyd Cutler
  • Jody Powell
  • Henry Owen

• Office of the Vice President

  • Denis Clift

• NSC

  • Gary Sick
  • Alfred Friendly

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Iran Negotiations. Mr. Newsom reported on the latest contacts through Villalon in Tehran.² He had seen Bani-Sadr who was to meet with the Revolutionary Council today. The firm intention is for a transfer of custody of the hostages to occur on Saturday.³ The precise details of the role of the students once the transfer has occurred is “a great mystery,” but Villalon says he has made it clear that a joint custody arrangement is unsatisfactory. Reportedly there are still issues to be resolved in Tehran on the question of transfer. The SCC agreed that we should not encourage undue optimism through our public statements since this could all come apart as it has so many times in the past. Our basic posture should be to acknowledge the positive signals which are coming out of Tehran but to restrict our comments to the fact that the situation is very fluid and no comments are desirable at this time. (S)

2. Expulsion of Iranian Diplomats. The Attorney General reviewed for the SCC the problems associated with expelling Iranian diplomats. The decision to grant them five days to depart, to impose close and visible surveillance, and to avoid disruptive incidents were inconsistent. A considerable number of non-diplomats are present in some of the facilities (perhaps more than 60 in the Washington Embassy, for example) and arms have been stockpiled. By allowing five days, we increase the chances that these individuals will organize incidents which could have an impact on civil order here and possibly on the hostages in Tehran. The need for close surveillance over a five-day period increases the diplomats [refusal?] to leave or a refusal of the airlines to accept them. (S)

The Attorney General recommended that we assume responsibility for removing the diplomats from the facilities and transporting them to the departure point. There would be an initial demonstration of U.S. presence, including individual notification of the requirement to depart, then less visible surveillance in the interim, followed by official escort to the departure point. He recommended reducing the period of delay to the minimum and no more than 24–48 hours. If there is substantial resistance, we would attempt to defuse it by negotiating methods rather than the use of force. (S)

Judge Webster seconded this recommendation. He noted that the FBI had located all but two of the residences of the diplomats involved. There is no evidence to date of any plan by the diplomats to run or attempt to escape. There are thousands of Iranian students in all of the cities where facilities are located, and demonstrations are a significant possibility. Recent reports indicate one case of an individual entering the Embassy with an AK–47 submachinegun. Another report indicates armed guards on the roof. There are Hanafi Muslims on the grounds of the Embassy with hand guns. There is one diplomat in Chicago who has been linked to the militants, and we would keep particularly close surveillance on him. However, we want to avoid a “Keystone Kops” situation where police cars converge on the Embassy and Consulates from all directions as the diplomats come to work in the morning. Three teams of two men each would be assigned to each individual, and this would be increased as the moment of departure arrives. Agents in each of the locations have been notified to make preparations, but detailed instructions have not yet been sent to avoid leaks. (S)

Mr. Aaron strongly supported the idea of reducing the departure time for the bulk of the diplomats to 24 hours from notification. This would cause personal hardship in some cases, but their personal effects could be handled by those who remained behind. The Department of State preferred 48 hours, but eventually acquiesced to the 24-hour deadline. The Department of State will develop a plan for the exit of the diplomats from the country. The Defense Department will be prepared to provide transportation if necessary. (S)

Approve 24 hour notice⁴

48 hours

Other

It was also agreed that a Justice, State, FBI group would develop a plan for removal of diplomats. The plan could be reviewed tomorrow afternoon if required.⁵ (S)

The Attorney General noted that as many as ten of the Iranian diplomats may seek asylum here. Others, such as the Chargé in Washington, may apply for residence on the grounds that he has an American wife. Mr. Aaron said we do not want an expulsion which results in half the expellees staying here under various pretexts. He said we should be harsh in our interpretations of the rules. If the Chargé is required to leave under the order, he should go and then apply for residence from outside the country.

3. Additional Sanctions. Mr. Aaron noted that we need to consider measures which go beyond the three sanctions we had previously accepted. Those measures had been widely advertised and might be discounted in advance by Tehran. The Department of State circulated a list of possible measures they had developed for the discussion.⁶

Resolutions in the UNSC or UNGA. All agreed that any new condemnatory resolutions would fail due to the Soviet veto, and we might also lose support as compared to the past. However, this may become an option once the ICJ hands down a final ruling. That will probably be about a month. (C)

INS Tighten Up Examination of Iranian Students. The Attorney General said this was being done. However, the delay in deportation resulted from the requirements for due process. By utilizing all channels of appeal, the process could be drawn out for as much as two years. Another problem is confirming departure of those deported or choosing voluntary departure. We do not maintain INS presence at departure points. We have no established checks on departures from this country. Mr. Aaron said the airlines are supposed to report departures to INS, but the Attorney General said they often fail to do so. The SCC agreed that the Attorney General should crack down on the airlines to insure that they fulfill their reporting obligations. With that data, we can determine what further steps might be effective.

Revoke all Iranian visas and Revalidate only for those who have no residence or business connection with Iran. Mr. Newsom noted that we still may be receiving visas issued by the militants using the visa plates at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Instructions had already been prepared to implement this order if the decision is taken, with special instructions to give preference to minority groups. Mr. Sick noted that this would impact heavily on many Iranians who are friends of the United States and who have legitimate business and personal interests here and in Iran. Mr. Aaron said that was a cost that would have to be accepted so long as the hostages are being held. The SCC agreed that this should be placed on the list of steps we would consider taking in the event we invoke sanctions.⁷

Explore legislation to prosecute individuals supporting the militants. The Attorney General said that there are very few actions Iranians in this country might take which would justify prosecution. If we want to get rid of the students, there are better ways to do it than restricting their freedom of speech. The SCC agreed that this should be rejected. (C)

Prohibit Shipment of Food and Medicine. Treasury noted that the present level of shipments of food is very small. Henry Owen said he would look into the question and report back to the SCC.⁸ It was the general feeling of the SCC that food should be included in the sanctions, since we had imposed the grain embargo on the USSR. Medicine should continue to be excluded. (C)

Prohibit all Transfers of Funds from Iran to Iranians in this Country. It was noted that a cutoff of funds for the Iranian students here would force them either to leave the country or to go on welfare. Mr. Aaron noted that this would be an option if and when we should decide to break diplomatic relations. We had decided not to take that step for the time being.

Agree that this step should be held in abeyance.

Prepare to proceed if sanctions are invoked.⁹

Terminate Iranian Military Training Programs. Secretary Brown said that some of the military procurement people would leave if we expel the diplomats. The military students will go if we decide to act on other Iranian students. The SCC agreed. (C)

Census of Claims. Treasury noted that the inventory of claims against Iranian assets is the only part of the sanctions package which has not been widely publicized, or at least understood. That being the case, we could probably toughen it up by indicating from the start that this is a first step toward the preparation of legislation to bring claims against Iranian assets. Originally we had intended to be neutral and note that the inventory of claims could be used either to resolve the freeze or to eventually seize assets. All agreed we should indicate that this is a first step toward satisfying U.S. claims against Iranian assets.

Agree¹⁰

Keep it neutral as previously planned.

It was also agreed that Justice and Treasury should prepare draft legislation which could be introduced at some point in the future which would permit families of the hostages to bring claims immediately against the Iranian assets, even if no seizure of assets was ordered.

Concur¹¹ Other

[Omitted here is material on Libya.]

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 10. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote “Zbig, C” in the upper right corner.
2. Memorandum of conversation between Villalon and Precht, April 3, 8 a.m. EST. (Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 2) Ghotbzadeh had informed Cottam earlier that a “transfer ceremony” was scheduled for April 5, but implied a transfer was not guaranteed because of the students. (Memorandum of conversation between Cottam and Ghotbzadeh, April 3, 7:30 a.m. EST; ibid.)
3. April 5.
4. Carter approved this option with a checkmark and wrote in the right margin: “discuss at NSC mtg.”
5. The paper prepared in the Department of Justice, “Operational Outline for Expulsion of Iranian Diplomats and Closure of Diplomatic Missions (Draft No. 1),” April 4, is in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 100, Meetings File, 4/4/80 SCC re Iran.
6. Reference presumably is to the undated list, “Possible Further Measures Against Iran.” (Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 2)
7. Carter approved the item with a checkmark and wrote in the right margin: “for NSC.”
8. In an April 4 memorandum, Tim Deal of the National Security Council Staff wrote to Aaron and Owen that a U.S. food embargo would work only in the long run if other grain exporting countries imposed a similar food embargo. Deal concluded that “the only effective way to use food to put pressure on Iran now would be a multilateral embargo combined with interdiction at sea to prevent grain ships from entering Iranian ports. The political costs of this option would obviously be extremely high.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran 4/1/80–4/18/80)
9. Carter approved this option with a checkmark and wrote “NSC” in the right margin.
10. Carter approved this option with a checkmark.
11. Carter approved this option with a checkmark and initialed in the right margin.