241. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Sanctions on Iran (C)
I chaired an SCC for two hours Friday afternoon2 to review the status of our planning and options in the event we decide to proceed with sanctions against Iran. You now have the following package:
1. All Iranian diplomats and military officials will be expelled in 24–48 hours (except one who will clean up).
[Page 635]2. The Census of Claims against Iran will be accompanied by legislation to permit the families of the hostages to begin legal action against Iran and its assets in the U.S.
3. An economic embargo which could be total, if you decide to add food and medicine.
4. A cut-off in all visas for Iranians except humanitarian cases and exiles/refugees.
In addition, we are preparing for a new approach to our allies to urge further actions on their part—including the withdrawal of their Ambassadors shortly after our actions go into effect. We also are exploring some military “gestures” (surveillance, jamming, overflights) which would underscore the seriousness of the moment. The problem is that some of them may heighten Iranian military readiness and thus conflict with other options on which you have been briefed. JCS and CIA will do a quiet analysis before Monday.3
Finally, it is extremely important that the agencies get 24 hours’ advance notice so that everything will proceed smoothly and we remain in full control.
The following sets forth the specifics on the diplomats’ explusion and the decision needed on including food and medicine in the sanctions.
Expulsion of Iranian Diplomats
—From the time of notice of explusion, the diplomats would be allowed until the departure of the last plane out of the country the following evening to leave the United States.
—All Iranian diplomats and all official Iranian representatives of purchasing missions here would be included in the order. Only one diplomat now would be allowed to remain in Washington for an additional five days to handle turnover to a Protecting Power. Military officials will be expelled, but military students and their liaison officers would be permitted to remain.
—Those diplomats wishing to apply for residence or asylum would be permitted to do so from Europe or other locations after expulsion.
[Page 636]—Guidance was developed for the FBI and Secret Service in the event of demonstrations, resistance or other contingencies with an emphasis on avoiding incidents which could affect the welfare of our hostages. However, if the lives of FBI agents are directly jeopardized, they can defend themselves.
Economic Sanctions
—The SCC, with the exception of the Department of State, favored making the embargo total by including food and medicine in the sanctions. The arguments in favor of a food and medicine embargo are: (1) it merely formalizes what we are already doing, since virtually nothing is currently being shipped; (2) it increases the scope of the sanctions package beyond the measures previously publicized; and (3) it demonstrates U.S. determination to terminate all trade with Iran while the hostages are being held. The Secretary of State objects to the use of food as a weapon and believes that, despite the Soviet grain embargo, this is contrary to past Presidential statements. They argue that this goes beyond the sanctions voted by the UNSC, has little practical effect since our Allies will not join us, and will be viewed negatively by other states in the region. I have been unable to reach Secretary Bergland, Dale Hathaway or anyone else in charge of the Department of Agriculture. However, I would imagine they might oppose including food.
Your Decision4
Make the embargo complete
Exempt food
Exempt medicine
- Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 7. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner.↩
- Neither a Summary of Conclusions nor Minutes of the April 4 meeting has been found.↩
- April 7. According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Carlucci, discussion of military options took place after the April 4 SCC meeting devolved into a smaller group. Carlucci noted that while everyone agreed that a heightened Iranian state of readiness could complicate other options, they felt that such alertness would work to U.S. advantage “since when the Iranians adjust to heightened U.S. activity whatever we do would be less noticed.” Carlucci added: “I am somewhat skeptical of this.” (April 4; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator, Box 13)↩
- There is no indication that Carter approved any option.↩