Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

21. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 10, 1979

SUBJECT

• Iran (U)

My reading of Khomeini’s past behavior suggests that, although he is not a man who “bargains” in the normal sense of the word, he is capable of considering flexibility and even tactical retreat when he perceives that a specific policy is in conflict with his ultimate goals. We have a number of instances of such actions in the past. He opposed the original draft constitution but found that there was widespread support within his own government. So he permitted it to be published with his blessing—and then used the Council of Experts to make the Islamic changes he had wanted all along. He fired the army chief at one point, then reversed himself when he found that the army chief had more support than he had expected. The man was later eased out in a general “reorganization.” He decreed that there would be no more music, but music continues to be played in Iran. He called for all women to wear the chador but then allowed that to lapse when there was a general protest. He launched a major effort to incite the Shia population of Iraq but then pulled back when he was convinced that there was danger of an Iraqi attack. He has not changed his mind about the Shia question, and he has lately raised the temperature again, but he is being more careful. (S)

In considering our own strategy in the hostage situation, we should focus all our efforts on convincing Khomeini that continuation of his present policy is damaging to his long-term goals. Those goals I would define as two: universal recognition of the Iranian revolution as a new beginning in Islamic history; and his own retention of absolute power in Iran. (S)

Our strategy of mobilizing world opinion against the taking of hostages is aimed directly at the first of those goals, and I believe it has had considerable effect. The fact that Khomeini apparently felt it necessary to deliver a long statement of self-justification after his meeting with the Papal envoy² (atypical of his style), suggests that the message is beginning to get through. The Papal message, the courageous analyses of his representatives in Washington and New York, and the flood of messages from previously sympathetic or uncommitted observers throughout the world should at least have given him grounds for concern that the revolution is being seriously damaged. (S)

Of more immediate importance—and more difficult for us to influence—is his concern about his own power position. As you know, I am convinced that he is exploiting this situation (as he exploited the Kurdish situation) to consolidate his direct control. In each case, he has used a popular cause to rally public opinion against a well-identified enemy, thereby taking their minds off the failures of his own rule. He has also used these occasions to accomplish specific political objectives. In the Kurdish case, he appointed himself commander in chief of the armed forces, closed down a troublesome press, and banned opposition political activity which was beginning to develop some clout. In the present case he has disposed of the Bazargan government, which had become a thorn in his side. (S)

Just before going to Algiers, Bazargan had submitted to Khomeini a petition signed by most of the members of his government calling for the disestablishment of the Islamic Council of Experts on the grounds that they had exceeded their mandate in revising the constitution. Khomeini must also have known that Yazdi, Bazargan and others were meeting with U.S. [less than 1 line not declassified]—which he would interpret as nothing more than plotting against him. Although Bazargan was quite open in admitting his powerlessness, he also refused to shirk his responsibility to inform Khomeini of what was going wrong and the disagreeable steps necessary to correct it. Was he the bearer of bad tidings one time too many? (S)

Every policy option available to us should be examined first in light of whether it will contribute to persuading Khomeini that his own power position is being undermined by his present course of action. We have very little to work with, especially since Khomeini will be making his judgment in terms of the facts on the ground rather than words. Some thoughts:

—[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

—I have suggested to State that they take advantage of the telex link to Bruce Laingen (directly through the Iranian Foreign Minister) to give periodic updates on events as we see them. We could slip in a few facts to give the Iranians pause, e.g. the USG is being flooded with popular calls to take drastic action but the President is resisting. This telex link is probably the most authoritative way we have of communicating with the Iranians and we should try to use it imaginatively. (S)

Some of these thoughts [less than 1 line not declassified] might better be raised in David Aaron’s special group on intelligence. I am providing David a separate copy. However, my analysis leads me to the conclusion that ending the hostage situation and ending Khomeini’s absolute power in Iran are in fact two sides of the same coin. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 29, Iran 11/1/79–11/14/79. Secret; Outside System. Sent for Information.
2. See footnote 7, Document 19.