Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

19. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 10, 1979, 9:24–10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Warren Christopher
  • David Newsom**

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • General John Pustay

• Energy

  • Secretary Charles Duncan**
  • John Sawhill**

• Justice

  • John Shanafield**

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Hamilton Jordan
  • Jody Powell
  • Lloyd Cutler**
  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Colonel William Odom
  • Captain Gary Sick

**Those so marked attended only the discussion of domestic issues: Economic, Energy, Legal.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The SCC meeting was divided into two parts: first, a discussion of issues involving domestic considerations or with direct domestic implications; second, a more restricted group to discuss political/military issues.²

1. Demonstrations. After a close call yesterday,³ the District of Columbia has now forbidden any further pro- or anti-Iran demonstrations. There is a need for better coordination between State, Justice and the White House Counsel’s office to share information and facilitate decision-making. A joint working group comprising these agencies will be formed under chairmanship of the Attorney General. State will explore the possibility of getting the Iranian Government to request no further demonstrations here. (C)

2. Iranian Students. Justice, State and Cutler will report by Monday morning specific steps which can be taken in the immediate future. The most promising approach may be an order requiring all Iranian students to report to Immigration to verify their status. Such a survey would be helpful in clarifying the facts and would send a clear signal. Actual deportation would be a lengthy process.⁴ The Attorney General in August issued an order making the departure of Iranians voluntary, even if out of status. This was done to protect Jewish Iranians and others from being forced to return to Iran against their will. Congressman Fish has asked that this be revoked in view of the present circumstances. The consequences of such a revocation will be reviewed. (C)

3. Iranian Assets. There is a report that Iran has ordered the withdrawal of all their assets from U.S. banks.⁵ The Federal Reserve can probably delay acting on this, but private banks will find it much more difficult. By declaring a national emergency, all Iranian transactions could be blocked. Dr. Brzezinski and Lloyd Cutler will talk to Treasury Secretary Miller and ask that he contact Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker to see what can be done to delay any withdrawals without taking dramatic, overt actions. Their views will be sought on the implications of any freeze or other public act on our relations with other major depositors. (TS)

4. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

5. Energy. Secretary Duncan will present a memo on Tuesday⁶ outlining the range of options available to us in the event oil deliveries are cut off. Basically, these fall into four categories: (1) acts which the President can take unilaterally; (2) actions which the State governments can take; (3) voluntary actions; and (4) emergency legislation. (C)

The following issues were discussed in restricted session:

1. Future Options. David Aaron will chair a group composed of Hal Saunders (State), Frank Carlucci (CIA), and Robert Komer (DOD) to examine the longer term implications of a possible disintegration of Iran and how we could best position ourselves to influence the course of events. The group will look at means of improving our intelligence [less than 1 line not declassified], identifying groups which might cooperate with us, and evaluating contacts with expatriate opposition groups. (TS)

2. Evacuation. State is working with the Swiss to develop a plan for bringing our people out if they should be released. An incomplete survey indicates 87 known Americans still in Iran in addition to the hostages. There are probably others that we do not know about. The two largest groups are the Fluor personnel (about 50) building the refinery in Isfahan and 30 Americans associated with the international school in Tehran. Secretary Vance intends to inform Fluor to pull their people out or their passports will be revoked. (S)

3. Emissaries and Negotiating Efforts. Ramsey Clark in Istanbul is attempting to negotiate his entrance as a private citizen. Bill Miller will be told to return. An emissary of the Pope was to see Khomeini this morning. Four Ambassadors visited the hostages this morning.⁷ They saw the hostages (including 12 women) but could not talk to them. Waldheim is considering an emissary but wants to avoid crossing wires with the PLO representative who was reportedly in Qom yesterday.⁸ Secretary Vance has sent a message to Arafat encouraging his efforts at securing release of the hostages. Strong representations were made to Soviets to cease their propaganda.⁹ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 17, SCC Meeting #200 11/13/79. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. An unknown hand wrote on Brzezinski’s November 9 log of his activities related to Iran: “The P. told ZB he would use force, if necessary; ordered the development of various rescue and retaliatory options. Compartmentalization of SCC approved.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran 2/80)
3. On November 9, approximately 900 Iranian students marched through downtown Washington for 6 hours, escorted by more than 400 police. Hundreds of angry anti-Iranian counter-demonstrators confronted them. The original route of the march included the White House, but the Park Police and Capitol Police revoked the permit for demonstrations on Federal property. At the insistence of Washington Mayor Marion Barry, the city permits for the marches remained in place. (Tom Sherwood, “Barry Is Urged To Limit Today’s March by Iranians,” Washington Post, November 9, 1979, p. A1, and Felicity Barringer and Judith Valente, “Marching Iranians Cursed, Pelted Here,” Washington Post, November 10, 1979, p. A1) On a November 15 memorandum from Civiletti to the President, Carter wrote: “I prefer that we do our best to prevent permits being issued for pro- or anti-Iranians until hostages are free. Take our case to court if necessary. cc Cy, Zbig.” (Carter Library, Records of the White House Office of Counsel to the President, Lloyd Cutler, Box 10)
4. On November 10, the White House announced that the Attorney General would deport any Iranian students in the United States who violated their student visa status. (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, p. 2109)
5. As reported in a November 9 memorandum from Poats to Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 29, Iran 11/1/79–11/14/79)
6. November 13. See Document 25.
7. On November 9, the Apostolic Nuncio to Iran, Monsignor Annibale Bugnini, delivered a message to the Iranian Foreign Ministry from Pope John Paul II to Khomeini asking that Khomeini ensure the safety of the hostages. (“Ayatollah Gets a Plea From Pope on Hostages,” New York Times, November 10, 1979, p. 7) Khomeini rejected the plea. The text of his reply to the Pope was transmitted in telegram 8403 from Ankara, November 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790534–0161) On November 10, four diplomats—the Syrian and Swedish Ambassadors to Iran and the French and Algerian Chargés d’Affaires—were allowed to view some of the hostages, the first contact with the hostages by “outsiders” since November 4. (Don Oberdorfer, “Envoys See Captives,” Washington Post, November 11, 1979, p. A1)
8. Presumably Abu Walid. An untitled note, dated 5 a.m., November 9, relayed related information that had come from Arafat. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 30, Iran 11/1/79–11/10/79)
9. In telegram 292025 to Moscow, November 9, The Embassy was instructed to convey to the Soviet Government that two recent Soviet propaganda commentaries were “inflammatory and unacceptable in view of tense situation in Iran.” Shulman made a similar démarche to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790516–0154)