20. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

[cable number not declassified]

COUNTRY

  • [less than 1 line not declassified]

SUBJECT

  • 1. Coup plotting regarding Iran by Paris based group
  • 2. [2 lines not declassified]

SOURCE

  • [3 lines not declassified]
[Page 47]

1. A group of [less than 1 line not declassified] Iranian expatriates [less than 1 line not declassified] have formed a group, in Paris, France, to organize a new, pro-Western government in Iran. The group hopes to shut down oil production in Iran during November 1979 as part of its campaign to remove the current leadership from Iran’s political scene. The group is considering selecting either an Iranian general or former Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar to be the titular leader of the provisional government, which could be confirmed subsequently in a national referendum. A shadow government has been named to the extent of having three choices listed for each of several principal government jobs. Some of those on the list are Iranian expatriates, [1½ lines not declassified]. Bakhtiar [less than 1 line not declassified] is not everyone in the group’s first choice to head the government, but he is the most likely nominee because he already is in France, and previously has served as Iranian Prime Minister. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: [less than 1 line not declassified]2

2. The Paris group has made high-level contacts with at least two Persian Gulf governments in an effort to secure support for the venture. [3 lines not declassified] Major Western governments apparently have not been approached by the Paris group. The expatriates have not received any firm pledges of support from any foreign government; the search for signs of encouragement from such quarters continues.

3. The group’s timetable was dictated in part by [less than 1 line not declassified] the United States Government intended to replace or repair some of Iran’s military equipment commencing in January 1980. The group concluded its best chance of success involved taking action in Iran prior to that time. The expatriates reportedly believe the problem is not so much the ouster of the Ayatollah Khomeini as it is having enough support internally to keep a new government in power.

4. [1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified].

5. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: [4½ lines not declassified].)

6. Reference: [less than 1 line not declassified]

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 105, SCC 198a Iran 11/10/79. Secret; Priority; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Sent to the Department of State, DIA, NSA, and NSC.
  2. A November 10 CIA Report [text not declassified] identifies those members of the Iranian Army coalescing around General Fathollah Minbashian in France. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 142, Chron File, Sick 11/1/79–11/15/79) Sick thought Bakhtiar’s appeal was “directly proportional to Khomeini’s perceived vulnerability” and that “thus far, his movement has not gotten off the ground.” (Memorandum from Sick to Brzezinski, November 5; ibid.) On November 5, Turner had provided Vance and Brzezinski with an October 10 report on Bakhtiar’s activities for the month of September. (Ibid.)