18. Intelligence Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
COUNTRY
- Iran
SUBJECT
- Situation in and around U.S. Embassy in Iran as concerns instigators of the occupation, access to Embassy and security considerations2 [less than 1 line not declassified]
SOURCE
- [less than 1 line not declassified]
1. The decision to occupy the American Embassy in Tehran was made personally by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on or about 20 October 1979. Implementation of the plan was assigned to students from the religious center at Qom who have taken the title “Islamic Students Following the Way of the Imam”. ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: The Mujahidin-e Islam probably furnished advisors and officers (L-Encadrement) for the students.) ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: A confidant of former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar in Paris said on 9 November that the occupation of the Embassy was certainly a planned action authorized by Khomeini and therefore the identities of the occupants of the Embassy are not important in terms of freeing the hostages. The order will have to come from Khomeini. He suggested National Voice and Profile of Iran Director Sadeq Ghotbzadeh as the one person in the Khomeini group who might be relatively reasonable, but noted that Ghotbzadeh is not in Khomeini’s inner circle.)
2. The occupation was carried out by a group of about 100 persons but that number is now at least 200. The only group located outside the premises of the Embassy to guard against the curious is a team of “Guardians of the Revolution”, about twenty to thirty of them by day, and half that many at night.
[Page 42]3. The Moslem students in the compound possess no heavy arms. They have light weapons (G–3), grenade launchers, and hand grenades. ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: The G–3 is a 7.62 mm rifle, produced in Iran under license from the West German firm Heckler and Koch. It is similar to the U.S. M–14 rifle.)
4. As of 9 November, the students had published 17 communiqués and held several press conferences. After 6 November, the communiqués stopped, but a press conference was supposed to be held the afternoon of 9 November.
5. Since 7 November, the Embassy has been completely cut off from the outside, no one having gone inside except for Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali who went in the afternoon of 7 November. Journalists have not been permitted to enter, having been brutally pushed away by the guards stationed outside. The determination of the students seems certain. ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: [1½ lines not declassified] Khalkhali is the leader of armed group called “Islam Fedayeen” which is not the same as the Fedayeen-e Khalq who are against the occupation. It is possible the “Mujahidin Islam” [less than 1 line not declassified] and the “Islam Fedayeen” led by Khalkhali are the same group.)
6. ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: Except for some intellectuals knowledgeable of international law, the Iranians have absolutely no idea of the gravity of the action undertaken by the Islamic students at the direction of the Imam.)
7. The Iranians approve of the action in general, the only reservation expressed thus far having been those of new Iranian Foreign Minister Abdol Hassan Banisadr who was concerned on 7 November that Iranian ambassadors abroad might one day suffer the same fate. Since then, however, Banisadr has rescinded his statement, and as of 9 November, was seeing only the positive points of the students’ action.
8. Iranian opinion estimates that the action constitutes a humiliation which is without precedent, imposed by a small nation on a great power. The oppressed have finally had an effect on the oppressors. ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: This public opinion naturally does not take into account the consequences which their enterprise can have and are convinced that the United States will give in to their demands.)
9. In the mind of Khomeini, these demands are to obtain the extradition of the Shah, to judge him and to execute him in order to destroy the only dangerous enemy which remains. According to Khomeini, the Shah is the only person who is capable of endangering the Islamic Republic.
10. An American military action could be considered by the Iranians as a cause for war (casus belli) and could lead Iranian officials to call [Page 43] upon the Soviets, which is now permitted by a clause in the constitution. ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: In early November 1979, this particular clause was among several abrogated by the Iranian Government in the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921.)
11. ACQ: [less than 1 line not declassified]
12. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: Embassy and DAO at Paris. Sent to [2 lines not declassified] USCINCEUR, COMIDEASTFOR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCPAC, IPAC, CSG, PACFLT, PACAF, USNMR SHAPE for General Rogers.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 30, Subject File, Iran, [Retained] 11/1/79–11/15/79. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Sent to the National Security Agency, Department of State, DIA, Department of the Treasury, Secret Service, FBI, White House Situation Room, NSC Staff, CIA Office of Current Operations, and Department of Justice.↩
- An unknown hand wrote in the right margin: “did they have the info in advance?”↩