Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

199. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 5, 1980

SUBJECT

• Post-Hostage Iran

This issue is scheduled to be discussed this afternoon at the SCC Meeting on Security Framework. The State INR paper² provided for the meeting focuses very heavily on foreign policy of Iran. It takes the present political situation in Tehran as its starting point and then extrapolates what would happen if the hostage situation were removed as a consideration. In that sense, it is an accurate reflection of the current conventional wisdom. However, it does not pose the serious questions in a form which is sharp enough to permit policy decisions.

In fact, the foreign policy of Iran in the post-hostage period will be determined almost exclusively by internal developments in Iran. This may not be the moment for a high-level review of the sensitive and difficult policy choices which we will face, but the following is an attempt to spell out very briefly the kinds of approaches we might consider, the kind of operational decisions which we may be required to make, and some of the larger strategic issues which we will wish to consider.

Evolution vs. Activism

The State paper explicitly adopts an evolutionary approach. It takes the present system, structure, and personalities as its starting point and then considers how we can nurse it along toward our desired objectives of:

—A reasonably stable and unified Iran which is

—Strongly resistant to pro-Soviet subversion and external threats,

—Accessible to the West for political dialogue and economic development,

—Willing to maintain mutually beneficial contact with the U.S. on issues of concern to both countries, and

—Continued production of significant quantities of oil.

[1 paragraph (8½ lines) not declassified]

Short Term Policy Issues

The following list attempts to identify the specific policy issues which will require decisions soon after the hostages are released. For purposes of discussion at the SCC, these could be regarded as areas for possible contingency planning by the various agencies.

Diplomatic Relations. State has already done quite a bit of work in preparation for the Swiss to take over as protecting power for us in Tehran, on the assumption that we will maintain diplomatic relations but no physical presence in Tehran. Alternatively, we could break diplomatic relations. Will we continue to grant student visas? Should we explore the possibility for direct contacts with the Iranian leadership on neutral territory? What does State mean by a “Joint Commission” which is mentioned in the paper?

Spare Parts. Will we continue to embargo the supply of spare parts? If this is not part of a hostage release package, what is our asking price to lift the embargo? Can we realistically expect our allies to continue the embargo once the hostages are out?

Oil. Will we be prepared to make spare parts and technical expertise available to Iran? Could we prevent it if we tried? Can we bargain our supply of parts and expertise in return for access to Iranian oil ports by U.S. tankers? Are we interested in attempting to resume purchase of Iranian oil?

Allied Projects. Will we acquiesce in a return to business as usual on the part of our allies? Could we prevent it if we tried? Is it in our interest to encourage the allies to rebuild a Western commercial presence?

Assets. How do we manage the unfreezing of Iranian assets? What problems do we foresee? How long will it take? What steps can we take in advance to facilitate management of this very complex problem?

Intelligence. [2 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (7½ lines) not declassified]

Longer Term Policy Issues

The following is intended as a thumbnail sketch of the kind of policy issues which we will have to address in terms of our basic foreign policy goals once the hostage crisis is off our backs.

CENTO Redux. A combination of mutual need and common vulnerability will tend to drive Turkey, Iran and Pakistan together. We will want to consider how we can best encourage that natural tendency and how we might best exploit it for our own interests. This will have to be seen as an important component of our relations with Turkey in particular.

Iraq will be a key factor, particularly if the tendency to intervene in the oil fields evolves into outright Iraqi expansionism.

USSR. The threat of Soviet subversion and potential direct military intervention in Iran will have to be dealt with in terms of our regional approach and in the context of our global relations with the Soviets.

[1 paragraph (9½ lines) not declassified]

Friends and Allies. We should project to the Europeans, Japanese and friendly states in the Gulf a sense of our objectives and a clear indication of what we expect of them and how we can cooperate for mutual benefit. The sooner we have a clear picture in our own mind, the more effective we can be in getting the kind of cooperation we would like.

Domestic

There is a vast range of problems associated with the integration of our domestic policy and our foreign policy on Iran. It is not clear who should be doing this thinking and when it should begin, but the domestic dimension should not be overlooked in our policy planning.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 64, Outside the System File, Iran Non-Meetings Hostage Crisis 1/80–3/80. Secret. A stamped notation in the upper right corner of the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.”
2. See Document 192.