Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

198. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation¹

Washington, March 6, 1980, 8:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Rafi Ahmed, Special Assistant to Secretary General Waldheim
• Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State, NEA

According to his counterpart in Tehran, Ghotbzadeh after this morning’s meeting with the UN Commission stated that the Commission had successfully completed its work on the first part of its mandate. The second part of the mandate requires a meeting with the hostages. Because the Government had met resistance on this point, Ghotbzadeh had asked the Commission to stay in Tehran another 2–3 days.

Ghotbzadeh at that point said he could say no more. Very privately, however, he must have briefed someone in the UN entourage along the following lines with strong emphasis on total secrecy: The hostages will remain where they are. The turnover will take place tonight. The Revolutionary Council will meet late today to discuss details.²

Our two lawyers apparently told someone in the UN group that it would be better for the Commission not to go to the Compound before Sunday³ because the students might “leave something behind” (presumably booby traps). Nevertheless, the UN group is talking about a visit to the Compound on Sunday, partly because Pettiti is going to Paris and will be back Saturday. When and if they go to see the hostages, a team of doctors will accompany them.

Apparently Bani Sadr got approval from Khomeini for the Commission to visit the Compound.⁴ The reaction of the occupiers of the Compound was to issue this morning’s statement.⁵

Ahmed asked his counterpart how the U.S. should react publicly. The advice from Tehran was that the U.S. should not comment. The U.S. should avoid referring in any substantial way to the statement by the occupiers.⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, Iran 3/80. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Saunders.
2. According to Saunders, the Revolutionary Council accepted the students’ decision to turn over the hostages and the formation of a committee to work out details of the transfer. (Saunders, “Diplomacy and Pressure,” American Hostages in Iran, pp. 131–132)
3. March 8.
4. As related in telegram 59159 to all diplomatic and consular posts, March 5, Khomeini gave his approval to Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh on the evening of March 4, but the students sought verification. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800113–0968)
5. In his memoir, Sick wrote that the “Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Line at the Den of Espionage” issued a press release that stated, “What can one do when the officials and those who are in charge in the commission have accepted that whatever the commission wants must be done? We cannot bow to and comply with a view that we do not regard as being in line with the Imam’s policy. But since those in charge of government always regard our methods as a factor contributing to their weakness—always speak of a government within a government—thus, we declare to the Revolutionary Council, in order to allay any misunderstanding, to take delivery of the hostages . . . from us to do with them anything they deem appropriate.” (Sick, All Fall Down, p. 315) For the full text of the statement, translated by the BBC based on a Tehran radio broadcast, see Washington Post, March 7, 1980, p. A25.
6. Cottam reported that during a March 6 telephone conversation, he found Ghotbzadeh to be “exhilarated” at the turn of events. Ghotbzadeh told Cottam that the United States should treat the news in a “non-joyous” fashion. (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Memoranda of Conversation)