Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

192. Summary of a Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Washington, undated

IRANIAN AND U.S. POLICY AFTER THE HOSTAGE CRISIS

The attached paper, prepared by INR, discusses Iranian foreign policy in the post-hostage period. Its conclusions, assuming safe release of the hostages, are as follows:

—Regardless of whether President Bani-Sadr or one of his rivals eventually triumphs, the shape and content of Iran’s foreign policy will be the same.

—Iranian foreign policy goals include non-alignment, economic self-sufficiency, the elimination of Super Power influence, and influencing governments in the region towards Iran’s Islamic, populist and non-aligned outlook.

—Both Super Powers are viewed as malevolent forces bent on exploiting the region. The U.S., however, is still seen as the most dangerous threat to Iran, despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

—Iran will probably not give significant material support to foreign liberation groups in the immediate future. It will, however, encourage such groups to follow Iran’s example.

—Iran’s revolutionary ideas have unleashed a potentially significant force which could impair U.S. strategic interests. Those ideas should be considered in reaching any decision about how to protect U.S. influence in the region.

—The impact of Iran in the region will be conditioned by the ability of Bani-Sadr and his government to bring political coherence to the revolution, control dissident ethnic groups, and make some progress in economic recovery.

—An anarchic Iran will increase the danger of coup attempts and be a tempting target for external intervention and subversion, particularly from the Soviet Union and Iraq.

U.S. Objectives in Post-Hostage Iran

—Establishing the foundations for gradual movement towards an improved bilateral relationship.

—The preservation of an independent Iran with the ability to maintain its territorial integrity.

—Strengthened economic and political relations between Iran and the West.

—Containment of the Iranian revolution within its own borders.

—Increased Iranian differentiation in its perceptions of the relative U.S. and Soviet threats, and understanding of U.S. actions in the area to meet the Soviet threat.

—Stable relationships between Iran and Iraq.

Post-hostage Iran, as the paper suggests, will be extremely difficult for the U.S. to deal with. Even if the U.S. is able to overcome the domestic obstacles to rebuilding a relationship with Iran, the revolutionary government will continue to pursue policies vis-à-vis the U.S. bilaterally and regionally in the area which will impinge on our own strategic interests, e.g., clearing the area of all foreign presence, pressuring Pakistan to steer clear of a security relationship with the U.S., and reduced oil production.

In pursuing our objectives in Iran, we should work both bilaterally and through third parties, which may have to carry much of the freight, given the bilateral strains which are likely to persist. The bilateral relationship will be strongly affected by the degree to which the U.S. can be forthcoming on issues of importance to Iran, e.g., supply of spare parts for military equipment, settling claims and attachments after assets are unfrozen, Iran’s efforts to repatriate the Shah’s assets, U.S. visas for Iranians (particularly students) and by the perception of U.S. policies in the region, e.g., Arab-Israel, defense relationships and the U.S.-USSR confrontation. Underlying these issues will be the question of “acceptance of the Iranian revolution”—an Iranian psychological need which we are unlikely to satisfy in the near term.

Steps the U.S. and Others Can Take

—Open a dialogue with Iran on outstanding bilateral issues, initially through the operation of a Joint Commission or indirect contacts.

—Work closely with the Congress and the press to create a climate in the U.S. which recognizes the strategic importance of Iran and enables the U.S. to disentangle post-hostage issues such as assets and release of previously purchased spare parts with a minimum of friction.

—Use the Joint Commission as a forum for a political dialogue on the Soviet threat and U.S. responses to it in the area, including our activities in the Gulf and with Pakistan. Exchange intelligence assessments on area problems such as Afghanistan.

—Encourage our allies to take a forthcoming approach to Iran on economic and political ties with Iran, including provision of military equipment and oil field technology.

—Make clear to the Soviets our interest in Iran’s integrity and in non-intervention by external powers.

—Develop a dialogue with Iraq, either directly or through others, which emphasizes our mutual interest in a stable and secure Iran.

—Strengthen our relations with Gulf states in ways that lessen their vulnerability to revolutionary waves from Iran (e.g., dealing with corruption, meeting legitimate needs of ethnic minorities).

—Maintain discreet relationships with a variety of Iranians who might provide future leadership in Iran without encouraging their anti-revolutionary activity. Avoid contact with émigré groups that have little or no political future in Iran.

—Encourage the development of democratic forces in Iran that will permit groups favorable to us to survive.

These last points will have a critical impact on improvement in bilateral relations. It is important that we maintain access to possible alternatives to the present revolutionary structure in Iran. However, to the extent that the Iranian authorities believe that we are supporting these dissidents or potential dissidents, it will be virtually impossible to build a constructive relationship with the revolutionary government or to diminish the deeply held Iranian conviction that we are opposed to the revolution.²

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 110. Secret. The paper, attached but not printed, was prepared at Brzezinski’s request for the February 29 SCC meeting. (Summary of Conclusions, February 22; Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 14) The paper was based on a draft prepared by Grummon. (Memorandum from Grummon to Constable, February 25; Department of State, INR Records, Grummon Papers, Other Memos) His emphasis on Iran’s goal of promoting radical Islam was softened in the final version printed here.
2. A February 28 CIA assessment of the INR paper stated “we generally concur with the thrust of this analysis,” but added that CIA believed Khomeini would aid other Islamic revolutionaries in neighboring states both materially and financially. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator, Box 13) A paper prepared in CIA, “National Policy and Intelligence Considerations in Post-Hostage Iran,” February 21, argued that U.S. policy toward Iran after the hostage crisis should focus on an independent Muslim Iran as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism, and on major oil producer Iran’s participation in the Western economy. An addendum offered four policy options: 1) ignore Iran and have the U.S. defense line based on the Saudis, 2) back Bani-Sadr openly and offer Iran U.S. aid, 3) take a low profile and wait for the Iranians to “come to us,” and 4) allow and encourage NATO allies to take a greater role in Iran, especially in arms sales. (Ibid.)