195. Message From the Swiss Ambassador to Iran (Lang) to the Department of State1
1. It is 2:50 p.m. B and V asked to see me to inform you urgently of an extremely grave development.
2. This morning as scheduled the “students” were at the Foreign Ministry at 10 o’clock.2 As scheduled, the two Commission members Bedjaouni and Davoudi arrived at 11 o’clock.
2.a. As a dramatic gesture the students refused to meet the Commission members.
2.b. The students refused also to give a date for the Commission’s visit. Thus we have a test of strength.
3. The Revolutionary Council is meeting in extraordinary session this evening at 5:30.
4. Ghotbzadeh, with the agreement of Bani-Sadr, is going to propose in these conditions that the visit take place this evening or tomorrow morning in order to force the students to accept the Council’s ruling.
5. If the Revolutionary Council should refuse to go to a test of strength with the students then Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh jointly will propose that the Council submit its resignation to the Imam and all of the members should go to the Imam to tell him that it is either the students or us.
6. B and V are working hard this afternoon because if the test of strength takes place we should profit from it and after having forced open the door of the compound for the visit, we should move immediately to the transfer of the hostages as the intermediate stage.
7. B and V will insist strongly on this aspect.
- Source: Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Swiss Channel. Secret; Sensitive.↩
- According to telegram 58115 to multiple recipients, March 4, the students met with Bani-Sadr and four members of the Revolutionary Council late in the afternoon on March 3 but were unable to reach an agreement on a scenario for a visit to the compound. The telegram further noted that Reuter news service reported that the students insisted “that the Commission take testimony from the hostages regarding Iran’s grievances against the Shah and the U.S.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800111–1201)↩