Office of the Historian

196. Message From the Swiss Ambassador to Iran (Lang) to the Department of State1

Tehran, March 4, 1980

As Bourguet was leaving me, he telephoned Pettiti, who had been considering leaving. Bourguet begged him to remain. According to Pettiti, the members of the Commission were shaken by the showdown with the students and several of them would like to leave Iran. They are also quite concerned about the problem of their personal security because they see how things are going and also they believe that the actions of the students represent a real attack on the prestige of the United Nations.

Bourguet plans to be in touch with Bani-Sadr, with New York, and probably the State Department in order that New York will give the Commission an order to remain in Tehran.2

Lang’s personal remark from his experience in Iran: Impasses and tests of strength all have a dramatic character but as in the auto traffic of Tehran, one believes that a person who tries to force his way through will provoke an accident but in most cases he ends up by giving way. On occasion it is the others who give way.

  1. Source: Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Swiss Channel. Secret; Sensitive.↩
  2. In a March 5 memorandum to Brzezinski, Sick reported that Ghotbzadeh had visited the compound that same day and the Iranian students had “kicked him out.” Ghotbzadeh was concerned for his physical safety and referred to the students as “those idiot communists.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 32, Subject File, Iran 3/27/80–3/31/80) Sick relayed that Bourguet and others had received death threats. (Sick, All Fall Down, pp. 314–315) Precht called Villalon to request that he tell the Commission members, especially Jayewardene and Pettiti, to remain through Friday, March 7. Villalon noted that Ghotbzadeh had made and Bani-Sadr would make the same request. Precht also emphasized to Villalon that it was imperative the hostages be seen. (Memorandum of conversation, March 3; Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Iran 3/80)↩