194. Message from the Swiss Ambassador to Iran (Lang) to the Department of State1
Analysis of Political Situation
I have taken advantage of V’s visit to compare my ideas and what I have learned about the situation with his to allow you to judge the situation and estimate possibilities for solving the crisis and consolidating the country.
1. We are unanimous on the following conclusion: there is no government. Legitimacy and the institutionalization of power which were slightly strengthened over the last few weeks are again in the process of being called into question by a combination of opposing and parallel forces.
2. By way of example, I would like to cite the discussion that my translator had a few days ago at the compound. It is instructive in more ways than one. His interlocutors (the “kids”) told him that they would do everything they could to see to it that power did not become centralized, that power did not become stronger. It is thanks to the fact that there are many parallel forces (he said specifically about 20) in Iran that imperialism can no longer exert pressure on the country (that went especially for the United States but also for the Soviet Union). Look, they said, if Carter wants to pressure us, he can, what good does it do him to pressure Bani-Sadr, he only has a minute fraction of the power. If Carter wants to make a deal he will have to have the agreement of all 20 and that will be very difficult.
3. Such a vision is not merely that of the fundamentalists: the radical left, the Communists, the ethnic minorities all have an interest in this fragmentation of power which ensues from some endless de-stabilization which will allow the necessary conditions for bringing about the second revolution, whereas for others it means a chance to live under de facto local autonomy in the absence of any central power.
4. V, in his discussions with Bani-Sadr on the outcome of the elections, still observes optimism, but tempered optimism. Bani-Sadr realizes that he has very little chance of winning the kind of victory he did in the Presidential election, and foresees the religious fundamentalists winning quite a few seats. But he has worked out a new tactic to get together with the more powerful candidates to get their support [Page 505] if elected and even to support some of them himself. Thus it can be expected that the parliament will not be as manageable as might have been thought at first. The fact still remains that the future cabinet will at least have the advantage of not being a dead weight, frightened, bogged down by inertia like the Revolutionary Council.
5. B and V have observed as we did long ago that the economy is increasingly paralyzed and that the country is literally living off its oil and according to what V has observed is not even selling it well. There is nothing on the horizon to trigger a takeoff of the economy. The crisis is responsible to a large extent but bogeymen and incompetents are also responsible. So the authorities, even Bani-Sadr, trumpet that it is the fault of the West, the West which is strangling Iran, is not sending it enough foodstuffs or spare parts. B and V are trying to dramatize this situation to wake up Bani-Sadr, Moinfar, and anyone else who has some understanding.
Let us not forget one important fact. Although Bani-Sadr is moderate in the political field, he will be less so in the economic field where he wants to apply theses which, to say the very least, have never been tried by fire.
6. The Imam, who is getting stronger, sometimes appears to regret having given Bani-Sadr too much power (df. the demonstration) and seems to be playing a role which runs counter to national stabilization, by favoring the opposition forces in order to strike a balance. In this context, B and V are wondering whether Ahmed Khomeini, the son, might not be playing a two-faced game and while pretending to help Bani-Sadr isn’t really playing the fundamentalists’ game.
The Imam has really never given his total confidence to anyone. Recent history gives us several examples of this: elimination of Yazdi, then Bani-Sadr, benefitting Ghotbzadeh, etc., etc. The person who seems to have his greatest confidence—by his very nature!—is Ghotbzadeh. This is a happy circumstance to the extent that Ghotbzadeh has given himself body and soul to reaching a solution. V’s question is how far will he go if he feels that the sands are shifting too much. To this jealousy and sensitivity must be added the aspect of the “folqar” which is now replacing the role of the “führer” that the Iman used to play.
7. Bani-Sadr now realizes that after having dreamed of overturning the imperial regime for more than ten years, the leadership obtained power without fighting, but especially without being prepared to take it. Aside from the unanimity on the question of overturning the imperial regime, there is total disagreement regarding the kind of system to be created, and this again adds to the total lack of structural organization.
8. Likewise, Bani-Sadr’s method of government and work does not favor a change in the direction of strong leadership. Bani-Sadr is a thinker, a loner, who, like the Imam, does not trust anyone entirely. It [Page 506] is really difficult to see how his relationships with the Ministers of his future cabinet will work. He prefers to surround himself with very young people whom, according to V, he treats very harshly even in the case of very competent people like Nobari of the Markazi Bank or the Bank’s Vice Governor. Delegation of power is very poor as is the transmission of information and briefings in both directions. Bani-Sadr tends to entrust one question to Peter, another one to Paul, but Paul is not supposed to know what Peter is doing. This secrecy assumes incredible proportions. V found out very little and by accident that while dossiers were being prepared against the Shah by the Ministry of Justice or by the Markazi Bank, Bani-Sadr had organized a team which was secretly drawing up dossiers on the very same subject.
Like Bazargan, Bani-Sadr allows himself to be overwhelmed by a mob of supplicants, a kind of populism which is a luxury which the country really cannot afford under present circumstances.
Public opinion which did after all support Bani-Sadr rather massively did so without enthusiasm or fervor—you have to take into account abstentions and fall back votes which would have been given to a candidate like Radjavi. There are many members of the intelligentsia who consider that he won’t last long, whence this attitude of “reserve” on the part of people who should be committing themselves. This is one more reason why the country still hasn’t gotten off the ground.
9. Like ancient tragedy, the Imam is always playing the role of the deux ex machina, which means that so far a solution has always been found to the various impasses in which the country has found itself. The Imam is still the only one who can rally quasi general consent, since the opposition is still too weak to make its voice heard.
But this will last only as long as the Imam lives and is mentally sound—the day he dies if power has not been sufficiently consolidated, which is now the case as we have seen, chaos will surely ensue. Chaos indeed, although parenthetically in the Iranian brand of chaos a certain normalcy comes about by the force of circumstances, a trait which can be observed at a higher stage of development in Italy.
10. Conclusion. As can be seen this situation is more unsettled than ever. The approaching elections as well as the climate surrounding the attempt to solve the hostage crisis both are increasing this tendency even more. So far the President has been able to maneuver adequately but the question is not whether he will continue to maneuver well but rather whether the parallel powers will let him.
- Source: Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Iran Update Mar 1980. Secret; Sensitive. The document was found attached to a March 4 memorandum from Saunders to Vance, Christopher, and Newsom entitled “Iran Update—March 5, 1980.”↩