Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

186. Memorandum Prepared by the Iran Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, February 19, 1980

SUBJECT

• CIA Views on The Release Of The Hostages

If President Bani-Sadr orders the militants occupying the US Embassy to release the hostages we believe the militants will refuse to do so. The militants have repeatedly stated that they do not believe he has the authority or the right to make decisions regarding the hostage issue. In our judgment, only a direct order from Ayatollah Khomeini—probably in public—will persuade the militants to give up the hostages. [portion marking not declassified]

Even if Khomeini orders the hostages’ release, there is some chance—probably less than 50 percent—that some of the militants will refuse to obey. [less than 1 line not declassified] there are some leftists among the Islamic fundamentalists holding the hostages. Bani-Sadr reportedly told a visiting Algerian delegation this month that he is concerned that one or more of the “Communist” captors will take precipitous action if the government orders the hostages released. [portion marking not declassified]

Government Forces

Bani-Sadr has said on several occasions that he would not use force to attain the release of the hostages. In his new role as commander-in-chief of the military the president has theoretical authority over a large number of forces in Tehran, however, that could be used against the militants. None are entirely loyal to Bani-Sadr and none are trained in the tactics necessary to storm the Embassy compound against determined resistance and free the hostages unharmed. [portion marking not declassified]

—Military units in Tehran consist of an under-strength infantry division, two armored brigades, a special forces brigade and one artillery group. At full strength this would amount to about 25,000 men but the actual strength is probably about half that figure. None of these units is garrisoned in the immediate vicinity of the US Embassy, although some military transport units and depots are located in the area. An armored brigade equipped with over 100 tanks is approximately eight kilometers from the Embassy. [portion marking not declassified]

—Revolutionary Guard forces in Tehran number approximately 5,000 personnel, divided into units of some 200 men. About 4,000 are garrisoned at the Sultanatabad barracks in the northwest part of the city and 1,000 are located near the Majles building in the bazaar. The degree of loyalty of the Guards to Bani-Sadr probably varies from unit to unit. Some sources have reported that there are Revolutionary Guardsmen inside the Embassy compound cooperating with the militants. [portion marking not declassified]

—Police and gendarmerie units in Tehran have been extensively purged since the revolution. There are apparently only headquarters personnel from the gendarmerie in the city. Police are patrolling the streets but reportedly their morale and effectiveness is low. Few policemen would probably be willing to take the risk of participating in an attack on the militants. [portion marking not declassified]

We believe Bani-Sadr would resort to using these forces only in extremis—perhaps after an order from Khomeini had failed to effect the release of the hostages. [portion marking not declassified]

Bani-Sadr’s most attractive option in this case would be to try to infiltrate loyal forces into the compound gradually in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the militants. Some press reports from Arab sources in Tehran have indicated that the government may already have begun this process, but we doubt that it has had much success to date. [portion marking not declassified]

We would expect the militants to resist forcibly a sudden government attempt to seize the Embassy in the absence of an order from Khomeini. At least some of the militants are probably sincerely prepared to be martyrs for the revolution. If Bani-Sadr decided to pursue a more gradual approach of cordoning off the compound, starving out the militants and gradually infiltrating their ranks, his ability to effect the hostages’ release would increase but would still be uncertain. [less than 1 line not declassified] there may be some fanatical Revolutionary Guards inside the Embassy who are prepared to execute the hostages in the event that any attempt is made to secure their release. [portion marking not declassified]

In sum, we doubt that the Iranian government’s forces can secure the release of the hostages unharmed against the wishes of the militants. The compound is so large that it would be a relatively easy task to hold off a government rescue force long enough to kill all of the hostages. If some of the hostages have been moved from the compound as some reports have suggested, the government’s task would be even more difficult.² [portion marking not declassified]

1. Source: Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Records, RG 218–07–0002, Records of J–3 DDSO, Box 2 Iranian Hostage Crisis 1979–1984, B184–188, Executive Information Package. Top Secret; [handling restriction not declassified] A February 20 covering memorandum from Major General James B. Vaught, attached to Tabs A–E, papers prepared in CIA, DIA, and JTF, states that these agencies had separately come to the same conclusion—that it is unlikely that the hostages would be transferred peacefully in the near future. Vaught stated that Carter should see the reports.
2. Attached but not printed are five tabs. Tabs A and B are “A DIA Working Paper, Capability of the Government of Iran to Secure the Release of the Hostages,” February 19, and a CIA memorandum, “CIA Views on the Release of the Hostages,” February 19. Tabs C–E are papers prepared by the Joint Task Force: “Hostage Location/Situation Projects,” February 16; “Analysis of ‘Student’/Militant Options,” February 9; and “Short Term Assessment,” February 4.