Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

110. Record of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting¹

Washington, undated

The following discussion by the SCC(I) on December 20² was approved by the President. The SCC(I) considered a proposed new finding regarding intelligence operations regarding Iran. Discussion centered on the operative description of our objectives in contacts with groups opposing Khomeini’s regime. It was agreed, that these contacts were intended “to encourage interactions that could lead to a broad, pro-Western front capable of forming an alternative government.” This wording was considered to be consistent with the decisions taken at the NSC meeting the previous day.³ The DCI noted that he needed a finding which would permit him to respond to the kinds of questions we are getting from Bakhtiar, viz: What does the U.S. think of General Oveissi? Should Bakhtiar link up with him or not? Is the Shah in contact with Oveissi? What does the U.S. think of General Ansari? Are we prepared to assist Bakhtiar in getting funding from the Saudis via Egypt? All agreed that the Congress would support a finding such as that proposed, although there was a risk that it would leak at some point. Dr. Brzezinski noted that this group should be kept informed of any actual expenditures of funds and what they were intended for. The DCI will draft general guidance on the use of funds. [2 lines not declassified] Secretary Vance pointed out that the finding represents a major step. It indicates that this group has made a decision to bring groups together to bring down Khomeini. Secretary Brown pointed out that we are proposing to encourage actions which “could” lead to an alternative government. Dr. Brzezinski said that this finding also had contingency value since Khomeini may fall and we will need to be able to support an alternative grouping. The SCC(I) unanimously recommended that the President approve and sign the attached finding. (TS)

On December 21, the SCC agreed⁴ that together with the background and discussion of the issue as approved by the President, the finding provided the necessary authority to proceed with the necessary actions. All agreed that the finding did not indicate that we anticipated that Khomeini’s regime could be transformed into a “responsible and democratic regime.” [2½ lines not declassified]. The President’s approval of the notes would be important in dealing with the congressional committees. (TS)

Attachment

Presidential Finding⁵

Washington, December 27, 1979

Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Concerning
Operations in Foreign Countries Other Than Those Intended
Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection

I find the following operation in a foreign country is important to the national security of the United States, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this finding to the concerned committees of the Congress pursuant to Section 662, and to provide such briefings as necessary.

SCOPE	DESCRIPTION
Iran	Conduct propaganda and political and economic action operations to encourage the establishment of a responsible and democratic regime in Iran;6 make contacts with Iranian opposition leaders and interested governments in order to encourage interactions that could lead to a broad, pro-Western front capable of forming an alternative government.

Jimmy Carter

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Subject File, Box I026, Iran Finding 27 Dec 1979. Top Secret; Sensitive. Brzezinski sent a copy to Turner under a December 27 covering memorandum.
2. The Summary of Conclusions is in Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 107.
3. See Document 107.
4. The Summary of Conclusions is in Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 107.
5. Secret; Sensitive.
6. The original draft of the finding reads: “Conduct propaganda and political and economic action operations to support opposition to Khomeini’s radical regime.” Carter struck the text and wrote above it: “Conduct propaganda and political and economic operations to encourage the establishment of a responsible and democratic regime in Iran.” (Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 107.