Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

178. Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 8, 1980

Based on both events of the past three days² and also the information that has been developed by our French friends, I believe that you can conclude that Bani-Sadr is taking on the militants for one or both of the following reasons:

—He cannot let their challenge to him go unanswered. If he did, whatever hope he has to be a strong and effective ruler of Iran would be sacrificed.

—“Taking on the students” has the support of the vast majority of the Iranian people. He probably considers his election victory a mandate for resolving the hostage crisis.

Because of political circumstances there and Bani-Sadr’s own personality (he is known for being impetuous), it could easily develop that he would see an immediate need to resolve the hostage situation outside of the scenario that we have been working on and that is presently being negotiated. It would seem to be in our own interest in furthering that possibility to give him the assurances that the various steps of the scenario which are politically important to Iran would take place anyway and that we would be reasonable in dealing with our other bilateral problems.

For that reason, I have been searching for some way to reach out a friendly hand without either embarrassing him or compromising our own posture.

Possibly an oral message which could be given to him from you through the Swiss ambassador which would contain these elements or some combination of them:

—An expression of goodwill

—Mutual interest to resolve our differences

—We have agreed to reciprocal steps, but if the President ever decided to move unilaterally on resolving the hostage situation, we would proceed with the reciprocal steps agreed upon and be reasonable in resolving the other issues which are important to both countries

—If direct private contact with the President (Bani-Sadr) is ever desired, you would be willing to send an emissary to Tehran to meet secretly with him

There may be a different/better way to do this, but it seems that we need to reinforce whatever desire he may have to proceed to resolve the hostage situation.

1. Source: Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, Iran 2/80. Eyes Only. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner of the memorandum.
2. See footnote 3, Document 177. In a February 8 late afternoon message, Lang reported that the Revolutionary Council had accepted the scenario as altered by Bourguet and Villalon and that details of the alterations would come later. He also reported Ghotbzadeh’s complaints about Newsweek and Time magazine articles on the Canadian role in the escape of the six Americans. (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Box 8, Swiss Channel)