177. Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter1
Over ten days ago, you and Secretary Vance signed off on the proposal that we developed with our French friends.2 Based on all that we have seen in the past 48 hours, we have good reason to believe that Bani-Sadr and the Revolutionary Council have accepted the bulk of our proposal. We are awaiting a response through the Swiss3 which we should get by mid-morning.
Once we agree to this scenario, we will have to live with it and had best all understand it and the accompanying risks.
A few points that should be made:
1. This whole effort is foolish and suicidal unless you accept/believe that the leadership of Iran desires to resolve the hostage crisis peacefully. I believe that they do, although no one knows the real feelings of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The indications from Bani-Sadr, Ghotbzadeh, and the Revolutionary Council are certainly positive in this regard. I am assuming that they will inform Khomeini at some point of their intentions and he will avoid responsibility for the plan (which might be an admission of a mistake) by taking the position that it is a decision which will have to be made by the Revolutionary Council and the elected leadership of the country.
2. While the scenario that has been developed is precise in terms of reciprocal steps, we have to realize the good possibility that Ghotbzadeh or Bani-Sadr will deviate from the scenario along the way for personal or political benefit. We should not forget that this whole [Page 466] thing will be played out at a time when the election of the constituent assembly is taking place and while different forces in the country are vying for Cabinet positions, etc.
While I trust my French friends, there is no basis for trusting Ghotbzadeh or Bani-Sadr. Having sounded that caution, it is an encouraging sign that the early signals out of Tehran conform precisely with our plan—for example, the Revolutionary Council called for the establishment of a “commission” instead of a tribunal. This was a point that we made strongly with our French friends and that seems to have been accepted by the Iranian leadership.
3. Because we have been dealing through a third party, it is difficult to have a precise understanding of what is and is not acceptable behavior by both parties. The French have done an excellent job in conveying the concerns and problems of both sides, but there is no substitute for direct contact and understanding. In this regard, I fully anticipate this thing falling apart a couple of times and having to be put back together. Direct contact at that time (secretly) might be good and necessary.
4. We have to be firm from the outset in utilizing the leverage provided us in the reciprocal steps. Let me give you a specific and likely example. The political benefit to Bani-Sadr occurs on the front-end at the creation of the Commission and its travel to Tehran. The risk that we take is also on the front-end when we have to abandon the principle of “simultaneous action”. The difficult part of the scenario for Bani-Sadr will be the removal of the hostages from the compound to the hospital. So, if we began the scenario without nailing down a time frame, the Commission could travel to Tehran, Bani-Sadr could reap the political benefit and because of circumstances that we can not foresee at this time, Bani-Sadr could get cold feet and either not remove the hostages to the hospital or let the thing drag on for weeks. The American people will tolerate us taking some risks and a change in our position as long as progress seems to be taking place, but they will not tolerate very long delays. For that reason, we need to use—through Waldheim—the date for the establishment of the Commission to insure a time frame for the release. We will also work this point with our French friends when we meet with them this weekend.
5. Quite frankly, the only two people now that understand both the scenario in detail and its problems/pitfalls are Hal Saunders and myself. We need for the Secretary, the Vice-President, Zbig, the First Lady and you to understand it in some detail. For that reason, I would recommend that we have a very private session for 30–45 minutes to walk through the scenario.4 Not only so everyone will understand it— [Page 467] which is important—but also so that we take the proper public posture that takes into account the risks that we are taking but also does not undermine or complicate the scenario that we agree upon.
Since so much is happening today which may prove important and relevant to that discussion, possibly tomorrow would be better for a meeting.
- Source: Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, Iran 2/80. Eyes Only. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner of the memorandum.↩
- See Document 168.↩
- The Department informed Lang on February 5 that Bourguet and Villalon wished to communicate with the Department through him and queried Lang to determine whether Iran proposed any possible changes in the scenario and, if so, how to handle this. Lang was also given a copy of telegram 1314 from London (see Document 157). (Carter Library, Records of the White House Office of Counsel to the President, Lloyd Cutler’s Files, Box 2) Lang responded with a detailed response on February 6. (Ibid.) The Department then asked Lang to meet with Bourguet and Villalon on February 7. (February 6; ibid.) Lang met with Bani-Sadr and Salamatian on February 6, handing them the messages in Document 174, which they read “with very great interest.” Ghotbzadeh stated that he placed the “highest price” on the report on Soviet deployments. (Summary of Report from Lang on his meetings with Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh, February 7; Carter Library, Records of the White House Office of Counsel to the President, Lloyd Cutler, Box 2)↩
- According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Vance, Mondale, Saunders, Brzezinski, and Jordan on February 7 from 5:30 until 6:15 p.m. (Carter Library) No other record of this meeting has been found.↩