176. Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter1
I hope that you will have a chance to review this before our 2:00 meeting on the hostage situation.2 It may be a bit disjointed, but analyzes frankly the situation that we face.
Our objective continues to be to get the hostages out safely at the earliest possible date without having to take risks that are unacceptable. If anything, our objective has been modified since the Afghanistan invasion to include, “and in a way that does not jeopardize the possibility of a reconciliation of US-Iranian relations”.3 Politically, I believe that we continue to have some flexibility on what we are able to do in the course of working toward the release of the hostages. The American people will tolerate a good deal more now than they would have before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan IF we have the successful resolution of the hostage situation.
Let me review briefly what we know for a fact and those things that we are not sure of:
1. That in the final analysis, only Khomeini can insure the safe release of the hostages. It is doubtful that Bani-Sadr can get the militants to release them and very, very doubtful that Ghotbzadeh can get them released.
2. That a large number of the Revolutionary Council—possibly all—see the need to resolve the hostage situation, and that this includes the clerics as well as the “European group”.
3. That at least among the European group and other members of the Revolutionary Council, a clear consensus is emerging as to how the [Page 462] situation should be resolved. It recognizes that the Shah will not be returned, but places special emphasis on the international tribunal, the right of Iran to seek extradition of the Shah, to seek the legal recovery of his “stolen monies” and public statements from the United States that suggest that we are willing to develop a relationship which acknowledges both the “equality” of Iran and is based on “mutual respect”.
4. That political factors and personal animosity between Ghotbzadeh and Bani-Sadr have possibly resulted in a situation whereby although there is general consensus as to “how”, there is not a consensus as to “who” or “when”. Ghotbzadeh wants to do it quickly and be personally involved for obvious reasons, and Bani-Sadr prefers to wait until after he takes power (at least that is the message from the Egyptian which we need to confirm).4
5. That although Ghotbzadeh is personally unpopular, he probably has the support of Beheshti and other members of the Revolutionary Council who are against Bani-Sadr for other reasons. It is impossible to discern as to whether the support for Ghotbzadeh reflects a desire to resolve the situation quickly or whether they simply want to deprive Bani-Sadr of the personal satisfaction of resolving it when he takes over.
6. That while Bani-Sadr might not like Ghotbzadeh, he has let us know through two very direct channels—Mrs. Nobari and Ambassador Lang that we were to continue to deal with Ghotbzadeh, but that he wanted to be kept informed. He probably recognizes the reality of the situation, and while not liking it is reconciled to it.
7. That while the Foreign Minister is disliked by almost everyone, those same people recognize that he has a personal relationship with Khomeini that cannot be ignored or taken lightly.
It seems to me that the following is and should be our posture:
—That we should continue to pursue an early release of the hostages through Ghotbzadeh, but not at the expense of our relationship with Bani-Sadr.
—That we should keep Bani-Sadr informed of our activities.
—That if it ever became a choice of having to choose between Ghotbzadeh and Bani-Sadr, we would have to go with Bani-Sadr.
—That we should work to try to avoid that choice by a reconciliation of their views, in this respect the French contacts are invaluable.
—That to put Ghotbzadeh on “hold” now has a number of problems for us:
[Page 463]1. We cannot make a conscious decision to wait until after Bani-Sadr takes office in late February to try to resolve the present crisis.
2. The delay also risks the chance that something could happen to Khomeini, who by all accounts will have to be personally involved in freeing the hostages from the compound.
3. That Bani-Sadr does not know what the political situation will be when he takes office. It could very well be that resolving the hostage situation will be more difficult for him then than it is for Ghotbzadeh now.
It might be possible through the French contacts and the political leverage of the Revolutionary Council to create a situation where Bani-Sadr has no choice but to tolerate/actively cooperate in pursuing a strategy of early release. In fairness to Bani-Sadr, he may think that only he will have the muscle and the influence to resolve the crisis, and that it is less a matter of who gets the credit but more a matter of who can pull it off.
Finally, you should read the enclosed Memcon from Cottam.5 Cottam says that Ghotbzadeh could not risk direct contact with us without the knowledge of Bani-Sadr, the Revolutionary Council and even Khomeini. He says that if we had an opportunity for direct contact, we would have to take advantage of it.
One final comment about our French contacts, particularly Mr. B. They are not the stooges of Ghotbzadeh. One preferred Habibi for President and the other Bani-Sadr. They have been dealing with the Foreign Minister because they have been told to by the Revolutionary Council and by Ghotbzadeh. They told me last weekend that if Ghotbzadeh tried to block them from seeing Bani-Sadr or the other members of the Revolutionary Council, they would “wash their hands of this matter”.
The Iranian experts at the State Department who have seen a flurry of stories and hints coming out of Tehran and the UN think strongly that the French proposal which we were involved in has been seen and is being discussed and debated by different members of the Revolutionary Council. They assume that Bani-Sadr would have to be a part of any such discussion. All of the various stories coming out which contain precise details are generally compatible with the scenario that we jointly evolved.
[Page 464]- Source: Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, Iran 2/80. Eyes Only. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner of the memorandum.↩
- According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Vance, Aaron, and Jordan from 1:58 until 2:22 p.m. (Carter Library) In his memoir, Carter wrote that the purpose of the meeting was “to get an update on the Iranian response.” “Apparently,” he wrote, “Bani-Sadr is sending word to us directly that he wants to proceed with a resolution of the hostage question. His inclination is to wait until after the 26th of February, when he can put his government together. (He also said he wanted to get rid of Ghotbzadeh.) He [Bani-Sadr] does not want us to identify him as a friend of the United States or as a moderate. He wants to be known as a revolutionary protecting the interests of Iran against both superpowers’ threats. We decided to maintain our multiple approaches to Iran.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 485) For Bani-Sadr’s message, see Document 175.↩
- The quoted phrase represents Jordan’s perception of how the December 27 Finding had changed. See Document 110.↩
- See Document 175.↩
- Not attached.↩
- Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner.↩