175. Message From Iranian President Bani-Sadr Transmitted Through Egyptian Journalist Mohammed Heykal1

Heykal left London 2 Feb for Cairo where will remain until shortly before 26 Feb when will go Tehran to cover Iranian parliamentary election. Heykal remains willing act as go between USG and Khomeini.

2. Heykal has received following message from Bani-Sadr and Ahmad Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini’s son. Bani-Sadr and Ahmad Khomeini understand that this message is for the USG, in fact Bani-Sadr asks that it be given directly to the President. According to Marwan, this message was delivered to Heykal in London by personal messenger from Tehran.

A. The U.S. hostage situation will be the first order of business after the new Iranian Government is formed on 26 February. (When asked why this could not take place sooner, Bani-Sadr said he could do nothing until Acting Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh has been removed from this job and given another. He said Ayatollah Khomeini has agreed to this removal.)

B. The condition of the hostages has greatly improved since the Iranian election. An Iranian medical doctor has been assigned to stay with them and care for them on orders direct from Khomeini.

C. Very shortly after 26 February, Asghar Moussavi-Khoeini, the link between the “students” and Khomeini, will make a public announcement that all of the U.S. hostages are henceforth under the direct control of Ayatollah Khomeini. (They are, of course, now; but this public statement will facilitate later negotiations.)

D. Within a very few days after Khoeini makes this announcement, the hostages will be removed from the Embassy and located in some unspecified neutral place in Tehran where U.S. medical doctors will be allowed access to them. Meanwhile, Khomeini will officially turn over negotiations on the hostages to Bani-Sadr.

E. The hostages will be allowed to leave Iran after the committee UN Secretary Waldheim appoints has met. Bani-Sadr insists, however, that this committee be “political” and not “administrative.” That is, its members must be official representatives of their governments and not just individuals appointed by Waldheim. Bani-Sadr understands and [Page 460] accepts that the Shah will not come to Iran nor appear directly before the Waldheim committee.2

F. Bani-Sadr appreciates the statements and actions of the President and the administration over the past two weeks, although he feels there have been too many different channels involved. He requests that the President continue not to apply sanctions and particularly requests that the administration and the U.S. media not depict him as a “moderate” and as having views which conflict with those of the “students.” He says to “forget about” his being a moderate.

3. Marwan said Heykal is optimistic that the hostages will be released in March. He thinks Bani-Sadr and others have a clear appreciation of the Soviet threat to Iran as a result of the Afghanistan invasion. Marwan also told [less than 1 line not declassified], although he (Marwan) was not supposed to pass this on, Heykal’s Sunday Times piece (ref B)3 was written at the direct request of Bani-Sadr.

4. Marwan will be in London through 6 Feb. (We have his onward schedule.) Pls advise what you wish transmitted back to Heykal by this route.

5. [Omission is in the original.]

End of message.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran 2/80. Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified]. The transmission and routing information is missing in the original.
  2. Next to a line drawn beside paragraphs C, D, and E, an unknown hand wrote: “Bani-Sadr’s scenario.”
  3. Not attached. See footnote 4, Document 174.