17. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- The Soviet Role in the Crisis in Iran
The SCC discussions to date have conspicuously ignored the Soviet variables in the power equation in Iran. I am sure they are clear in your mind but as a reminder I enumerate the following points:
First, the Soviet strategy in the Persian Gulf region for several years has been aimed at demobilization. The seizure of power in Ethiopia and later in Afghanistan2 showed a Soviet willingness to set in motion upheavals in Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. Clearly the Soviet decision on this strategy was based on the assumption that they could ride the upheavals and benefit.
Second, the Tudeh cadres and other pro-Soviet groups have proved relatively weak as an objective basis for Soviet influence within Iran. The obvious tactic for them, therefore, is to exacerbate tension and [Page 40] conflict. What little intelligence we have about the student takeover of the embassy supports this assumption.
Third, the Soviets can profit from either of two scenarios in Iran. A radical left regime which gains control of the entire country and develops a Vietnamese or Cuban-like relationship to Moscow is the preferred outcome. An alternative outcome is dissolution of the Persian empire and the intervention of outside forces, possibly Western in southern Iran, which would justify Soviet intervention in northern Iran.
Fourth, our demonstrated weakness in the present crisis not only has adverse effects on our allies in the region but also in Europe and East Asia. If we do nothing, the credibility of our nuclear deterrent posture is thrown into question. But if we react by punishing Iran and endangering oil production there, Europe and Japan will be no less upset at us. Either outcome encourages our allies to avoid tensions with Moscow.
Fifth, the Politburo faces a dilemma in how to deal with Khomeini in the present circumstance. Objectively, Brezhnev should support him. The cost of doing that publicly, however, is so great that he will likely avoid it. Nonetheless, Radio Tehran reports tonight that Brezhnev and Gromyko support Khomeini’s stance against “plots.”
Implications for U.S. Policy
—Other forces such as Moslem opinion or world opinion may save our Embassy personnel, but it looks completely beyond our power.
—It is not in our objective interest either to break up Iran or to destroy its oil production. In other words, any retaliatory measure may soothe our emotions, but it is difficult to see how it could serve our objective interests.
—Other crises like this will face us in the months and years ahead until we have regained a preeminent military posture based on a firmer economy.
—A shorter term implication concern is our military posture in the Persian Gulf. More ships in the Indian Ocean will never compensate for ground bases and a strong military advisory effort which integrates all countries on the Arabian Peninsula and perhaps a broader area.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 29, Iran 11/1/79–11/14/79. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.”↩
- On February 11, 1977, Mengistu Haile Mariam became head of state in Ethiopia. He accepted aid from the USSR, subsequently closing the U.S. military mission in April 1977. On April 28, 1978, the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan assassinated Afghan President Mohammad Daoud Khan. He was succeeded by Nur Mohammad Taraki who implemented Marxist-Leninist policies in Afghanistan.↩