Office of the Historian

16. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism (Quainton) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)1

Washington, November 8, 1979

SUBJECT

  • [less than 1 line not declassified] Khomeini—Implications for Negotiations

[3 paragraphs (17 lines) not declassified]

(1) We should not provoke Khomeini or make statements that will polarize the situation. Categoric statements about what we cannot do could have a counter-productive effect.

(2) We need to appear to be strong. Since Khomeini respects authority we should try to get across an image of strength without threats. We should also convey the idea that we accept Khomeini’s authority in this situation but that because we do there will be real costs for Iran if anything goes wrong.

(3) Any proposal put to him should appeal to his own positions and beliefs. Offers to bargain, mediate or negotiate will not work. In this respect, the PLO’s stance of not speaking for the US is a very sound one.

(4) We should be reluctant to convey concessions directly to Khomeini. He is likely to see this as weakness and to ask for more. However, if concessions are announced indirectly, he may judge this as our giving in to his power, thereby enabling him to decide that he can unilaterally terminate the incident.

(5) Time is on our side. We should project the view that the ball is in Khomeini’s court and we are waiting to see what the Iranians will do. We should allow approaches such as that of the PLO to go forward without any direct link or association to the US. The PLO’s known antagonism to the US is a very positive aspect in its dealings with Khomeini.

(6) Humanitarian appeals are not likely to move Khomeini, although they may have an impact on some of his followers.

[Page 39]

[less than 1 line not declassified] the possibility of serious psychological trauma for the hostages. The cable from Geneva2 reflects some of the same concern. Under the circumstances, we should have in mind a contingency plan to ensure the hostages receive prompt medical and psychiatric support on their release.

  1. Source: Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Iran: Ghotbzadeh, Bani-Sadr, Khomeini (Iranian Government and its Degrees). Secret. Copies were sent to Read, Saunders, and Constable. A note on the first page reads: “Mr. Newsom has seen Nov 18 1979.” [text not declassified]↩
  2. Not further identified.↩