Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

169. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 28, 1980

SUBJECT

• Iran—Next Steps

The strategy developed by Hal Saunders and Ham Jordan² is an intelligent and cautious outline of an approach intended to maximize our very limited access and leverage. It is unlikely in the extreme that the scenario will in fact play out in the way it is supposed to, but the key is not the validity of the scenario, it is the fact that we have concrete proposals to put before Bani Sadr (and Ghotbzadeh) which will draw them into a substantive negotiation process. We are justified in taking some calculated risks to get such a process going, but we should do so with our eyes open. So let me start by listing the grounds for skepticism:

—The political analysis by the two Frenchmen was dead wrong. They expected Habibi to win the election as a result of maneuvering by the “master political leader” Khomeini. This was their view as late as last Friday.³ There is a persistent element of wishful thinking throughout their analysis. I suspect that their scenario is cut from the same cloth.

—If the Frenchmen were right that Khomeini intended Habibi to win, then how is he likely to react to Bani Sadr’s triumph? Probably by cutting him down to size as quickly as possible. If, on the other hand, the election went as scheduled, then our Frenchmen are not nearly as well plugged in as they would have us believe. Are they really in a position to work with Bani Sadr?

—The time scale is totally unrealistic. Step One (establishing the channel) must take at least a week. Step Two (setting up a commission of inquiry by the UN) can not be done in less than a week or ten days, knowing the speed of the UN and all the consultations and preparations—including terms of reference—which would have to precede it. Step Three (the game with the Panamanians) is irrelevant. Step Four (hearings by the commission in Tehran) is allotted a week, but almost certainly could be accomplished no faster than two weeks or more. Step Five (commission report to the UN with a simultaneous resolution and release of the hostages) would add at least another week, which almost certainly puts us into March. Yet Step Five is supposed to take place during the week of February 10. That is simply impossible.

—The scenario being proposed sets up Ghotbzadeh as the goat. He is designated as the sole negotiator or point man. That probably suits his amour propre, but it also leaves him increasingly exposed as the logical fall guy when the knives come out in Tehran—as they will. It bothers me not at all to contemplate Ghotbzadeh’s sacrifice in a noble cause, but I doubt if he will stand still for it. He is crafty and very much concerned with his political skin. He is not going to give Bani Sadr the perfect excuse to fire him after first destroying his relationship with Khomeini. A double cross is virtually inevitable at some point.

With those cautionary notes in mind, I believe this strategy is worth pursuing, but with some precautionary modifications:

—We should view Step One as the process of smoking out the new political relationships in the post-election environment. Therefore, we should establish a concrete test which will require a real decision from Tehran without tipping our entire hand from the start.

—The memo indicates that “key Iranians would know the entire proposed scenario,” presumably from the start. I do not believe we should spell out the entire scenario at the beginning, but only indicate that we are prepared to proceed with a series of concrete steps (unspecified) once a reliable channel of communication has been established.

—In Step One, we should ask that a reliable interlocutor from our side be established in Tehran—or near Tehran if that is preferred—before we can proceed. We should identify an American (Cottam?) or a third country national to establish himself in the Swiss Embassy or some other location with good and reliable communications to pursue the negotiations. They may wish to suggest an individual, and we should be flexible.

—If both Bani Sadr and Ghotbzadeh can agree on this, we would have some indication that the process had promise. If they cannot agree, we would have a better idea of what to expect.

—Only after a mutually agreed interlocutor was in place should we undertake detailed discussion of a scenario. By then we would have some tangible evidence that practical decision-making was possible on the Iranian side, and we would have removed the negotiations from the hands of well-meaning (but possibly naive) intermediaries. They would have committed themselves to no specific concessions, but we would be assured at least of direct control of our own side of the talks.

With that modification, I think we should proceed as soon as practicable to open the dialogue.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 30, Iran 1/11/80–1/31/80. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “GS, Show to Ham & return to me.”
2. See Document 168. Brzezinski sent a copy of the paper to Sick under a January 28 covering memorandum, asking for his assessment. Sick submitted this analysis to Brzezinski and a shorter one on January 29 recounting the meeting he had with Jordan at Brzezinski’s request. He sent both memoranda to Aaron and Hunter under a January 31 covering memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 31, Subject File, Iran [Retained] 1/80)
3. Friday, January 25; see Document 164. Bani-Sadr was elected President that day.