396. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
204700. For the Ambassador from the Sec and Linowitz. Subject: Consultations With Sadat on Jerusalem Problem. Ref: (A) Alexandria 677;2 (B) Cairo 16690;3 (C) State 202324;4 (D) State 202220.5
1. (S) Entire text.
2. You should convey6 following message to Sadat by whatever means is most effective in time for him to have our views before Sadat’s own policy council on Jerusalem problem.
3. The President appreciates the opportunity to consult with Sadat with respect to the Israeli moves on Jerusalem. He has carefully considered Sadat’s comments and is appreciative of Sadat’s concern to devise a response that is helpful to our mutual objectives.
4. We are confronted here by two steps of different nature and implications, one of which, the Cohen Bill, is already an accomplished [Page 1328] fact;7 the other, a decision to move the Prime Minister’s office to East Jerusalem, now appears a certainty but may be delayed for several weeks. The first point the President wishes to make is that, after having given careful reflection to the considerations Sadat has raised, he does not repeat not believe that suspending the autonomy talks in response to either of these moves would be a wise decision. It will clearly not cause the Israelis to change their position and would leave us in a quandary as to how subsequently we can restore momentum to the peace process. As difficult as this Israeli move is for us, we should not allow it to derail us from the peace strategy in which we, Egypt and Israel have invested so much. The President believes that the latest round of technical-level talks in the autonomy negotiations covered useful new ground and revealed a genuinely better atmosphere for making progress. We are sufficiently encouraged to believe that however our two governments decide to react to the Israeli moves on Jerusalem we should not allow this issue to place a further burden on the negotiations.
5. We nevertheless agree with Sadat that the Israeli moves pose a definite challenge and that our two governments must make clear we do not accept them as in any way determining the future of Jerusalem which can only be resolved through negotiations. We see the Knesset bill as essentially a legal matter. While we view it seriously, we believe our reaction to it can be adequately and effectively handled by the statement we have already issued (reftel D), which states in simple terms that we do not accept the new law as determining the status of Jerusalem. The bill does not change anything on the ground as far as we can determine and we do not contemplate any further action with respect to it at this time.
6. We would also be concerned about Israeli announcement of moving the Prime Minister’s office to Jerusalem, which, as a physical act, is likely to evoke a greater reaction in Arab and Islamic countries, and to have a more negative impact on the prospect for negotiations. We plan to take the following steps if and when the Israelis carry out this move:
—(A) We will issue a statement expressing our clear opposition to and disapproval of the move and reaffirming our policy that we do not accept such unilateral acts as determining the future of Jerusalem.
—(B) We will maintain our present policy of refusing to allow our Ambassador or any other administration official to meet with Israeli officials (including the Prime Minister) in East Jerusalem.
[Page 1329]7. We have given careful thought to various ways of responding to the Israeli moves and believe the course we have outlined would offer the fewest long term disadvantages. We recognize, however, that the Government of Egypt will be subject to serious domestic and foreign pressures as a result of the Israeli move. Only Sadat can make the judgment as to what will be politically sustainable for him in the new circumstances that we will face, and we will of course understand and respect his ultimate decision.
8. FYI: For the Ambassador. If you find in your discussion that Sadat is determined to suspend the autonomy talks, you should urge him to do this only for a specific, limited period of time as a means of demonstrating his disapproval. End FYI.
9. Following is text of statement which has been approved for issuance in the event the Israeli Cabinet approves moving Prime Minister’s office to East Jerusalem. You may share text with Sadat.
Begin text: The decision announced by the Israeli Government yesterday is not in keeping with the vital international efforts flowing from the Camp David Accords to achieve a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East.
United States policy on the issue of Jerusalem is of long standing, beginning with statements by our Permanent Representatives to the United Nations in 1967 and 1969.8 It has been restated on a number of occasions since then. Our view has been, and remains, that the final status of Jerusalem should be determined through negotiations among the parties concerned; that the settlement which is worked out should leave the city undivided; that it should provide free access for people of all faiths to the holy places; and that it should take into account the interests of all the city’s inhabitants. As President Carter stated on March 3, 1980: “we strongly believe that Jerusalem should be undivided with free access to the holy places for all faiths.”
Pending such negotiations, the United States does not believe that any party should take unilateral measures which alter the status of Jerusalem. We do not regard the action taken by the Knesset as precluding those future negotiations. We made clear to the Prime Minister and other Israeli officials that we would view the move of the Prime Minister’s office to East Jerusalem to be contrary to the principles we believe will be most helpful to the current negotiations and to the broader effort to bring about a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East.
The most vital objective for Israel, Egypt, and the United States is to pursue the Camp David peace process through to success. All the [Page 1330] parties should avoid any action that would detract from that central purpose.
We hope that the Government of Israel will suspend implementation of this decision in the larger interest of the success of the effort undertaken by Israel, in common with Egypt and the United States, to bring about a negotiated settlement of the Middle East conflict. End text.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–2303. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Saunders, Linowitz, Hunter, and Jane E. Taylor (S/S–O); approved by Newsom.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 393.↩
- In telegram 16690 from Cairo, July 30, Atherton relayed his July 30 exchange with Ali in which the latter asked if Atherton had received “reaction from Washington” to the report of Atherton’s July 29 meeting with Sadat. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–1864)↩
- In telegram 202324 to Cairo, July 31, the Department informed the Embassy that “We have not been able to reach a final decision on the steps we would take in response to an Israeli move to transfer the Prime Minister’s office to East Jerusalem. You should inform Mobarak/Ali that the matter is still under high-level consideration here and that we will need further time before conveying our views to Sadat.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–2301)↩
- In telegram 202220 to all Near Eastern and South Asian posts and all NATO capitals, July 30, the Department conveyed the press guidance on the Cohen Bill used by the Department Spokesman in response to questions on July 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800365–1113)↩
- Meeting with Ali on August 2 to deliver the message for Sadat, Atherton reported in telegram 16883 from Cairo, August 2, that “it quickly emerged that Sadat has already reached his decision” and that “Egypt is unable to go on negotiating with Israel under present circumstances.” Atherton continued: “Ali stressed that Egypt remains committed to the Camp David process and to the negotiations provided for in the Camp David Agreement, but that Israeli actions have made it impossible to continue those negotiations now. Egypt will continue negotiating with Israel, he said, only if (a) Israel agrees that Jerusalem is negotiable, (b) there is a freeze on settlements, and (c) Israel makes some gesture toward easing conditions for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.” A copy of this telegram upon which Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner, indicating that he saw the document, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, Egypt: 8/80.↩
- See Document 394.↩
- See footnotes 11 and 12, Document 64.↩