397. Editorial Note
On August 4, 1980, a letter from Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, expressing his dissatisfaction with Israeli actions which he viewed as impediments to the peace process, was delivered to the Prime Minister by Egyptian Ambassador to Israel Saad Murtada. In the letter, dated August 2, Sadat recounted the course of the autonomy negotiations, noting “to our disappointment and to the surprise of many of Israel’s friends, events did not take the course which was likely to bring us closer to an agreement. On the contrary, provocative and negative actions have been taken unjustifiably and in open defiance to the process and its very essence.” Sadat continued, “I am referring here to the actions which are being taken with respect to Jerusalem and the settlements, together with the repressive measures taken in the West Bank and Gaza.” Sadat reaffirmed Egypt’s “clear and unwavering” position on the peace process, outlining his country’s wholehearted commitment to peace; its adherence to the “letter and spirit of Camp David;” its preparation to “help our partners in the peace process and provide them with solutions and way out even when they fail to see the realities of the situation;” its belief in the settling of “all matters” at the end of the process; its rejection of “actions taken by Israel unilaterally and against the universal consensus with respect to Jerusalem and the settlements;” the need to respect the “historic and legal rights of the Arabs and Muslims” in Jerusalem “while keeping different functions in the city united;” the need for Israel to “desist from all settlement activities” and remove settlements built in the West Bank and Gaza; Egyptian opposition to any encroachment on the rights of Palestinians to determine their own future; and
Egyptian preparation to implement the establishment of a Palestinian self-governing authority in Gaza as a first step to its implementation in the West Bank.
[Page 1331]Sadat concluded the letter by urging Begin to “take the remedial action which is necessary for the removal of the obstacles which have been placed on the road to peace in the past few months. I leave it to you to choose the appropriate ways and means for achieving that.” The same day, August 4, Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali provided U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. a copy of the letter, which Atherton sent to Washington from Cairo in telegram 16922, August 4. A copy of the telegram, bearing President Jimmy Carter’s handwritten comment, “The situation is discouraging. Well worded, very good message. C.,” is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, Egypt: 8/80.
Sadat’s letter began series of exchanges between the two leaders over the next three weeks. On August 4, Begin replied to Sadat’s letter, taking issue with a number of points. Begin asserted that Sadat had misrepresented the discussion between them at El-Arish on the subject of water for Israel, that the principles of “good faith, goodwill, mutual understanding, and promoting peace and cooperation” had been undermined by Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Boutros Ghali’s influencing African governments to withhold renewing diplomatic relations with Israel, votes cast for “hostile,” anti-Israeli resolutions by the Egyptian delegation at the United Nations, as well as Egyptian public statements inconsistent with the Camp David Accords. Begin also restated the Israeli position on Jerusalem and stated a desire to bring Palestinians and King Hussein of Jordan into the negotiations. Begin concluded by pointing out that Egypt had unilaterally suspended the autonomy talks on four different occasions and urged Sadat to “dispense with further unilateral suspensions. Let us renew our negotiations.” Israeli Ambassador to the United States Ephraim Evron provided President Jimmy Carter a copy of Begin’s letter on August 6. This copy, attached to an August 7 memorandum from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski to Carter in which Brzezinski evaluated the letter as “not as bad or as ‘door closing’ as Israeli leaks had led us to expect,” is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 6, Autonomy Talks: Senior Level 8/11/80 Meeting: 8/80.
Sadat followed up with Begin on August 14. While arguing that “it is not my intention to get involved into a verbal or rhetorical exchange which is not likely to serve the interests of any of us, not to mention the interest of peace,” Sadat provided a lengthy rebuttal of many of the points raised in Begin’s letter. At the end of the letter, however, Sadat suggested the convening of a “summit conference in an attempt to stem” the “lingering differences” between their two countries “before they jeopardize our mission.” The Egyptians provided Atherton an ad [Page 1332] vance copy of the letter, and Atherton sent it to Washington in telegram 17872 from Cairo, August 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1535) Atherton met with Egyptian Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Osama el-Baz on August 15 to suggest edits to the letter, including replacing the phrase “summit conference” with “high level conference at an appropriate time.” They also discussed the timetable for the resumption of negotiations. El-Baz rejected the U.S. proposal for resuming talks in mid-September and stated that the earliest the talks could be resumed would be mid-October. (Telegram 17881 from Cairo, August 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–1848) The final version of Sadat’s letter, which was 35 typewritten pages in length, proposed the resumption of talks after the U.S. elections on November 4 and the convening of a tripartite summit conference after that date. (“Sadat Asks U.S. Role in Autonomy Talks,” The New York Times, August 16, 1980, page 1) This letter was delivered to the Israelis on August 15 and the contents made public through the press. This, in turn, prompted a lengthy August 18 response by Begin warning Sadat that “if you persist in your negative attitude, the negotiations will remain disrupted for the simple and only reason that Egypt repeatedly suspends the talks.” On the summit idea, Begin stated: “I understand that President Carter was not consulted. Permit me to say that both he and I should have been consulted through a diplomatic, confidential exchange. Let us at least now, however, quietly consider the matter, the venue and the date should all three parties accept the principle itself. This should not, under any circumstances, preclude the renewal and the uninterrupted continuation of the autonomy talks.” The text of Begin’s August 18 response was sent in telegram 15450 from Tel Aviv, August 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800395–0629)
Atherton met with Sadat on August 18, to discuss his most recent letter to Begin. Atherton stressed that Carter “understood the difficulties Sadat faces and that we were not pressing for immediate decisions, but that the President remains convinced the only way to make progress is through continuation of the negotiating process; it is important to demonstrate that the Camp David process is still alive.” “In this connection,” Atherton noted, “Sadat’s call for a summit after our elections could be misinterpreted to mean that the USG is unable to move in the meantime. This would not be a helpful impression to give.” Sadat responded that the “situation today was different from that which existed when he authorized Kamal Hassan Ali to agree to resume the negotiations during his and Dr. Burg’s visits to Washington. Prime Minister Begin was confronting both Egypt and the U.S. with challenges that could not be ignored—the Jerusalem bill, the pending move of his office to East Jerusalem and the recent announcement of three new settlements. The negotiations were stalemated and would remain so until [Page 1333] after the U.S. elections and, frankly, until after new elections in Israel. The only solution was for the U.S. to come forward with a proposal; this was why he had suggested a new summit meeting. Sadat said his position was strong and he could wait, if necessary until November, 1981. For now, he wanted to relieve President Carter of the burden of the Middle East negotiations.” Atherton reported that Sadat “did not respond to my attempts to ascertain what moves Israel might take which would be helpful to him but promised to think about this.” Sadat promised to continue the dialogue with the United States and stated he had invited Israeli President Yitzhak Navon to come to Egypt, was preparing to send a delegation to Israel to help the normalization process, and was calling Egyptian media representatives to “put a stop” to further press attacks on Begin. (Telegram 18065 from Cairo, August 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1557)
Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. Lewis met with Begin on August 22, to brief him on the meeting between Atherton and Sadat. Lewis stressed that Sadat was “anxious to try to keep the atmosphere as positive as possible,” while efforts were underway to restart negotiations and cited Sadat’s initiatives to improve relations with Israel. “It is clear to us,” Lewis stated to the Israeli Prime Minister, “that Sadat hopes that these initiatives will make such a contribution and will in some way be reciprocated by Israel.” Lewis suggested the Israeli release of prisoners in Gaza for the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr as a gesture to Sadat, a proposal Begin stated “he wouldn’t object to.” (Telegram 15690 from Tel Aviv, August 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880142–1048) Begin informed Lewis on August 26 that he would be prepared to release 20 prisoners in Gaza to help the negotiating atmosphere. (Telegram 15861 from Tel Aviv, August 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880142–1015) Meanwhile, on August 25, the Department of State announced that President Carter’s Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations, Sol M. Linowitz, would be visiting Israel and Egypt beginning August 29 for talks with Begin and Sadat on restarting negotiations. (Telegram 226194 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, August 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800406–0410) Shortly before Linowitz’s visit, Sadat sent a final letter to Begin on August 29, explaining that beginning with his first letter, it was not his intention to “start any rhetorical or polemical exchange,” but was instead motivated by “my keen desire to explore every available avenue to ascertain whether a common ground existed for the resumption of the autonomy talks.” He reaffirmed his interest in the convening of a summit conference and “looked forward to a meaningful and fruitful exchange.” A copy of Sadat’s letter was sent to Washington in telegram 19022 from Cairo, August 29. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, Egypt: 8/80)