Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

393. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 29, 1980

SUBJECT

• Sadat and East Jerusalem (U)

At Tab I is Roy’s Cherokee cable² on his meeting last night with Sadat on the East Jerusalem problem. The upshot is that Sadat is leaning toward a suspension of the talks, but that he really wants to do what will best help the President, and wants us to coordinate our approaches. It was not a definitive conversation, however, since Sadat hadn’t really thought about it (he said). (S)

NEA feels—and I concur—that we should get back to Sadat in fairly short order, since the Israeli Cabinet decision is supposed to be made this Sunday,³ and we will need another full round of exchanges with Sadat before then. The Friday breakfast would be too late, therefore, and NEA will be working up a cable of instructions, for clearance around and ultimately by the President (probably tomorrow). Preliminary thinking is that it would say to Sadat:

—we will have a statement (Muskie?) for after the Cabinet decision (there is a draft in preparation that takes a “more in sorrow than in anger” approach, but which is straightforward on our Jerusalem position);⁴

—Lewis (and other USG officials) will not be going to East Jerusalem. However (one variant would state), we will not go public with this until the move actually takes place; and⁵

—we share Sadat’s dilemma on the continuation of the autonomy talks, but believe on balance it would be better to keep them going.⁶ (S)

At the same time, Begin has complained⁷ to Sam about press stories (in Israel, before the Gwertzman piece⁸) about Muskie’s remarks to the Cabinet. Muskie has asked that a response⁹ go to Begin about our efforts to keep this out of the press; recounting what our approaches had been to Israel on this; and indicating that the Cabinet session was private—but the Prime Minister will understand how leaks in a democracy can happen! (S)

Clearly, of course, we remain in a reactive position—though we have little choice, and USG has collectively been doing a good job lately in managing a complex effort. (The UNGA speech¹⁰—which everyone but Vanden Heuvel liked—drew praise both from Begin and from Essafi (Tunisian Permrep), who also said that the PLO “understood” that we had to make such a statement. We must be doing something right/wrong!). (S)

There is no easy way out of the reactive position. One suggestion, however: that Muskie go out to Egypt and Israel to talk over the situation, in general—not keyed to Jerusalem (since that is virtually a fait accompli, etc.), but rather to go over the whole complex of issues, autonomy, and the psychology that is operating. Muskie, after all, has not been to the Middle East, yet, and needs to do so at some point. Of course, there are downsides—including not raising expectations; delinking a visit from East Jerusalem—not an easy job; and not appearing to undercut Sol (to say nothing of Muskie’s probable disinclination to climb on a plane). To broaden the trip, Muskie might also go to Riyadh for a “get acquainted” visit.¹¹ (S)

Such a trip (perhaps next week or so) would not be the answer to our prayers; but it might help to calm the situation, and indicate that we are not just prepared to be passive as the situation gets more convoluted. (S)

FYI: Butrus Ghali has told Sol’s people that he would like Muskie to take the lead in trying to get Palestinian views into the negotiating process. That would probably not be a good thing for Muskie to attempt, at least on a first Middle East trip (the initial reaction from the Palestinians would be to demagogue in public); but this idea is consistent with the President’s approach to Hussein,¹² and Muskie might again float the need for some Palestinian “involvement,” which even Burg says could be worthwhile. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(7/80–9/80). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “These are good p[oin]ts. Try them out on Hal S.” At the bottom of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: “Hunter given c[op]y 7/31.”
2. Telegram 677 from Alexandria, July 29, is attached but not printed.
3. August 3.
4. In the right-hand margin next to this point, Brzezinski wrote: “yes.”
5. In the right-hand margin next to this point, Brzezinski wrote: “yes.”
6. In the right-hand margin next to this point, Brzezinski wrote: “yes.”
7. In a telephone call to Lewis on July 29, Begin requested confirmation of media reports that Muskie used “sharp expressions” when speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate regarding the transfer of the Israeli Prime Minister’s office to East Jerusalem, particularly the alleged use of the word “provocation” in characterizing the Israeli action. (Telegram 13785 from Tel Aviv, July 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890005–0410)
8. Reference is presumably to The New York Times reporter Bernard Gwertzman’s May 27 article in which he reported that Carter administration officials viewed Weizman’s resignation as a setback to the autonomy negotiations. Gwertzman added that senior administration officials believed that domestic politics in Israel might lead Begin to “surprise us and demonstrate more give” in the next round of talks.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “In Washington, Officials Express Optimism in Talks,” The New York Times, May 27, 1980, p. A18)
9. The response to Begin, stating that the United States has made “every effort to avoid public confrontation” and that Muskie’s briefing for the Cabinet was “confidential and not intended for publication,” was conveyed in telegram 200886 to Tel Aviv, July 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143–1093)
10. On July 24, before an Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly called to consider draft resolutions A/RES/ES–7/2 and A/RES/ES–7/3 on Palestinian rights, Vanden Heuvel delivered a statement of the U.S. position, which he confirmed in a second statement on July 29 following the passage of the two resolutions. The texts of both statements are printed in the Department of State Bulletin, September 1980, pp. 66–69.
11. Brzezinski highlighted this and the following paragraph in the right-hand margin and wrote: “[what?] would he accomplish”
12. See Documents 384 and 385.